Assigned risk.
The director of the department of insurance, after consultation with sureties authorized to issue worker’s compensation policies and guaranty contracts in this state, may put into effect a reasonable system for the equitable apportionment among such sureties of applicants for such policies or guaranty contracts who are in good faith entitled to but are unable to procure the same through ordinary methods. Such system shall be so drawn as to guarantee that such an applicant, if not in default on worker’s compensation premiums, shall, following his application to the assigned risk system and tender of required premium, be covered by worker’s compensation insurance or his coverage guaranteed. When any such system has been approved, all such carriers shall subscribe thereto and participate therein. Assignment shall be in such manner that, as far as practicable, no surety shall be assigned a larger proportion of compensation premiums under assigned policies during any calendar year than that which the total of compensation premiums written in the state by such surety during the preceding year bears to the total compensation premiums written in the state by all such sureties during the preceding calendar year. Provided however, that domestic reciprocal insurers which insure only worker’s compensation risks shall be exempt from participation in this system. Premium charges for the assigned risk plan shall not be excessive, inadequate, nor unfairly discriminatory and shall produce sufficient revenue to make the plan self-sustaining and self-supporting.
Notes of Decisions
Vawter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 318 P.3d 893 (Idaho 2014).
“In front of the Commission, “in pursuit of Idaho Code § 72-406 or § 72-322 apportionment,” UPS “has argued that the opinion of Dr.”
Bruce v. Clear Springs Trout Farm, 707 P.2d 422 (Idaho 1985).
· cites it 2× “What prompted any member to do so is anyone's guess. Even without the benefit of a legal education and without the benefit of nearly 40 years in the profession, I would have thought that a mind not functioning normally was indeed a "functional abnormality.”
Smith v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 443 P.3d 178 (Idaho 2019).
· cites it 2× “Next, Smith argues that the Commission did not consider his psychological impairment as a personal circumstance.”
Smith v. State of Idaho, Indus. Special Indem. Fund (Idaho 2019).
· cites it 2× “The Commission concluded that Smith’s psychological impairment was a temporary, treatable condition, and therefore, it could not be considered as one of the combining factors under Idaho Code section 72-332.”
— Idaho Code § 72-322(2) — 2 cases
Smith v. Indus. Special Indem. Fund, 443 P.3d 178 (Idaho 2019).
“Next, Smith argues that the Commission did not consider his psychological impairment as a personal circumstance.”
Smith v. State of Idaho, Indus. Special Indem. Fund (Idaho 2019).
“The Commission concluded that Smith’s psychological impairment was a temporary, treatable condition, and therefore, it could not be considered as one of the combining factors under Idaho Code section 72-332.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.