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Illinois Compiled Statutes

750 ILCS 5/503 (2026)

Disposition of property and debts

✓ current as of May 2026
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(750 ILCS 5/503) (from Ch. 40, par. 503)
    Sec. 503. Disposition of property and debts.
    (a) For purposes of this Act, "marital property" means all property, including debts and other obligations, acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is known as "non-marital property":
        (1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent or
    
property acquired in exchange for such property;
        (2) property acquired in exchange for property
    
acquired before the marriage;
        (3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of
    
legal separation;
        (4) property excluded by valid agreement of the
    
parties, including a premarital agreement or a postnuptial agreement;
        (5) any judgment or property obtained by judgment
    
awarded to a spouse from the other spouse except, however, when a spouse is required to sue the other spouse in order to obtain insurance coverage or otherwise recover from a third party and the recovery is directly related to amounts advanced by the marital estate, the judgment shall be considered marital property;
        (6) property acquired before the marriage, except as
    
it relates to retirement plans that may have both marital and non-marital characteristics;
        (6.5) all property acquired by a spouse by the sole
    
use of non-marital property as collateral for a loan that then is used to acquire property during the marriage; to the extent that the marital estate repays any portion of the loan, it shall be considered a contribution from the marital estate to the non-marital estate subject to reimbursement;
        (7) the increase in value of non-marital property,
    
irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this Section; and
        (8) income from property acquired by a method listed
    
in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection if the income is not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.
    Property acquired prior to a marriage that would otherwise be non-marital property shall not be deemed to be marital property solely because the property was acquired in contemplation of marriage.
    The court shall make specific factual findings as to its classification of assets as marital or non-marital property, values, and other factual findings supporting its property award.
    (b)(1) For purposes of distribution of property, all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage is presumed marital property. This presumption includes non-marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership between the spouses, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by showing through clear and convincing evidence that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section or was done for estate or tax planning purposes or for other reasons that establish that a transfer between spouses was not intended to be a gift.
    (2) For purposes of distribution of property pursuant to this Section, all pension benefits (including pension benefits under the Illinois Pension Code, defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans and accounts, individual retirement accounts, and non-qualified plans) acquired by or participated in by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation or declaration of invalidity of the marriage are presumed to be marital property. A spouse may overcome the presumption that these pension benefits are marital property by showing through clear and convincing evidence that the pension benefits were acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section. The right to a division of pension benefits in just proportions under this Section is enforceable under Section 1-119 of the Illinois Pension Code.
    The value of pension benefits in a retirement system subject to the Illinois Pension Code shall be determined in accordance with the valuation procedures established by the retirement system.
    The recognition of pension benefits as marital property and the division of those benefits pursuant to a Qualified Illinois Domestic Relations Order shall not be deemed to be a diminishment, alienation, or impairment of those benefits. The division of pension benefits is an allocation of property in which each spouse has a species of common ownership.
    (3) For purposes of distribution of property under this Section, all stock options and restricted stock or similar form of benefit granted to either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or legal separation or declaration of invalidity of marriage, whether vested or non-vested or whether their value is ascertainable, are presumed to be marital property. This presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the stock options or restricted stock or similar form of benefit were acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section. The court shall allocate stock options and restricted stock or similar form of benefit between the parties at the time of the judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage recognizing that the value of the stock options and restricted stock or similar form of benefit may not be then determinable and that the actual division of the options may not occur until a future date. In making the allocation between the parties, the court shall consider, in addition to the factors set forth in subsection (d) of this Section, the following:
        (i) All circumstances underlying the grant of the
    
stock option and restricted stock or similar form of benefit including but not limited to the vesting schedule, whether the grant was for past, present, or future efforts, whether the grant is designed to promote future performance or employment, or any combination thereof.
        (ii) The length of time from the grant of the option
    
to the time the option is exercisable.
    (b-5)(1) As to any existing policy of life insurance insuring the life of either spouse, or any interest in such policy, that constitutes marital property, whether whole life, term life, group term life, universal life, or other form of life insurance policy, and whether or not the value is ascertainable, the court shall allocate ownership, death benefits or the right to assign death benefits, and the obligation for premium payments, if any, equitably between the parties at the time of the judgment for dissolution or declaration of invalidity of marriage.
    (2) If a judgment of dissolution of marriage is entered after an insured has designated the insured's spouse as a beneficiary under a life insurance policy in force at the time of entry, the designation of the insured's former spouse as beneficiary is not effective unless:
        (A) the judgment designates the insured's former
    
