Illinois Compiled Statutes
725 ILCS 205/5 (2026)
The respondent in any proceedings under this Act shall have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel
✓ current as of May 2026
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(725 ILCS 205/5)
(from Ch. 38, par. 105-5)
Sec. 5.
The respondent in any proceedings under this Act shall have the
right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel. The cost of representation by counsel for an indigent respondent shall be paid by the county in which the proceeding is brought. At the
hearing on the petition it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the
commission by the respondent of any number of crimes together with whatever
punishments, if any, were inflicted.
(Source: P.A. 98-88, eff. 7-15-13.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 47
cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1996–2023 · leading case: People v. Trainor, 752 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. 2001).
People v. Trainor, 752 N.E.2d 1055 (Ill. 2001). “Section 5 of the Act mandates that the defendant is accorded certain rights: “The respondent in any proceedings under this Act shall have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel. At the hearing on the petition it shall be competent to introduce…”
In Re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 2002). “Respondent further observed that, under the version of section 5(e) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 205/5(e) (West 1998)) in effect at the time the State filed the petition at bar, a “[sjexually violent offense” for purposes of the Act was defined as criminal sexual assault (720…”
People v. Lawton, 818 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. 2004). “725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2002). A defendant's right to counsel in proceedings under the Act not only is conferred by the statute itself, it is required by the United States Constitution.”
People v. Burns, 809 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. 2004). “01 (West 2000)), although a defendant is entitled to counsel and may demand a jury trial on the State’s petition (725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2000)). In addition, the State must prove sexual dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt.”
People v. Craig, 934 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). “725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2006). A respondent also has the right to a speedy trial and a right to challenge the State’s evidence and to confront and cross-examine the witnesses testifying against him.”
People v. Masterson, 798 N.E.2d 735 (Ill. 2003). “Thus, commitment under the SDPA requires that the State convince the trier of fact — whether judge or jury (725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998)) — beyond a reasonable doubt (725 ILCS 205/3.”
People v. Hancock, 771 N.E.2d 459 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “” 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2000). The trial court did not err by allowing the State to introduce evidence of respondent’s prior crimes.”
People v. Grant, 2016 IL 119162 (Ill. 2016). “725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2012). The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the respondent is a sexually dangerous person in need of confinement.”
People v. Downs, 864 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). “Downs, who had been confined under the Act and was indigent, applied to the circuit court of Perry County for a discharge, and in accordance with section 5 of the Act (725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2004)), an attorney was appointed by that court to represent him.”
In re Commitment of Hooker, 2012 IL App (2d) 101007 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “38, ¶ 105-5) (now 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2008)). Section 5 contained the following provision on evidence of past crimes, which was almost identical in wording to section 35(b) of the SVP Act: “At the hearing on the petition it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the…”
People v. Trainor, 728 N.E.2d 74 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998). This includes the right to demand a jury trial for hearings on applications showing recovery under the Act.”
In re Det. of Hunter, 2013 IL App (4th) 120299 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). “” 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 2008). This information, respondent argues, is hearsay and should not be allowed to be used in the jury’s determination of whether he is a sexually dangerous person.”
— 725 ILCS 205/5(e) — 2 cases
In Re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 2002). “Respondent further observed that, under the version of section 5(e) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 205/5(e) (West 1998)) in effect at the time the State filed the petition at bar, a “[sjexually violent offense” for purposes of the Act was defined as criminal sexual assault (720…”
In re Det. of Lieberman (Ill. 2002).
— 725 ILCS 205/5(e)(1) — 1 case
In re Det. of Lieberman (Ill. 2002).
— 725 ILCS 205/5(e)(l) — 1 case
In Re Det. of Lieberman, 776 N.E.2d 218 (Ill. 2002). “Respondent further observed that, under the version of section 5(e) of the Commitment Act (725 ILCS 205/5(e) (West 1998)) in effect at the time the State filed the petition at bar, a “[sjexually violent offense” for purposes of the Act was defined as criminal sexual assault (720…”
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