Idaho Code
Idaho Code

Idaho Code § 73-114 (2026)

Statutory terms defined. 

✓ current as of May 2026
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Statutory terms defined. 

(1) Unless otherwise defined for purposes of a specific statute:

(a)  Words used in these compiled laws in the present tense, include the future as well as the present;
(b)  Words used in the masculine gender, include the feminine and neuter;
(c)  The singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular;
(d)  The word "person" includes a corporation as well as a natural person;
(e)  Writing includes printing;
(f)  Oath includes affirmation or declaration, and every mode of oral statement, under oath or affirmation, is embraced by the term "testify," and every written one in the term "depose";
(g)  Signature or subscription includes mark, when the person cannot write, his name being written near it, and witnessed by a person who writes his own name as a witness.
(2)  The following words have, in the compiled laws and rules and policies of the state of Idaho, the signification attached to them in this section, unless otherwise apparent from the context:
(a)  "Boy" means a minor human male.
(b)  "Father" means a male parent.
(c)  "Female" means an individual who has, had, will have, or, but for a developmental or genetic anomaly or historical accident, would have the reproductive system that at some point produces, transports, and utilizes eggs for fertilization.
(d)  "Gender," when used to refer to males, females, or the natural differences between males and females, shall be considered a synonym for "sex" and shall not be considered a synonym for gender identity, an internal sense of gender, experienced gender, gender expression, or gender role. This definition shall not apply when the term "gender" is used in conjunction with other words or as an adjective to modify other words.
(e)  "Girl" means a minor human female.
(f)  "Intellectual disability" means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two (2) of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social or interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety. The onset of significantly subaverage general intelligence functioning and significant limitations in adaptive functioning must occur before age eighteen (18) years.
(g)  "Male" means an individual who has, had, will have, or, but for a developmental or genetic anomaly or historical accident, would have the reproductive system that at some point produces, transports, and utilizes sperm for fertilization.
(h)  "Month" means a calendar month, unless otherwise expressed.
(i)  "Mother" means a female parent.
(j)  "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidences of debt and general intangibles as defined in the uniform commercial code — secured transactions.
(k)  "Property" includes both real and personal property.
(l)  "Real property" is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and claims.
(m)  "Registered mail" includes certified mail.
(n)  "Sex" means an individual’s biological sex, either male or female.
(o)  "State," when applied to the different parts of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories; and the words "United States" may include the District of Columbia and territories.
(p)  "Will" includes codicils.
(q)  "Writ" signifies an order or precept in writing, issued in the name of the people, or of a court or judicial officer, and the word "process," a writ or summons issued in the course of judicial proceedings.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18 cases (5 in the last 5 years), 1958–2025 · leading case: Odenwalt v. Zaring, 624 P.2d 383 (Idaho 1980).
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Odenwalt v. Zaring, 624 P.2d 383 (Idaho 1980). · cites it 20× “I.C. § 73-114, which was enacted long before § 6-801 and which applies to the compiled laws of Idaho, states that "[u]nless otherwise defined for purposes of a specific statute .”
Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 591 P.2d 1078 (Idaho 1979). · cites it 8× “" The conclusion to be drawn from the examples cited above is that the term "judge" is not to be considered synonymous with the term "justice." In addition, the statute states that "the judge" may award attorney's fees.”
C. Forsman Real Est. Co. v. Hatch, 547 P.2d 1116 (Idaho 1976). · cites it 12× “" He argues cases from other jurisdictions such as California are distinguishable from the case at bar in that those states' statutory provisions refer to "the party to be charged" in connection with the signature requirement while Idaho has chosen to employ the term "owner" in…”
Hettwer v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 797 P.2d 81 (Idaho 1990). · cites it 12× “' The conclusion to be drawn from the examples cited above is that the term `judge' is not to be considered synonymous with the term `justice.”
Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 761 P.2d 1169 (Idaho 1988). · cites it 4× “a singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular____” I.C. § 73-114. 3 Because our analysis in *844 Odenwalt misperceived the “unit rule” as incongruous, because the “unit rule” is, in fact, a less harsh and more just method of applying our comparative…”
Day v. Idaho Transp. Dept, 533 P.3d 1227 (Idaho 2020). · cites it 4× “The district court’s decision explains that an inverse condemnation claim is personal property, rather than real property as defined by Idaho Code section 73-114(2). That statute defines personal property as “money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidence of debt and general…”
Patricia McKay v. Thomas G. Walker, 369 P.3d 926 (Idaho 2016). · cites it 7× “” This Court is not free to ignore the definitions of real property provided by the Idaho Legislature in Idaho Code sections 73-114 and 55-101 because we view them as anachronistic nor are we free to amend them by judicial fiat under the guise of statutory construction.”
State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971). · cites it 4× “I.C. § 73-114 defines certain terms as used in the statutes, including the term “person.”
Fulton v. Duro, 687 P.2d 1367 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). · cites it 2× “Those decisions interpreted statutes which defined real property as lands, tenements and hereditaments.”
Kimbrough v. Reed, 943 P.2d 1232 (Idaho 1997). · cites it 2× “Idaho Code § 73-114 (2) defines “real property” as “coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments, possessory rights and claims.”
Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2021). · cites it 8× “” The district court relied on Idaho Code section 73-114(1)(b) to read the AIA in a gender-neutral manner. We affirm that section 73-114(1)(b) permits reviewing courts to read the word “husband” in the AIA as the gender-neutral term “spouse.”
Fremont-Madison Irrigation Dist. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 763 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1985). · cites it 2× “Idaho Code § 73-114 (1) (1973); Idaho Code § 55-102 (1979).”
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— Idaho Code § 73-114(1)(b) — 2 cases
Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2021). “” The district court relied on Idaho Code section 73-114(1)(b) to read the AIA in a gender-neutral manner. We affirm that section 73-114(1)(b) permits reviewing courts to read the word “husband” in the AIA as the gender-neutral term “spouse.”
Gatsby v. Gatsby, 495 P.3d 996 (Idaho 2021).
— Idaho Code § 73-114(1)(d) — 1 case
Sibling Rivalry Diverse Servs., LLC v. City of Boise (D. Idaho 2024).
— Idaho Code § 73-114(2) — 2 cases
Day v. Idaho Transp. Dept, 533 P.3d 1227 (Idaho 2020). “The district court’s decision explains that an inverse condemnation claim is personal property, rather than real property as defined by Idaho Code section 73-114(2). That statute defines personal property as “money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidence of debt and general…”
Patricia McKay v. Thomas G. Walker, 369 P.3d 926 (Idaho 2016). “” This Court is not free to ignore the definitions of real property provided by the Idaho Legislature in Idaho Code sections 73-114 and 55-101 because we view them as anachronistic nor are we free to amend them by judicial fiat under the guise of statutory construction.”
— Idaho Code § 73-114(2)(e) — 2 cases
Day v. Idaho Transp. Dept, 533 P.3d 1227 (Idaho 2020). “The district court’s decision explains that an inverse condemnation claim is personal property, rather than real property as defined by Idaho Code section 73-114(2). That statute defines personal property as “money, goods, chattels, things in action, evidence of debt and general…”
Patricia McKay v. Thomas G. Walker, 369 P.3d 926 (Idaho 2016). “” This Court is not free to ignore the definitions of real property provided by the Idaho Legislature in Idaho Code sections 73-114 and 55-101 because we view them as anachronistic nor are we free to amend them by judicial fiat under the guise of statutory construction.”
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