spouse as the beneficiary;
        (B) the insured redesignates the former spouse as the
    
beneficiary after entry of the judgment; or
        (C) the former spouse is designated to receive the
    
proceeds in trust for, on behalf of, or for the benefit of a child or a dependent of either former spouse.
    (3) If a designation is not effective under paragraph (2), the proceeds of the policy are payable to the named alternative beneficiary or, if there is not a named alternative beneficiary, to the estate of the insured.
    (4) An insurer that pays the proceeds of a life insurance policy to the beneficiary under a designation that is not effective under paragraph (2) is liable for payment of the proceeds to the person or estate provided by paragraph (3) only if:
        (A) before payment of the proceeds to the designated
    
beneficiary, the insurer receives written notice at the home office of the insurer from an interested person that the designation is not effective under paragraph (2); and
        (B) the insurer has not filed an interpleader.
    (5) The provisions in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection (b-5) do not apply to life insurance policies subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 100 et seq., the Federal Employee Group Life Insurance Act, 5 U.S.C. 8701 et seq., or any other federal law that preempts the application of those paragraphs.
    (c) Commingled marital and non-marital property shall be treated in the following manner, unless otherwise agreed by the spouses:
        (1)(A) If marital and non-marital property are
    
commingled by one estate being contributed into the other, the following shall apply:
            (i) If the contributed property loses its
        
identity, the contributed property transmutes to the estate receiving the property, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection (c).
            (ii) If the contributed property retains its
        
identity, it does not transmute and remains property of the contributing estate.
        (B) If marital and non-marital property are
    
commingled into newly acquired property resulting in a loss of identity of the contributing estates, the commingled property shall be deemed transmuted to marital property, subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) of this subsection (c).
        (2)(A) When one estate of property makes a
    
contribution to another estate of property, the contributing estate shall be reimbursed from the estate receiving the contribution notwithstanding any transmutation. No such reimbursement shall be made with respect to a contribution that is not traceable by clear and convincing evidence or that was a gift. The court may provide for reimbursement out of the marital property to be divided or by imposing a lien against the non-marital property that received the contribution.
        (B) When a spouse contributes personal effort to
    
non-marital property, it shall be deemed a contribution from the marital estate, which shall receive reimbursement for the efforts if the efforts are significant and result in substantial appreciation to the non-marital property except that if the marital estate reasonably has been compensated for his or her efforts, it shall not be deemed a contribution to the marital estate and there shall be no reimbursement to the marital estate. The court may provide for reimbursement out of the marital property to be divided or by imposing a lien against the non-marital property which received the contribution.
    (d) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each spouse's non-marital property to that spouse. It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors, including:
        (1) each party's contribution to the acquisition,
    
preservation, or increase or decrease in value of the marital or non-marital property, including (i) any decrease attributable to an advance from the parties' marital estate under subsection (c-1)(2) of Section 501; (ii) the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit; and (iii) whether the contribution is after the commencement of a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage;
        (2) the dissipation by each party of the marital
    
property, provided that a party's claim of dissipation is subject to the following conditions:
            (i) a notice of intent to claim dissipation shall
        
be given no later than 60 days before trial or 30 days after discovery closes, whichever is later;
            (ii) the notice of intent to claim dissipation
        
shall contain, at a minimum, a date or period of time during which the marriage began undergoing an irretrievable breakdown, an identification of the property dissipated, and a date or period of time during which the dissipation occurred;
            (iii) a certificate or service of the notice of
        
intent to claim dissipation shall be filed with the clerk of the court and be served pursuant to applicable rules;
            (iv) no dissipation shall be deemed to have
        
occurred prior to 3 years after the party claiming dissipation knew or should have known of the dissipation, but in no event prior to 5 years before the filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage;
        (3) the value of the property assigned to each spouse;
        (4) the duration of the marriage;
        (5) the relevant economic circumstances of each
    
spouse when the division of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having the primary residence of the children;
        (6) any obligations and rights arising from a prior
    
marriage of either party;
        (7) any prenuptial or postnuptial agreement of the
    
parties;
        (8) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and
    
sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
        (9) the custodial provisions for any children;
        (10) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in
    
