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Illinois Compiled Statutes

735 ILCS 5/12-1001 (2026)

Personal property exempt

✓ current as of May 2026
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(735 ILCS 5/12-1001) (from Ch. 110, par. 12-1001)
    Sec. 12-1001. Personal property exempt. The following personal property, owned by the debtor, is exempt from judgment, attachment, or distress for rent:
        (a) All household goods, including but not limited
    
to, the debtor's and the debtor's dependents' food, eating and cooking utensils, bedding, furniture, books, refrigerator, stove, microwave oven, kitchen appliances, necessary provisions, washing machine, clothes dryer, vacuum cleaner, yard equipment and household equipment and tools, all personal possessions, including, but not limited to, clothing, pets, personal health aids, medications, computers or similar electronic devices and telephones, except that a creditor may obtain court permission to levy on any item of furniture, appliance, electronic device, yard equipment, precious item, utensils, set of utensils, or any other item exempt under this subsection that has a resale value of more than $5,000 unless that item is exempt under another provision of this Section. The debtor may exempt one piece of jewelry up to a value of $5,000;
        (b) The debtor's equity interest, not to exceed
    
$4,000 in value, of which $1,000 is an automatic exemption pursuant to Section 12-1001.1, in any other property;
        (c) The debtor's interest, not to exceed $3,600 in
    
value, in any one motor vehicle;
        (d) The debtor's equity interest, not to exceed
    
$2,250 in value, in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor;
        (e) Professionally prescribed health aids for the
    
debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
        (f) All proceeds payable because of the death of the
    
insured and the aggregate net cash value of any or all life insurance and endowment policies and annuity contracts payable to a wife or husband of the insured, or to a child, parent, or other person dependent upon the insured, or to a revocable or irrevocable trust which names the wife or husband of the insured or which names a child, parent, or other person dependent upon the insured as the primary beneficiary of the trust, whether the power to change the beneficiary is reserved to the insured or not and whether the insured or the insured's estate is a contingent beneficiary or not;
        (g) The debtor's right to receive:
            (1) a social security benefit, unemployment
        
compensation, or public assistance benefit;
            (2) a veteran's benefit;
            (3) a disability, illness, or unemployment
        
benefit; and
            (4) alimony, support, or separate maintenance, to
        
the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor.
        (h) The debtor's right to receive, or property that
    
is traceable to:
            (1) an award under a crime victim's reparation
        
law;
            (2) a payment on account of the wrongful death of
        
an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor;
            (3) a payment under a life insurance contract
        
that insured the life of an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent, to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
            (4) a payment, not to exceed $22,500 in value, on
        
account of personal bodily injury of the debtor or an individual of whom the debtor was a dependent; and
            (5) any restitution payments made to persons
        
pursuant to the federal Civil Liberties Act of 1988 and the Aleutian and Pribilof Island Restitution Act, P.L. 100-383.
        For purposes of this subsection (h), a debtor's right
    
to receive an award or payment shall be exempt for a maximum of 2 years after the debtor's right to receive the award or payment accrues; property traceable to an award or payment shall be exempt for a maximum of 5 years after the award or payment accrues; and an award or payment and property traceable to an award or payment shall be exempt only to the extent of the amount of the award or payment, without interest or appreciation from the date of the award or payment.
        (i) The debtor's right to receive an award under Part
    
20 of Article II of this Code relating to crime victims' awards.
        (j) Moneys held in an account invested in the
    
Illinois College Savings Pool of which the debtor is a participant or donor and funds invested in an ABLE Account as defined by Section 529 of the Internal Revenue Code, except the following non-exempt contributions:
            (1) any contribution to such account by the
        
debtor as participant or donor that is made with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the debtor;
            (2) any contributions to such account by the
        
debtor as participant during the 365 day period prior to the date of filing of the debtor's petition for bankruptcy that, in the aggregate during such period, exceed the amount of the annual gift tax exclusion under Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect at the time of contribution; or
            (3) any contributions to such account by the
        
debtor as participant during the period commencing 730 days prior to and ending 366 days prior to the date of filing of the debtor's petition for bankruptcy that, in the aggregate during such period, exceed the amount of the annual gift tax exclusion under Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, in effect at the time of contribution.
        For purposes of this subsection (j), "account"
    
