750 ILCS 5/403
Pleadings - Commencement - Abolition of Existing Defenses - Procedure
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(750 ILCS 5/403)
(from Ch. 40, par. 403)
Sec. 403. Pleadings - Commencement - Abolition of Existing Defenses
- Procedure. (a) The complaint or petition for dissolution of marriage or legal
separation shall be verified and shall minimally set forth:
(1) the age, occupation and residence of each party | and his length of residence in this State; |
(2) the date of the marriage and the place at which | it was registered; |
(2.5) whether a petition for dissolution of marriage | is pending in any other county or state; |
(3) that the jurisdictional requirements of | subsection (a) of Section 401 have been met and that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage; |
(4) the names, ages and addresses of all living | children of the marriage and whether a spouse is pregnant; |
(5) any arrangements as to support, allocation of | parental responsibility of the children and maintenance of a spouse; and |
(6) the relief sought.
(b) Either or both parties to the marriage may initiate the
proceeding.
(c) (Blank).
(d) The court may join additional parties necessary and proper for
the exercise of its authority under this Act.
(e) Contested trials shall be on a bifurcated basis with the issue of whether irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, as described in Section 401,
being tried first, regardless of whether that issue is contested or uncontested. Upon the court determining that irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage,
the court may allow additional time for the
parties to settle
amicably the remaining issues before resuming the trial, or may
proceed immediately to trial on the
remaining issues. The court has the discretion to use the date of the trial or such other date as agreed upon by the parties, or ordered by the court within its discretion, for purposes of determining the value of assets or property. In cases where the requirements of Section 401 are uncontested and proved
as in cases of default, the trial on all other remaining issues shall proceed
immediately, if so ordered by the court or if the parties so stipulate. Except as provided in subsection (b) of Section 401, the court shall enter a judgment of dissolution of marriage, including an order dissolving the marriage, incorporation of a marital settlement agreement if applicable, and any other appropriate findings or orders, only at the conclusion of the case and not after hearing only the testimony as to whether irreconcilable differences have caused the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.
(f) (Blank).
(Source: P.A. 99-90, eff. 1-1-16.)
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14
cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1994–2026 · leading case: Blum v. Koster
Blum v. Koster (2009)
“See 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2004) (providing for bifurcated contested trials on issues of grounds and “other remaining issues”).”
In Re Marriage of Ramsey (2003)
“403(e) (now see 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2000)). The supreme court noted that a dissolution of marriage is an entirely statutory creation (Strukoff, 76 Ill.”
In Re Marriage of Jerome and Martinez (1994)
“403(e) (now 750 ILCS 5/ 403(e) (West 1992)). Respondent argues that strict construction of section 403(e) of the Act is required and failure to follow its mandate leaves a trial court without subject matter jurisdiction.”
Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc. (2013)
“ttempts to explain away the special mention in section 20(c)(11) of the omission of the signature as not affecting the validity the notice, by claiming this exception was placed there to distinguish it from other statutory situations where a signature would be required, such as…”
In Re Marriage of Snider (1999)
“” 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 1996). Rebecca argues that the “bifurcated basis” of the trial creates two separate causes of action in which a party can enter separate appearances, allowing a general appearance in one proceeding and a special and limited appearance in the other.”
In Re Marriage of Seffren (2006)
“750 ILCS 5/403(d) (West 2004). Even though the joinder of third parties is not specifically addressed in the postdecree context, section 105 of the Act states that the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 — 101 et seq.”
Warga v. Warga (2016)
“750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2014). Even under the no-fault principle, the divorce court must find that George and Laima have lived separately for at least two years (or there has been a waiver of this requirement by both spouses), that “irreconcilable differences have caused the…”
MacAluso v. MacAluso (2002)
“Specifically, section 503(j) references "the final hearing on all other issues between the parties. (Emphasis added)" 750 ILCS 5/503(j) (West 2000).”
Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc. (2013)
“mpts to explain away the special mention in section 20(c)(11) of the omission of the signature as not affecting the validity of the notice, by claiming this exception was placed there to distinguish it from other statutory situations where a signature would be required, such as…”
Macaluso v. Macaluso (2002)
“750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2000). We hold that so long as the trial court otherwise has jurisdiction over the case, either party may petition for contribution toward attorney fees “[a]t the conclusion of the case.”
In re Marriage of Keller (2021)
“” 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2018). Section 401(b) provides: “Judgment shall not be entered unless *** the court has considered, approved, reserved or made provision for the allocation of parental responsibilities, the support of any child of the marriage entitled to support, the…”
In re Marriage of Schoen (2026)
“Section 403(a) specifically refers to the requirements of section 401(a) as “jurisdictional” and provides in relevant part: “The complaint or petition for dissolution of marriage … shall minimally set forth: (1) the age, occupation and residence of each party and his length of…”
— 750 ILCS 5/403(a) — 3 cases
Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc. (2013)
“ttempts to explain away the special mention in section 20(c)(11) of the omission of the signature as not affecting the validity the notice, by claiming this exception was placed there to distinguish it from other statutory situations where a signature would be required, such as…”
Schultz v. Performance Lighting, Inc. (2013)
“mpts to explain away the special mention in section 20(c)(11) of the omission of the signature as not affecting the validity of the notice, by claiming this exception was placed there to distinguish it from other statutory situations where a signature would be required, such as…”
In re Marriage of Schoen (2026)
“Section 403(a) specifically refers to the requirements of section 401(a) as “jurisdictional” and provides in relevant part: “The complaint or petition for dissolution of marriage … shall minimally set forth: (1) the age, occupation and residence of each party and his length of…”
— 750 ILCS 5/403(d) — 2 cases
In Re Marriage of Seffren (2006)
“750 ILCS 5/403(d) (West 2004). Even though the joinder of third parties is not specifically addressed in the postdecree context, section 105 of the Act states that the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2 — 101 et seq.”
In re: Marriage of Seffren (2006)
— 750 ILCS 5/403(e) — 9 cases
Blum v. Koster (2009)
“See 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2004) (providing for bifurcated contested trials on issues of grounds and “other remaining issues”).”
In Re Marriage of Ramsey (2003)
“403(e) (now see 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2000)). The supreme court noted that a dissolution of marriage is an entirely statutory creation (Strukoff, 76 Ill.”
In Re Marriage of Jerome and Martinez (1994)
“403(e) (now 750 ILCS 5/ 403(e) (West 1992)). Respondent argues that strict construction of section 403(e) of the Act is required and failure to follow its mandate leaves a trial court without subject matter jurisdiction.”
In Re Marriage of Snider (1999)
“” 750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 1996). Rebecca argues that the “bifurcated basis” of the trial creates two separate causes of action in which a party can enter separate appearances, allowing a general appearance in one proceeding and a special and limited appearance in the other.”
Warga v. Warga (2016)
“750 ILCS 5/403(e) (West 2014). Even under the no-fault principle, the divorce court must find that George and Laima have lived separately for at least two years (or there has been a waiver of this requirement by both spouses), that “irreconcilable differences have caused the…”
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