ILCS » Chapter 725 · Act 207

725 ILCS 207/5

Definitions

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(725 ILCS 207/5)
    Sec. 5. Definitions. As used in this Act, the term:
    (a) "Department" means the Department of Human Services.
    (b) "Mental disorder" means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence.
    (c) "Secretary" means the Secretary of Human Services.
    (d) "Sexually motivated" means that one of the purposes for an act is for the actor's sexual arousal or gratification.
    (e) "Sexually violent offense" means any of the following:
        (1) Any crime specified in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30,
    
11-1.40, 11-1.60, 11-6, 11-20.1, 11-20.1B, 11-20.3, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, or 12-16 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012; or
        (1.5) Any former law of this State specified in
    
Section 11-1 (rape), 11-3 (deviate sexual assault), 11-4 (indecent liberties with a child) or 11-4.1 (aggravated indecent liberties with a child) of the Criminal Code of 1961; or
        (2) First degree murder, if it is determined by the
    
agency with jurisdiction to have been sexually motivated; or
        (3) Any solicitation, conspiracy or attempt to commit
    
a crime under paragraph (e)(1) or (e)(2) of this Section.
    (f) "Sexually violent person" means a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense, has been adjudicated delinquent for a sexually violent offense, or has been found not guilty of a sexually violent offense by reason of insanity and who is dangerous because he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence.
(Source: P.A. 96-292, eff. 1-1-10; 96-328, eff. 8-11-09; 96-1551, eff. 7-1-11; 97-1150, eff. 1-25-13.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 232 cases (50 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case: In Re Detention of Samuelson
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In Re Detention of Samuelson (2000) ill · cites it 18× “725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill.”
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct · cites it 13× “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
In Re Detention of Lieberman (2002) ill · cites it 5× “As a final matter, the appellate court ruled that the legislature’s subsequent amendment to section 5(e) of the Act adding the offense of rape to the definition of a “sexually violent offense” (725 ILCS 207/5(e)(1.5) (West 2000)) supported its conclusion that the Act as…”
People v. Hughes (2013) ill · cites it 3× “725 ILCS 207/5 (West 2006) (listing the enumerated offenses).”
People v. Masterson (2003) ill · cites it 4× “) 725 ILCS 207/5(0 (West 2000). In Hendricks and Crane, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a Kansas statute which was very similar to Illinois’ SVPA.”
People v. Masterson (2011) ill · cites it 4× “” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2000). ¶ 31 The SVPA is limited only to those criminal offenses deemed “sexually violent” by the General Assembly.”
In re Detention of Stanbridge (2012) ill · cites it 3× “Following a trial on the State’s petition, in October 2007, a jury found Stanbridge to be a sexually violent person as defined by section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2004)). Thereafter, in February 2008, the trial court ordered him committed to a secure facility for…”
In Re Detention of Varner (2001) ill · cites it 5× “” The jury was further instructed that criminal sexual assault constitutes a “sexually violent offense,” and it was given the definition of “[mjental disorder” set forth in section 5(b) of the Act, namely, “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional…”
People v. Swanson (2002) illappct · cites it 4× “See 725 ILCS 207/5(b), (f) (West 1998). In the second motion, respondent argued that the State’s petition was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of April 7, 1999, which was the date that respondent was first released on parole.”
In re Commitment of Montanez (2021) illappct · cites it 3× “” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2016). When reviewing the court’s determination that respondent is an SVP, we ask whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Re Detention of Lieberman (2007) illappct · cites it 3× “This court has noted that “the Act contains a volitional component in (1) its definition of ‘mental disorder’ as ‘a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence’ (725 ILCS 207/5(b)…”
In Re Detention of Powell (2005) ill · cites it 2× “This petition alleged that respondent was a “sexually violent person” within the meaning of section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000)) and, therefore, subject to commitment to the custody of the Department of Human Services “until such time [as] he is no longer a…”
