Illinois Compiled Statutes
740 ILCS 100/2 (2026)
Right of Contribution
✓ current as of May 2026
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(740 ILCS 100/2)
(from Ch. 70, par. 302)
Sec. 2.
Right of Contribution.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this
Act, where 2 or more persons are subject to liability in tort arising out
of the same injury to person or property, or the same wrongful death,
there is a right of contribution among them, even though judgment has not
been entered against any or all of them.
(b) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who
has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability, and his total
recovery is limited to the amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata
share. No tortfeasor is liable to make contribution beyond his own pro rata
share of the common liability.
(c) When a release or covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment
is given in good faith to one or more persons liable in tort arising out
of the same injury or the same wrongful death, it does not discharge any
of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death
unless its terms so provide but it reduces the recovery on any claim against
the others to the extent of any amount stated in the release or the covenant,
or in the amount of the consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.
(d) The tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c) is
discharged from all liability for any contribution to any other tortfeasor.
(e) A tortfeasor who settles with a claimant pursuant to paragraph (c)
is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability
is not extinguished by the settlement.
(f) Anyone who, by payment, has discharged in full or in part the liability
of a tortfeasor and has thereby discharged in full his obligation to the
tortfeasor, is subrogated to the tortfeasor's right of contribution. This
provision does not affect any right of contribution nor any right of
subrogation arising from any other relationship.
(Source: P.A. 84-1308.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 307
cases (37 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001).
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001). “740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation.”
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005). “5 million for the assignments of the plaintiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendant. Thus, Litgen was only entitled to a setoff of $4.”
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994). “Soo Line and Milwaukee Motor filed cross-counterclaims for contribution under the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1992)). A jury trial was held and a verdict returned for Ziarko in the amount of approximately $7.”
Babb v. City of Champaign, 642 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. 1994). “” (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1992).) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party.”
Roberts v. Alexandria Transp., Inc., 2021 IL 126249 (Ill. 2021). “740 ILCS 100/2, 3 (West 2018). - 11 - ¶ 43 E.”
Virginia Sur. Co. v. N. Ins., 866 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 2007). “The contribution lawsuit presents a second type of liability exposure for the employer.”
Antonicelli v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL 121943 (Ill. 2018). “*1214 ¶ 1 At issue in this appeal is whether the circuit court of Cook County erroneously entered a finding of a good-faith settlement agreement under section 2 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (Contribution Act) ( 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 2012) ). This case involves a…”
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). “" 740 ILCS 100/2(b) ( West 1996 ). Thus, because a tortfeasor is only liable for his or her proportionate share of damages as defined by section 2-1117, it appears that a tortfeasor would never need, or be able, to pursue a contribution action against an employer and, therefore,…”
Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 v. Lybrand, 803 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 2003). “(West 1994)) contains three provisions applicable to this case: (1) there is a right to contribution among two or more persons subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them (740 ILCS 100/2(a)…”
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2002). “" See 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). In Doyle , this court explained that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) is in the nature of an affirmative defense that is waived if not asserted.”
Adams v. N. Illinois Gas Co., 809 N.E.2d 1248 (Ill. 2004). “2d 155 , quoting 740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1998). Indeed, Illinois case law reveals that Illinois courts have long applied common law principles to defendant utilities subsequent to the 1921 enactment of the Public Utilities Act and despite the existence of tariffs filed with the…”
Lard v. Am/fm Ohio, Inc., 901 N.E.2d 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “2d 410 (1990); 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2006). "This right of contribution exists only in favor of tortfeasors who have paid more than their pro rata share of the common liability, and recovery is limited to the amount they have paid in *1016 excess of their pro rata share.”
— 740 ILCS 100/2(A) — 1 case
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994). “Soo Line and Milwaukee Motor filed cross-counterclaims for contribution under the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1992)). A jury trial was held and a verdict returned for Ziarko in the amount of approximately $7.”
— 740 ILCS 100/2(a) — 118 cases
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 783 N.E.2d 1024 (Ill. 2002). “" See 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2000). In Doyle , this court explained that the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/5(a) (West 2000)) is in the nature of an affirmative defense that is waived if not asserted.”