addition to maintenance;
        (11) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for
    
future acquisition of capital assets and income; and
        (12) the tax consequences of the property division
    
upon the respective economic circumstances of the parties.
    (e) Each spouse has a species of common ownership in the marital property which vests at the time dissolution proceedings are commenced and continues only during the pendency of the action. Any such interest in marital property shall not encumber that property so as to restrict its transfer, assignment or conveyance by the title holder unless such title holder is specifically enjoined from making such transfer, assignment or conveyance.
    (f) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a court that lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the court, in determining the value of the marital and non-marital property for purposes of dividing the property, has the discretion to use the date of the trial or such other date as agreed upon by the parties, or ordered by the court within its discretion, for purposes of determining the value of assets or property.
    (g) The court if necessary to protect and promote the best interests of the children may set aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, physical and mental health, and general welfare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent child of the parties. In making a determination under this subsection, the court may consider, among other things, the conviction of a party of any of the offenses set forth in Section 11-1.20, 11-1.30, 11-1.40, 11-1.50, 11-1.60, 12-3.3, 12-4, 12-4.1, 12-4.2, 12-4.3, 12-13, 12-14, 12-14.1, 12-15, or 12-16, or Section 12-3.05 except for subdivision (a)(4) or (g)(1), of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 if the victim is a child of one or both of the parties, and there is a need for, and cost of, care, healing and counseling for the child who is the victim of the crime.
    (h) Unless specifically directed by a reviewing court, or upon good cause shown, the court shall not on remand consider any increase or decrease in the value of any "marital" or "non-marital" property occurring since the assessment of such property at the original trial or hearing, but shall use only that assessment made at the original trial or hearing.
    (i) The court may make such judgments affecting the marital property as may be just and may enforce such judgments by ordering a sale of marital property, with proceeds therefrom to be applied as determined by the court.
    (j) After proofs have closed in the final hearing on all other issues between the parties (or in conjunction with the final hearing, if all parties so stipulate) and before judgment is entered, a party's petition for contribution to fees and costs incurred in the proceeding shall be heard and decided, in accordance with the following provisions:
        (1) A petition for contribution, if not filed before
    
the final hearing on other issues between the parties, shall be filed no later than 14 days after the closing of proofs in the final hearing or within such other period as the court orders.
        (2) Any award of contribution to one party from the
    
other party shall be based on the criteria for division of marital property under this Section 503 and, if maintenance has been awarded, on the criteria for an award of maintenance under Section 504.
        (3) The filing of a petition for contribution shall
    
not be deemed to constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege between the petitioning party and current or former counsel; and such a waiver shall not constitute a prerequisite to a hearing for contribution. If either party's presentation on contribution, however, includes evidence within the scope of the attorney-client privilege, the disclosure or disclosures shall be narrowly construed and shall not be deemed by the court to constitute a general waiver of the privilege as to matters beyond the scope of the presentation.
        (4) No finding on which a contribution award is based
    
or denied shall be asserted against counsel or former counsel for purposes of any hearing under subsection (c) or (e) of Section 508.
        (5) A contribution award (payable to either the
    
petitioning party or the party's counsel, or jointly, as the court determines) may be in the form of either a set dollar amount or a percentage of fees and costs (or a portion of fees and costs) to be subsequently agreed upon by the petitioning party and counsel or, alternatively, thereafter determined in a hearing pursuant to subsection (c) of Section 508 or previously or thereafter determined in an independent proceeding under subsection (e) of Section 508.
        (6) The changes to this Section 503 made by this
    
