ILCS » Chapter 720 · Act 5
Illinois Compiled Statutes

720 ILCS 5/3-4 (2026)

Effect of former prosecution

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section IL-ILGAilga.gov JustiaChapter on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
(720 ILCS 5/3-4) (from Ch. 38, par. 3-4)
    Sec. 3-4. Effect of former prosecution.
    (a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts, if that former prosecution:
        (1) resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal
    
or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction;
        (2) was terminated by a final order or judgment, even
    
if entered before trial, that required a determination inconsistent with any fact or legal proposition necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
        (3) was terminated improperly after the jury was
    
impaneled and sworn or, in a trial before a court without a jury, after the first witness was sworn but before findings were rendered by the trier of facts, or after a plea of guilty was accepted by the court.
    A conviction of an included offense, other than through a plea of guilty, is an acquittal of the offense charged.
    (b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if that former prosecution:
        (1) resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal,
    
and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted on the former prosecution; or was for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged on the former prosecution, as provided in Section 3-3 of this Code (unless the court ordered a separate trial of that charge); or was for an offense that involves the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required on the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began;
        (2) was terminated by a final order or judgment, even
    
if entered before trial, that required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the subsequent prosecution; or
        (3) was terminated improperly under the circumstances
    
stated in subsection (a), and the subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have been convicted if the former prosecution had not been terminated improperly.
    (c) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted in a District Court of the United States or in a sister state for an offense that is within the concurrent jurisdiction of this State, if that former prosecution:
        (1) resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal,
    
and the subsequent prosecution is for the same conduct, unless each prosecution requires proof of a fact not required in the other prosecution, or the offense was not consummated when the former trial began; or
        (2) was terminated by a final order or judgment, even
    
if entered before trial, that required a determination inconsistent with any fact necessary to a conviction in the prosecution in this State.
    (d) A prosecution is not barred within the meaning of this Section 3-4, however, if the former prosecution:
        (1) was before a court that lacked jurisdiction over
    
the defendant or the offense; or
        (2) was procured by the defendant without the
    
