ILCS » Chapter 735 · Act 5

735 ILCS 5/2-1303

Interest on judgment

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(735 ILCS 5/2-1303) (from Ch. 110, par. 2-1303)
    Sec. 2-1303. Interest on judgment.
    (a) Except as provided in subsection (b), judgments recovered in any court shall draw interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of the judgment until satisfied or 6% per annum when the judgment debtor is a unit of local government, as defined in Section 1 of Article VII of the Constitution, a school district, a community college district, or any other governmental entity. When judgment is entered upon any award, report or verdict, interest shall be computed at the above rate, from the time when made or rendered to the time of entering judgment upon the same, and included in the judgment. Interest shall be computed and charged only on the unsatisfied portion of the judgment as it exists from time to time. The judgment debtor may by tender of payment of judgment, costs and interest accrued to the date of tender, stop the further accrual of interest on such judgment notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the judgment.
    (b)(1) As used in this Section:
    "Consumer debt" means money or property, or the equivalent, due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person by reason of a transaction in which property, services, or money is acquired by that natural person primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
    "Consumer debt judgment" means a judgment recovered in any court against one or more natural persons arising out of consumer debt. "Consumer debt judgment" does not include any compensation for bodily injury or death, nor any judgment entered where the debt is guaranteed by or contains a joint and several liability provision between a natural person and a business, whether or not that business is legally constituted under the laws of this State or any other state.
    (2) Notwithstanding subsection (a), consumer debt judgments of $25,000 or less shall draw interest from the date of the judgment until satisfied at the rate of 5% per annum.
    (3) The judgment debtor may, by tender of payment of judgment, costs, and interest accrued to the date of tender, stop the further accrual of interest on the consumer debt judgment, notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate, or modify the judgment.
    (4) This subsection applies to all consumer debt judgments entered into after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 101st General Assembly.
    (c) In all actions brought to recover damages for personal injury or wrongful death resulting from or occasioned by the conduct of any other person or entity, whether by negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, intentional conduct, or strict liability of the other person or entity, the plaintiff shall recover prejudgment interest on all damages, except punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney's fees, and statutory costs, set forth in the judgment. Prejudgment interest shall begin to accrue on the date the action is filed. If the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action and refiles, the accrual of prejudgment interest shall be tolled from the date the action is voluntarily dismissed to the date the action is refiled. In entering judgment for the plaintiff in the action, the court shall add to the amount of the judgment interest calculated at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of the judgment, minus punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney's fees, and statutory costs. If the judgment is greater than the amount of the highest written settlement offer made by the defendant within 12 months after the later of the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly or the filing of the action and not accepted by the plaintiff within 90 days after the date of the offer or rejected by the plaintiff, interest added to the amount of judgment shall be an amount equal to interest calculated at the rate of 6% per annum on the difference between the amount of the judgment, minus punitive damages, sanctions, statutory attorney's fees, and statutory costs, and the amount of the highest written settlement offer. If the judgment is equal to or less than the amount of the highest written settlement offer made by the defendant within 12 months after the later of the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly or the filing of the action and not accepted by the plaintiff within 90 days after the date of the offer or rejected by the plaintiff, no prejudgment interest shall be added to the amount of the judgment. For the purposes of this subsection, withdrawal of a settlement offer by defendant shall not be considered a rejection of the offer by the plaintiff. Notwithstanding any other provision of this subsection, prejudgment interest shall accrue for no longer than 5 years.
    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, neither the State, a unit of local government, a school district, community college district, nor any other governmental entity is liable to pay prejudgment interest in an action brought directly or vicariously against it by the injured party.
    For any personal injury or wrongful death occurring before the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly, the prejudgment interest shall begin to accrue on the later of the date the action is filed or the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 102nd General Assembly.
(Source: P.A. 101-168, eff. 1-1-20; 102-6, eff. 7-1-21.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 146 cases (50 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Cotton v. Coccaro
