Illinois Compiled Statutes

705 ILCS 405/2-31 (2026)

Duration of wardship and discharge of proceedings

✓ current as of May 2026
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(705 ILCS 405/2-31) (from Ch. 37, par. 802-31)
    Sec. 2-31. Duration of wardship and discharge of proceedings.
    (1) All proceedings under Article II of this Act in respect of any minor automatically terminate upon the minor attaining the age of 21 years.
    (2) Whenever the court determines, and makes written factual findings, that health, safety, and the best interests of the minor and the public no longer require the wardship of the court, the court shall order the wardship terminated and all proceedings under this Act respecting that minor finally closed and discharged. The court may at the same time continue or terminate any custodianship or guardianship theretofore ordered but the termination must be made in compliance with Section 2-28. When terminating wardship under this Section, if the minor is over 18 or if wardship is terminated in conjunction with an order partially or completely emancipating the minor in accordance with the Emancipation of Minors Act, the court shall also consider the following factors, in addition to the health, safety, and best interest of the minor and the public: (A) the minor's wishes regarding case closure; (B) the manner in which the minor will maintain independence without services from the Department; (C) the minor's engagement in services including placement offered by the Department; (D) if the minor is not engaged, the Department's efforts to engage the minor; (E) the nature of communication between the minor and the Department; (F) the minor's involvement in other State systems or services; (G) the minor's connections with family and other community support; and (H) any other factor the court deems relevant. The minor's lack of cooperation with services provided by the Department of Children and Family Services shall not by itself be considered sufficient evidence that the minor is prepared to live independently and that it is in the best interest of the minor to terminate wardship. It shall not be in the minor's best interest to terminate wardship of a minor over the age of 18 who is in the guardianship of the Department of Children and Family Services if the Department has not made reasonable efforts to ensure that the minor has documents necessary for adult living as provided in Section 35.10 of the Children and Family Services Act.
    (3) The wardship of the minor and any custodianship or guardianship respecting the minor for whom a petition was filed after July 24, 1991 (the effective date of Public Act 87-14) automatically terminates when the minor attains the age of 19 years, except as set forth in subsection (1) of this Section. The clerk of the court shall at that time record all proceedings under this Act as finally closed and discharged for that reason. The provisions of this subsection (3) become inoperative on and after July 12, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-78).
    (4) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the changes made by Public Act 101-78 apply to all cases that are pending on or after July 12, 2019 (the effective date of Public Act 101-78).
(Source: P.A. 102-558, eff. 8-20-21; 103-22, eff. 8-8-23.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 42 cases (19 in the last 5 years), 1995–2026 · leading case: In Re Aaron R., 902 N.E.2d 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In Re Aaron R., 902 N.E.2d 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). · cites it 6× “705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2006). DCFS also argued the evidence heard on the State's supplemental petition revealed a family still needing supervision and assistance and DCFS service plans filed with the court from April 30, 2007, to October 31, 2007, found unsatisfactory…”
In Re Mm, 786 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 3× “The order appealed from in this case actually achieves a permanency goal by appointing the foster parents as guardians.”
People v. Mandi H., 830 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 2005). “" 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2002). The appellate court held that the trial court's oral statements sufficiently stated the basis for the court's finding, and remanding the matter to reiterate the findings in a written order was, therefore, unnecessary.”
In Re Jaron Z., 810 N.E.2d 108 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “However, the law is clear that the court may modify a dispositional order at any time, since proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act do not terminate unless the child "ages out" of the juvenile system or the trial court issues an order expressly stating that the case is closed…”
In Interest of MK, 649 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). · cites it 2× “A lack of reasonable progress is a ground for termination of parental rights (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1992)), but is not involved with termination of proceedings under the Act (see 705 ILCS 405/2-31 (West Supp. 1993)). The appropriate standard is the child's best…”
In Re Alexis H., 783 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). · cites it 2× “It provides that all proceedings under the Act with respect to any minor for whom a petition was filed automatically terminate upon the minor's attaining the age of 19 years or whenever the court determines and makes written factual findings that the health, safety, and best…”
In re Aaron L., 2013 IL App (1st) 122808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). · cites it 3× “The minor’s lack of cooperation with services provided by the [DCFS] shall not by itself be considered sufficient evidence that the minor is prepared to live independently and that it is in the best interest of the minor to terminate wardship.”
People v. Sommer L. (In Re M.G.), 2018 IL App (3d) 170591 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 2× “705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2016); see In re M.”
In re D.V., 2024 IL App (4th) 240751 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). · cites it 2× “) 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2022). Respondent argues the April 18, 2024, order was flawed because the trial court did not use the word “public” in its oral ruling or written order.”
In re Rico L., 2012 IL App (1st) 113028 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “) 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2010). Our legislature specifically chose not to use the word “change,” which it had used previously in the Act–in section 2-28, for example.”
In re Custody of H.J., 2020 IL App (4th) 190818-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 3× “These sections provide that all proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act with respect to any minor where a petition was filed automatically terminates when the minor turns 21 or whenever the trial court determines -5- and makes written factual findings that the “health, safety,…”
In Re Vm, 816 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “contends that the trial court abused its discretion in setting a private *781 guardianship goal and ruling in favor of DCFS' motion to transfer guardianship to the foster parents and close the case, which was against the manifest weight of the evidence and in violation of…”
— 705 ILCS 405/2-31(1) — 6 cases
In Re Alexis H., 783 N.E.2d 158 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “It provides that all proceedings under the Act with respect to any minor for whom a petition was filed automatically terminate upon the minor's attaining the age of 19 years or whenever the court determines and makes written factual findings that the health, safety, and best…”
In re Aaron L., 2013 IL App (1st) 122808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “The minor’s lack of cooperation with services provided by the [DCFS] shall not by itself be considered sufficient evidence that the minor is prepared to live independently and that it is in the best interest of the minor to terminate wardship.”
In re K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 231166 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
In re Custody of H.J., 2020 IL App (4th) 190818-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “These sections provide that all proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act with respect to any minor where a petition was filed automatically terminates when the minor turns 21 or whenever the trial court determines -5- and makes written factual findings that the “health, safety,…”
In Interest of CW, 684 N.E.2d 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
— 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) — 32 cases
In Re Aaron R., 902 N.E.2d 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2006). DCFS also argued the evidence heard on the State's supplemental petition revealed a family still needing supervision and assistance and DCFS service plans filed with the court from April 30, 2007, to October 31, 2007, found unsatisfactory…”
In Re Mm, 786 N.E.2d 654 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “The order appealed from in this case actually achieves a permanency goal by appointing the foster parents as guardians.”
People v. Mandi H., 830 N.E.2d 498 (Ill. 2005). “" 705 ILCS 405/2-31(2) (West 2002). The appellate court held that the trial court's oral statements sufficiently stated the basis for the court's finding, and remanding the matter to reiterate the findings in a written order was, therefore, unnecessary.”
In Interest of MK, 649 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). “A lack of reasonable progress is a ground for termination of parental rights (see 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1992)), but is not involved with termination of proceedings under the Act (see 705 ILCS 405/2-31 (West Supp. 1993)). The appropriate standard is the child's best…”
In re Aaron L., 2013 IL App (1st) 122808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “The minor’s lack of cooperation with services provided by the [DCFS] shall not by itself be considered sufficient evidence that the minor is prepared to live independently and that it is in the best interest of the minor to terminate wardship.”
— 705 ILCS 405/2-31(a) — 1 case
In re M.F.Y., 2021 IL App (1st) 210825-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
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