knowledge of the proper prosecuting officer, and with the purpose of avoiding the sentence that otherwise might be imposed; or if subsequent proceedings resulted in the invalidation, setting aside, reversal, or vacating of the conviction, unless the defendant was thereby adjudged not guilty.
(Source: P.A. 96-710, eff. 1-1-10.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 80 cases (14 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165 (Ill. 2020).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165 (Ill. 2020). · cites it 7× “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (West 2014). Finally, because the court entered judgment only on defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, which was vacated by the appellate court, the State asks this court to remand to the trial court for sentencing on defendant’s domestic battery…”
People v. Daniels, 718 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 1999). · cites it 2× “" 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 1996). In the instant appeal, defendant contends that the State abandoned the felony-murder theory after jeopardy attached in the first trial.”
People v. Delhaye, 2021 IL App (2d) 190271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). · cites it 2× “¶ 57 In turn, section 3-4(b)(1) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 2016)) “addresses the consequences of failing to comply with compulsory joinder under section 3-3.”
People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 134049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). · cites it 4× “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 2010). The defendant's motion argued that the murder prosecution defied logic because "one must try to murder someone before they in fact murder them.”
Robert J. Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001). “1993) (holding that the absence of one of the four requirements under 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(l), (1) federal or sister state prosecution must be former prosecution, (2) former prosecution must have resulted in acquittal or conviction, (3) both prosecutions must be for same conduct,…”
People v. Wilson, 2020 IL App (1st) 162430 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “¶ 61 Under the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution’s fifth amendment, no person may “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.”
People v. Knaff, 752 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. 2001). “] * * * (b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if such former prosecution: (1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for an…”
People v. Henry, 789 N.E.2d 274 (Ill. 2003). “NOTES [1] The statutory form of this rule is set forth in section 3-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 1996)), which provides that "(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts,…”
People v. Dunnavan, 886 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 2× “1, § 10) and statutory dimension (720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(1) (West 2004)). The prohibition against double jeopardy is designed to protect a citizen against three distinct abuses: "`"(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same…”
People v. Gilberto G.-P., 873 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 2× “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(3) (West 2002). However, section 3-4(d)(1) of the Code provides that a prosecution is not barred within the meaning of section 3-4 if the former prosecution "[w]as before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.”
People v. Gooden, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2000). “720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 1996). In enacting the compulsory-joinder provision, our legislature attempted to alleviate the fundamental unfairness that ensues when the State holds repeated trials for *1254 the same illegal conduct, a practice which had "troubled the conscience of…”
People v. Page, 2022 IL App (4th) 210374 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 2020). “The prohibition against double jeopardy is designed to prevent the State from engaging in more than one attempt to convict an individual, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, continuing anxiety and insecurity, and increasing the…”
Show all 80 citing cases →
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) — 22 cases
People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165 (Ill. 2020). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (West 2014). Finally, because the court entered judgment only on defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, which was vacated by the appellate court, the State asks this court to remand to the trial court for sentencing on defendant’s domestic battery…”
People v. Wilson, 2020 IL App (1st) 162430 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “¶ 61 Under the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution’s fifth amendment, no person may “be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S.”
People v. Daniels, 718 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 1999). “" 720 ILCS 5/3-4 (West 1996). In the instant appeal, defendant contends that the State abandoned the felony-murder theory after jeopardy attached in the first trial.”
People v. Sanders, 2021 IL App (5th) 180339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
People v. Kotlarchik, 2022 IL App (2d) 200358 (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) — 8 cases
People v. Henry, 789 N.E.2d 274 (Ill. 2003). “NOTES [1] The statutory form of this rule is set forth in section 3-4(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 1996)), which provides that "(a) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same offense, based upon the same facts,…”
People v. Williams, 721 N.E.2d 524 (Ill. 1999).
People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 134049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 2010). The defendant's motion argued that the murder prosecution defied logic because "one must try to murder someone before they in fact murder them.”
People v. Taylor, 2013 IL App (2d) 110577 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 134049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(2) — 1 case
People v. Motzko, 2019 IL App (3d) 180184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(3) — 22 cases
People v. Gaines, 2020 IL 125165 (Ill. 2020). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a) (West 2014). Finally, because the court entered judgment only on defendant’s criminal trespass conviction, which was vacated by the appellate court, the State asks this court to remand to the trial court for sentencing on defendant’s domestic battery…”
People v. Moon, 2020 IL App (1st) 170675 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
People v. Palen, 2016 IL App (4th) 140228 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
People v. Largent, 786 N.E.2d 1102 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
People v. Hill, 819 N.E.2d 1285 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(l) — 1 case
People v. Knaff, 752 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. 2001). “] * * * (b) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for a different offense, or for the same offense based upon different facts, if such former prosecution: (1) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal, and the subsequent prosecution is for an…”
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b) — 2 cases
People v. Schram (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
People v. Henry (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) — 11 cases
People v. Delhaye, 2021 IL App (2d) 190271 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021). “¶ 57 In turn, section 3-4(b)(1) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 2016)) “addresses the consequences of failing to comply with compulsory joinder under section 3-3.”
People v. Gooden, 725 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2000). “720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(1) (West 1996). In enacting the compulsory-joinder provision, our legislature attempted to alleviate the fundamental unfairness that ensues when the State holds repeated trials for *1254 the same illegal conduct, a practice which had "troubled the conscience of…”
People v. Brown, 2015 IL App (1st) 134049 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(1) (West 2010). The defendant's motion argued that the murder prosecution defied logic because "one must try to murder someone before they in fact murder them.”
People v. Davis, 869 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
People v. Hasselbring, 2014 IL App (4th) 131128 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(b)(2) — 2 cases
People v. Wharton, 779 N.E.2d 346 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
People v. Collins (Ill. 2026).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c) — 2 cases
People v. Jimenez, 2020 IL App (1st) 182164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
People v. Brown, 2020 IL App (5th) 190248-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(1) — 4 cases
People v. Dunnavan, 886 N.E.2d 393 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “1, § 10) and statutory dimension (720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(1) (West 2004)). The prohibition against double jeopardy is designed to protect a citizen against three distinct abuses: "`"(1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same…”
People v. Jimenez, 2020 IL App (1st) 182164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
People v. Jimenez, 2020 IL App (1st) 182164 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
People v. Brown, 2020 IL App (5th) 190248-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(l) — 1 case
Robert J. Tezak v. United States, 256 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2001). “1993) (holding that the absence of one of the four requirements under 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)(l), (1) federal or sister state prosecution must be former prosecution, (2) former prosecution must have resulted in acquittal or conviction, (3) both prosecutions must be for same conduct,…”
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(d) — 3 cases
People v. Hull, 2020 IL App (3d) 190544 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
People v. Hull, 2020 IL App (3d) 190544 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
People v. Collins (Ill. 2026).
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(d)(1) — 1 case
People v. Gilberto G.-P., 873 N.E.2d 534 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). “See 720 ILCS 5/3-4(a)(3) (West 2002). However, section 3-4(d)(1) of the Code provides that a prosecution is not barred within the meaning of section 3-4 if the former prosecution "[w]as before a court which lacked jurisdiction over the defendant or the offense.”
— 720 ILCS 5/3-4(d)(2) — 3 cases
People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 160025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 162315 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
People v. Marshall, 2021 IL App (1st) 210096-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.