Show all 232 citing cases →
— 725 ILCS 207/5(1) — 8 cases
In Re Detention of Samuelson (2000) ill “725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill.”
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
People v. Tittlebach (2001) illappct
In Re Detention of Varner (2003) ill
In Re Detention of Hardin (2009) illappct
— 725 ILCS 207/5(a) — 1 case
Eugene Brown v. Larry Phillips (2015) ca7
— 725 ILCS 207/5(b) — 81 cases
In Re Detention of Samuelson (2000) ill “725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill.”
In re The Detention of White (2016) illappct
People v. Swanson (2002) illappct “See 725 ILCS 207/5(b), (f) (West 1998). In the second motion, respondent argued that the State’s petition was untimely because it was not filed within 30 days of April 7, 1999, which was the date that respondent was first released on parole.”
In re Commitment of Montanez (2021) illappct “” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2016). When reviewing the court’s determination that respondent is an SVP, we ask whether, “viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
In Re Detention of Lieberman (2007) illappct “This court has noted that “the Act contains a volitional component in (1) its definition of ‘mental disorder’ as ‘a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual violence’ (725 ILCS 207/5(b)…”
— 725 ILCS 207/5(d) — 1 case
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
— 725 ILCS 207/5(e) — 24 cases
In Re Detention of Lieberman (2002) ill “As a final matter, the appellate court ruled that the legislature’s subsequent amendment to section 5(e) of the Act adding the offense of rape to the definition of a “sexually violent offense” (725 ILCS 207/5(e)(1.5) (West 2000)) supported its conclusion that the Act as…”
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
In Re Detention of Samuelson (2000) ill “725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill.”
People v. Botruff (2004) ill
In Re Detention of Bolton (2003) illappct
— 725 ILCS 207/5(e)(1) — 10 cases
People v. Masterson (2011) ill “” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2000). ¶ 31 The SVPA is limited only to those criminal offenses deemed “sexually violent” by the General Assembly.”
In re Commitment of Moore (2023) illappct
In re the Committment of Kelley (2012) illappct
In Re Detention of Diestelhorst (1999) illappct
People v. Masterson (2011) ill
— 725 ILCS 207/5(e)(2) — 4 cases
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
In Re Detention of Diestelhorst (1999) illappct
In re Commitment of Bumpers (2024) illappct
In re Detention of Diestelhorst (1999) illappct
— 725 ILCS 207/5(e)(3) — 4 cases
People v. Masterson (2011) ill “” 725 ILCS 207/5(b) (West 2000). ¶ 31 The SVPA is limited only to those criminal offenses deemed “sexually violent” by the General Assembly.”
In Re Detention of Diestelhorst (1999) illappct
People v. Masterson (2011) ill
In re Detention of Diestelhorst (1999) illappct
— 725 ILCS 207/5(e)(l) — 2 cases
In Re Detention of Welsh (2009) illappct “) 725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 2004). Section 5(e) of the Act defines a “sexually violent offense” as: “(1) Any crime specified in Section 11 — 6, 12 — 13, 12 — 14, 12— 14.”
In Re Detention of Kortte (2000) illappct
— 725 ILCS 207/5(f) — 186 cases
In Re Detention of Samuelson (2000) ill “725 ILCS 207/5(1) (West 1998). Defendant argues that the Act violates the Illinois Constitution’s provision that a person shall not “be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense” (Ill.”
People v. Hughes (2013) ill “725 ILCS 207/5 (West 2006) (listing the enumerated offenses).”
In Re Detention of Lieberman (2002) ill “As a final matter, the appellate court ruled that the legislature’s subsequent amendment to section 5(e) of the Act adding the offense of rape to the definition of a “sexually violent offense” (725 ILCS 207/5(e)(1.5) (West 2000)) supported its conclusion that the Act as…”
In re Detention of Stanbridge (2012) ill “Following a trial on the State’s petition, in October 2007, a jury found Stanbridge to be a sexually violent person as defined by section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2004)). Thereafter, in February 2008, the trial court ordered him committed to a secure facility for…”
In Re Detention of Powell (2005) ill “This petition alleged that respondent was a “sexually violent person” within the meaning of section 5(f) of the Act (725 ILCS 207/5(f) (West 2000)) and, therefore, subject to commitment to the custody of the Department of Human Services “until such time [as] he is no longer a…”
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