includes all accounts for a particular designated beneficiary, of which the debtor is a participant or donor.
    Money due the debtor from the sale of any personal property that was exempt from judgment, attachment, or distress for rent at the time of the sale is exempt from attachment and garnishment to the same extent that the property would be exempt had the same not been sold by the debtor.
    If a debtor owns property exempt under this Section and he or she purchased that property with the intent of converting nonexempt property into exempt property or in fraud of his or her creditors, that property shall not be exempt from judgment, attachment, or distress for rent. Property acquired within 6 months of the filing of the petition for bankruptcy shall be presumed to have been acquired in contemplation of bankruptcy.
    The personal property exemptions set forth in this Section shall apply only to individuals and only to personal property that is used for personal rather than business purposes. The personal property exemptions set forth in this Section shall not apply to or be allowed against any money, salary, or wages due or to become due to the debtor that are required to be withheld in a wage deduction proceeding under Part 8 of this Article XII.
(Source: P.A. 104-120, eff. 1-1-26.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 121 cases (7 in the last 5 years), 1993–2024 · leading case: Anna Robinson v. Cynthia Hagan, 811 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016).
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Anna Robinson v. Cynthia Hagan, 811 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016). · cites it 10× “The district court determined that, because the legislature did not place a monetary limitation on the items exempted in 735 ILCS 5/12-1001 (a), a bible is exempt without regard to its value.”
In Re Lesniak, 208 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). · cites it 10× “100% Exempt UNKNOWN 401K # 12 Motorola Stock $500 # 23 First Natl — 1994 Blazer $7,500 1992 GMC Jimmy (over 100,000 miles, body $4,000 damage) # 33 Sears — Snow blower, tires $200 The Debtors also claimed the following exemptions in Schedule C: Value of Description of Property…”
Kauffman v. Wrenn, 2015 IL App (2d) 150285 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). · cites it 4× “95 of the funds belonged to the judgment debtor, and (2) the remaining funds were disability funds that were exempt from judgment under section 12-1001(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g) (West 2014)). ¶2 I.”
In Re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). · cites it 10× “(Husband & Wife) (401K(H)) Proceeds from insurance policy 735 ILCS 5/12-1001© 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% A debtor claims exemptions by designating property as exempt on Schedule C of the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities.”
In Re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). · cites it 3× “The Trustee further asserts that 735 ILCS 5/12-1006 exempts income traceable to a pension plan only to the extent that it is necessary for the support of the Debtor and his family; and that, under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001 the social security income of the Debtor and his wife is only…”
In Re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998). · cites it 5× “On February 23, 1998, she amended her Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt to include her earned income credit as an asset of the estate and to claim an exemption for the entire amount pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12 — 1001 (b) and 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(l).”
In re Melching, 589 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018). · cites it 8× “For example, paragraph (d) allows an exemption for "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value , in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”
In re Franklin, 506 B.R. 765 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014). · cites it 3× “The TRUSTEE’S objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in his checking account will be allowed as to all amounts in excess of the wildcard exemption under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b). Her objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in the checking account under 735 ILCS 5/12-704…”
In Re Hellen, 329 B.R. 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). · cites it 4× “Specifically, the Court holds that only those adaptations made to the van and bicycle to meet Scott Hellen’s special needs are exempt as “professionally prescribed health aids” pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(e). The Court finds that the special modifications made to the van…”
In the Matter of Daniel J. YONIKUS & Carolyn S. Yonikus, Debtors. Appeal of Daniel J. YONIKUS, 996 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1993). “110 ¶ 12-1001, was reclassified and numbered 735 ILCS 5/12-1001 on January 1, 1993, pursuant to Public Act 87-1005.”
In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). · cites it 3× “In Amended Schedule C of Property Claimed as Exempt the Debtor exempted $3000 of the 2013 federal tax refund pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(1), (2) and (3). He exempted $1,700 of the refund pursuant to the wild-card exemption allowed by 735 ILCS 5/12— 1001(b) which provides…”
In Re Bateman, 157 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). · cites it 4× “The debtor was allowed to claim the $1,200 exemption for his equity interest in an auto under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (which specifically exempts debtors’ interests in autos), and then claim an additional $2,000 exemption for his additional equity interest in that same car under…”
Show all 121 citing cases →
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(a) — 8 cases