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Cotton v. Coccaro (2023) illappct · cites it 4× “See 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West Supp. 2021). The trial court modified -3- No.”
First Midwest Bank v. Rossi (2023) illappct · cites it 3× “Prejudgment Interest ¶ 177 Rossi argues that the prejudgment interest statute (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West Supp. 2021)) is unconstitutional because it (1) interferes with the fundamental right to a trial by jury and the jury’s determination of damages, (2) violates due process by…”
Galich v. Advocate Health and Hospital Corp. (2024) illappct · cites it 4× “Michael Soo-Young Joo, argue that (i) the trial judge’s answers to the jury questions deprived it of its constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and constitutes reversible error and (ii) the statute mandating prejudgment interest in personal injury and wrongful death…”
Radosevich v. Industrial Commission (2006) illappct · cites it 4× “Claimant submits interest under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2004)), at a rate of 9% per annum, should be awarded claimant from September 17, 2002, the date of the arbitrators award, through May 28, 2003, the date employer paid…”
Wilcox v. Advocate Condell Medical Center (2024) illappct · cites it 3× “Finally, it argues that the trial court erred in concluding that section 2-1303(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022)), which allows prejudgment interest in actions for personal injury or wrongful death, is constitutional.”
Shackelford v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (2017) illappct · cites it 4× “" ¶4 On October 13, 2015, Shackelford filed a complaint in which she alleged that Allstate had not paid the award, and she sought a "judgment against Allstate in the amount of her individual award, plus interest due" under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code)…”
Pinske v. Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company (2016) illappct · cites it 5× “¶3 Pinske then filed a class action lawsuit against Allstate seeking interest on the award pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2012)), arguing that Allstate did not timely issue the funds at the conclusion of the…”
Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver (2006) ill “" 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2002). Tri-G argues that, because Burke failed to obtain a judgment against Elgin Federal in 1987, Burke is responsible for "postjudgment" interest, extending from June 1, 1987, when the judgment should have been entered, through February 28, 2002, when…”
Sylvia Evans, Administrator of the Estate of Andrew Evans v. City of Chicago (1993) ca7 · cites it 2× “1 * During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the rate of interest Chicago paid on judgments (6% per annum for municipal governments, 735 ILCS 5/2-1303) was substantially less than the market cost of credit.”
Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc. (2022) illappct · cites it 2× “735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2010). The circuit court has no discretion in awarding interest; rather, the court is required to award interest on a judgment.”
Dobbs Tire & Auto v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n (2018) illappct · cites it 11× “appeal, the claimant, Peggy Stolte, appeals the June 23, 2016, order of the circuit court of Fayette County that denied her motion for enforcement of judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West *70 2014) ) and interest on…”
Mikolajczyk v. Ford Motor Co. (2007) illappct · cites it 2× “On appeal, defendants contended (1) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the law of strict liability for design defects; (2) that the trial court erred in declining to instruct the jury about damage apportionment, the effect of Timberlake's intoxication and the…”
Show all 146 citing cases →
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(a) — 17 cases
Fairfield Homes, Inc. v. Amrani (2023) illappct
Poundstone v. Cook (2025) illappct
Barnai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (2023) illappct
Patton v. Biswell (2021) illappct
Graham v. Village of Dolton (2023) illappct
— 735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) — 20 cases
First Midwest Bank v. Rossi (2023) illappct “Prejudgment Interest ¶ 177 Rossi argues that the prejudgment interest statute (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West Supp. 2021)) is unconstitutional because it (1) interferes with the fundamental right to a trial by jury and the jury’s determination of damages, (2) violates due process by…”
Cotton v. Coccaro (2023) illappct “See 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West Supp. 2021). The trial court modified -3- No.”
Galich v. Advocate Health and Hospital Corp. (2024) illappct “Michael Soo-Young Joo, argue that (i) the trial judge’s answers to the jury questions deprived it of its constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict and constitutes reversible error and (ii) the statute mandating prejudgment interest in personal injury and wrongful death…”
Wilcox v. Advocate Condell Medical Center (2024) illappct “Finally, it argues that the trial court erred in concluding that section 2-1303(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1303(c) (West 2022)), which allows prejudgment interest in actions for personal injury or wrongful death, is constitutional.”
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp. (2025) illappct
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