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994). “Soo Line and Milwaukee Motor filed cross-counterclaims for contribution under the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1992)). A jury trial was held and a verdict returned for Ziarko in the amount of approximately $7.”
Sperl v. Henry, 2018 IL 123132 (Ill. 2018).
Mercola v. Abdou, 223 F. Supp. 3d 720 (N.D. Ill. 2016).
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001). “740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation.”
— 740 ILCS 100/2(b) — 71 cases
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). “" 740 ILCS 100/2(b) ( West 1996 ). Thus, because a tortfeasor is only liable for his or her proportionate share of damages as defined by section 2-1117, it appears that a tortfeasor would never need, or be able, to pursue a contribution action against an employer and, therefore,…”
Virginia Sur. Co. v. N. Ins., 866 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 2007). “The contribution lawsuit presents a second type of liability exposure for the employer.”
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005). “5 million for the assignments of the plaintiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendant. Thus, Litgen was only entitled to a setoff of $4.”
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994). “Soo Line and Milwaukee Motor filed cross-counterclaims for contribution under the Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/2 (West 1992)). A jury trial was held and a verdict returned for Ziarko in the amount of approximately $7.”
Claudy v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 660 N.E.2d 895 (Ill. 1995).
— 740 ILCS 100/2(c) — 138 cases
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001). “740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation.”
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005). “5 million for the assignments of the plaintiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendant. Thus, Litgen was only entitled to a setoff of $4.”
Babb v. City of Champaign, 642 N.E.2d 1195 (Ill. 1994). “” (740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1992).) The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party.”
Lard v. Am/fm Ohio, Inc., 901 N.E.2d 1006 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). “2d 410 (1990); 740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 2006). "This right of contribution exists only in favor of tortfeasors who have paid more than their pro rata share of the common liability, and recovery is limited to the amount they have paid in *1016 excess of their pro rata share.”
Halleck v. Coastal Bldg. Maint. Co., 647 N.E.2d 618 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
— 740 ILCS 100/2(c)(d) — 1 case
In Re Chicago Flood Litig., 719 N.E.2d 1117 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
— 740 ILCS 100/2(d) — 67 cases
Roberts v. Alexandria Transp., Inc., 2021 IL 126249 (Ill. 2021). “740 ILCS 100/2, 3 (West 2018). - 11 - ¶ 43 E.”
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005). “5 million for the assignments of the plaintiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendant. Thus, Litgen was only entitled to a setoff of $4.”
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001). “740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation.”
Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 v. Lybrand, 803 N.E.2d 460 (Ill. 2003). “(West 1994)) contains three provisions applicable to this case: (1) there is a right to contribution among two or more persons subject to liability in tort arising out of the same injury, even though judgment has not been entered against any or all of them (740 ILCS 100/2(a)…”
Pierre Condo. Ass'n v. Lincoln Park West Assocs., LLC, 881 N.E.2d 588 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
— 740 ILCS 100/2(e) — 34 cases
Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Dev., Inc., 756 N.E.2d 836 (Ill. 2001). “740 ILCS 100/2(a) (West 1994). This right, which exists only in favor of a tortfeasor which has paid more than its pro rata share of damages to the injured party (740 ILCS 100/2(b) (West 1994)), is subject to an important limitation.”
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 827 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 2005). “5 million for the assignments of the plaintiffs' claim against the nonsettling defendant. Thus, Litgen was only entitled to a setoff of $4.”
Richardson v. Chapman, 676 N.E.2d 621 (Ill. 1997).
Solimini v. Thomas, 688 N.E.2d 356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
Sperl v. Henry, 2017 IL App (3d) 150097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
— 740 ILCS 100/2(f) — 4 cases
Associated Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. Aon Corp., 800 N.E.2d 424 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
Mondschein v. Power Constr. Co., 936 N.E.2d 1101 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).
Orejel v. York Intern. Corp., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
Associated Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v. AON Corp. (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
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