Anna Robinson v. Cynthia Hagan, 811 F.3d 267 (7th Cir. 2016). “The district court determined that, because the legislature did not place a monetary limitation on the items exempted in 735 ILCS 5/12-1001 (a), a bible is exempt without regard to its value.”
In re Melching, 589 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018). “For example, paragraph (d) allows an exemption for "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value , in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”
In re Robinson, 498 B.R. 207 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2013).
Robinson v. Hagan, 527 B.R. 314 (S.D. Ill. 2014).
Whitney J. Harding (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2023).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b) — 45 cases
In Re Lesniak, 208 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “100% Exempt UNKNOWN 401K # 12 Motorola Stock $500 # 23 First Natl — 1994 Blazer $7,500 1992 GMC Jimmy (over 100,000 miles, body $4,000 damage) # 33 Sears — Snow blower, tires $200 The Debtors also claimed the following exemptions in Schedule C: Value of Description of Property…”
In Re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “(Husband & Wife) (401K(H)) Proceeds from insurance policy 735 ILCS 5/12-1001© 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% A debtor claims exemptions by designating property as exempt on Schedule C of the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities.”
In re Franklin, 506 B.R. 765 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014). “The TRUSTEE’S objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in his checking account will be allowed as to all amounts in excess of the wildcard exemption under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b). Her objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in the checking account under 735 ILCS 5/12-704…”
In Re Meyers, 616 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2010).
In Re: Mary L. Polis, Debtor-Appellant Mary L. Polis, Plaintiff-Appellant,. v. Getaways, Inc., 217 F.3d 899 (7th Cir. 2000).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b)(l) — 1 case
In Re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998). “On February 23, 1998, she amended her Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt to include her earned income credit as an asset of the estate and to claim an exemption for the entire amount pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12 — 1001 (b) and 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(l).”
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) — 11 cases
In Re Lesniak, 208 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “100% Exempt UNKNOWN 401K # 12 Motorola Stock $500 # 23 First Natl — 1994 Blazer $7,500 1992 GMC Jimmy (over 100,000 miles, body $4,000 damage) # 33 Sears — Snow blower, tires $200 The Debtors also claimed the following exemptions in Schedule C: Value of Description of Property…”
In Re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “(Husband & Wife) (401K(H)) Proceeds from insurance policy 735 ILCS 5/12-1001© 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% A debtor claims exemptions by designating property as exempt on Schedule C of the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities.”
In Re Ulrich, 203 B.R. 691 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997).
In Re Bateman, 157 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). “The debtor was allowed to claim the $1,200 exemption for his equity interest in an auto under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (which specifically exempts debtors’ interests in autos), and then claim an additional $2,000 exemption for his additional equity interest in that same car under…”
In re Stone, 504 B.R. 908 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(d) — 5 cases
In re Melching, 589 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018). “For example, paragraph (d) allows an exemption for "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value , in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”
In Re Zais, 202 B.R. 263 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
In Re King, 153 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
In Re Hively, 358 B.R. 752 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2007).
In Re Gentry, 297 B.R. 553 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2003).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(e) — 3 cases
In Re Hellen, 329 B.R. 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2005). “Specifically, the Court holds that only those adaptations made to the van and bicycle to meet Scott Hellen’s special needs are exempt as “professionally prescribed health aids” pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(e). The Court finds that the special modifications made to the van…”
In Re Lesniak, 208 B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “100% Exempt UNKNOWN 401K # 12 Motorola Stock $500 # 23 First Natl — 1994 Blazer $7,500 1992 GMC Jimmy (over 100,000 miles, body $4,000 damage) # 33 Sears — Snow blower, tires $200 The Debtors also claimed the following exemptions in Schedule C: Value of Description of Property…”
Voiland v. Kimmell (In re Kimmell), 480 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(f) — 14 cases
In Re Doyle, 209 B.R. 897 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1997). “(Husband & Wife) (401K(H)) Proceeds from insurance policy 735 ILCS 5/12-1001© 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% Whole Life Insurance Policy 100% A debtor claims exemptions by designating property as exempt on Schedule C of the Schedule of Assets and Liabilities.”
In Re Bateman, 157 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). “The debtor was allowed to claim the $1,200 exemption for his equity interest in an auto under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (which specifically exempts debtors’ interests in autos), and then claim an additional $2,000 exemption for his additional equity interest in that same car under…”
In Re McKinney, 317 B.R. 344 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2004).
In Re Shaffer, 228 B.R. 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998).
In re Sharif, 564 B.R. 328 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g) — 4 cases
Kauffman v. Wrenn, 2015 IL App (2d) 150285 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). “95 of the funds belonged to the judgment debtor, and (2) the remaining funds were disability funds that were exempt from judgment under section 12-1001(g) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g) (West 2014)). ¶2 I.”
United States v. Munson, 248 B.R. 343 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
In re Woodside, 538 B.R. 518 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015).
In re Marriage of Pope-Clinton (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(1) — 3 cases
In Re Royal, 397 B.R. 88 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2008).
In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). “In Amended Schedule C of Property Claimed as Exempt the Debtor exempted $3000 of the 2013 federal tax refund pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(1), (2) and (3). He exempted $1,700 of the refund pursuant to the wild-card exemption allowed by 735 ILCS 5/12— 1001(b) which provides…”
In re Hamm, 586 B.R. 745 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2018).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(3) — 2 cases
In re Lagrow, 165 B.R. 34 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
In re Sullivan, 567 B.R. 348 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2017).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(4) — 2 cases
In Re Hice, 223 B.R. 155 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1998).
Richardson v. Reyes (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2023).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(l) — 9 cases
In Re Brockhouse, 220 B.R. 623 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998). “On February 23, 1998, she amended her Schedule C-Property Claimed as Exempt to include her earned income credit as an asset of the estate and to claim an exemption for the entire amount pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12 — 1001 (b) and 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(l).”
In re Frueh, 518 B.R. 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
In re Vazquez, 516 B.R. 523 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014). “In Amended Schedule C of Property Claimed as Exempt the Debtor exempted $3000 of the 2013 federal tax refund pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(g)(1), (2) and (3). He exempted $1,700 of the refund pursuant to the wild-card exemption allowed by 735 ILCS 5/12— 1001(b) which provides…”
In Re Schnabel, 153 B.R. 809 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). “The Trustee further asserts that 735 ILCS 5/12-1006 exempts income traceable to a pension plan only to the extent that it is necessary for the support of the Debtor and his family; and that, under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001 the social security income of the Debtor and his wife is only…”
In re Franklin, 506 B.R. 765 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2014). “The TRUSTEE’S objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in his checking account will be allowed as to all amounts in excess of the wildcard exemption under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(b). Her objection to the DEBTOR’S claim of exemption in the checking account under 735 ILCS 5/12-704…”
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h) — 6 cases
In re Frueh, 518 B.R. 881 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Bates (In Re Bates), 161 B.R. 965 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
In Re King, 153 B.R. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
Pogge v. Nothdurft (In re Nothdurft), 526 B.R. 780 (C.D. Ill. 2015).
In re Woodside, 538 B.R. 518 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2015).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(1) — 1 case
In re Melching, 589 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018). “For example, paragraph (d) allows an exemption for "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value , in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(3) — 5 cases
In Re Bateman, 157 B.R. 635 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993). “The debtor was allowed to claim the $1,200 exemption for his equity interest in an auto under 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(c) (which specifically exempts debtors’ interests in autos), and then claim an additional $2,000 exemption for his additional equity interest in that same car under…”
In Re Bunting, 322 B.R. 852 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005).
In Re Bird, 288 B.R. 546 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2002).
People Ex Rel. Dir. of Corrs. v. Ruckman, 843 N.E.2d 882 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
People ex rel. Dir. of Corr. v. Ruckman (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(h)(4) — 14 cases
In re Melching, 589 B.R. 846 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2018). “For example, paragraph (d) allows an exemption for "[t]he debtor's equity interest, not to exceed $1,500 in value , in any implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the debtor.”
In Re Dealey, 204 B.R. 17 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1997).
Thomas v. The Illinois Dep't of Healthcare & Fam. Servs., 2016 IL App (1st) 143933 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In Re Simon, 170 B.R. 999 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1994).
In Re Langa, 222 B.R. 843 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1998).
— 735 ILCS 5/12-1001(j) — 1 case
Shawn Bradley Hills - Adversary Proceeding (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2019).
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