amendatory Act of 1996 apply to cases pending on or after June 1, 1997, except as otherwise provided in Section 508.
    (k) In determining the value of assets or property under this Section, the court shall employ a fair market value standard. The date of valuation for the purposes of division of assets shall be the date of trial or such other date as agreed by the parties or ordered by the court, within its discretion. If the court grants a petition brought under Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure, then the court has the discretion to use the date of the trial or such other date as agreed upon by the parties, or ordered by the court within its discretion, for purposes of determining the value of assets or property.
    (l) The court may seek the advice of financial experts or other professionals, whether or not employed by the court on a regular basis. The advice given shall be in writing and made available by the court to counsel. Counsel may examine as a witness any professional consulted by the court designated as the court's witness. Professional personnel consulted by the court are subject to subpoena for the purposes of discovery, trial, or both. The court shall allocate the costs and fees of those professional personnel between the parties based upon the financial ability of each party and any other criteria the court considers appropriate, and the allocation is subject to reallocation under subsection (a) of Section 508. Upon the request of any party or upon the court's own motion, the court may conduct a hearing as to the reasonableness of those fees and costs.
    (m) The changes made to this Section by Public Act 97-941 apply only to petitions for dissolution of marriage filed on or after January 1, 2013 (the effective date of Public Act 97-941).
    (n) If the court finds that a companion animal of the parties is a marital asset, it shall allocate the sole or joint ownership of and responsibility for a companion animal of the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal. As used in this Section, "companion animal" does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act.
(Source: P.A. 99-78, eff. 7-20-15; 99-90, eff. 1-1-16; 99-763, eff. 1-1-17; 100-422, eff. 1-1-18; 100-871, eff. 1-1-19.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 578 cases (139 in the last 5 years), 1993–2026 · leading case: In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 40× “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). · cites it 14× “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). · cites it 19× “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). · cites it 7× “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). · cites it 13× “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Didier, 742 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). · cites it 17× “2d 124 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). "There is another presumption that a transfer from a parent to a child is presumed to be a gift, and that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). · cites it 10× “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). · cites it 9× “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). · cites it 7× “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). · cites it 13× “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
In re Marriage of James, 2018 IL App (2d) 170627 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). · cites it 9× “" ¶ 18 On March 7, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage fully incorporating its memorandum of decision. Respondent sought reconsideration thereof, and the trial court denied it after a hearing on July 20, 2017.”
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 92636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). · cites it 6× “3d 138, 141 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2008). ¶ 78 A “gift” is defined as a “ ‘voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another,’ ” and it is “ ‘essential to a gift that it should be without consideration.”
Show all 578 citing cases →
— 750 ILCS 5/503(1) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Gerber, 2024 IL App (2d) 220244-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(C)(2)(A) — 1 case
Hendricks v. Petersen Health Quality, LLC, 2021 IL App (3d) 200032-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a) — 128 cases
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In Re Marriage of Didier, 742 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “2d 124 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). "There is another presumption that a transfer from a parent to a child is presumed to be a gift, and that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
Marriage of Abrell v. Abrell, 923 N.E.2d 791 (Ill. 2010).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(1) — 41 cases
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In re Marriage of Asta, 2016 IL App (2d) 150160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 92636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “3d 138, 141 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2008). ¶ 78 A “gift” is defined as a “ ‘voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another,’ ” and it is “ ‘essential to a gift that it should be without consideration.”
In re Marriage of Lonvick, 2013 IL App (2d) 120865 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
In re Marriage of Foster, 2014 IL App (1st) 123078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) — 19 cases
In Re Marriage of Didier, 742 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “2d 124 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). "There is another presumption that a transfer from a parent to a child is presumed to be a gift, and that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In Re Marriage of Hegge, 674 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(3) — 1 case
In Re Marriage of Charles, 672 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(3)(A) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(4) — 9 cases
In re Marriage of Arjmand, 2013 IL App (2d) 120639 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
In Re Marriage of Gurda, 711 N.E.2d 339 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In re Marriage of Woodrum, 2018 IL App (3d) 170369 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
In re Marriage of Chez, 2013 IL App (1st) 120550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
In re Marriage of Amyette, 2023 IL App (3d) 200195 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(5) — 4 cases
Partipilo v. Partipilo, 770 N.E.2d 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
In re Marriage of Agee, 2021 IL App (5th) 150153-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
In re Marriage of Rios (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
Partipilo v. Partipilo (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) — 33 cases
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Sanfratello, 913 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In re Marriage of Zamudio, 2019 IL 124676 (Ill. 2019).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(7) — 16 cases
In Re Marriage of Blunda, 702 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Lundahl, 919 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In Re Marriage of Weiler, 629 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
In Re Marriage of Steinberg, 701 N.E.2d 254 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(8) — 11 cases
In Re Marriage of Schmitt, 909 N.E.2d 221 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In Re Marriage of Lundahl, 919 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In re Marriage of Bradley, 2011 IL App (4th) 110392 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
In re Marriage of Ford, 879 N.E.2d 335 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
In Re Marriage of Bradley, 961 N.E.2d 980 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(l) — 5 cases
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In Re Marriage of Sanfratello, 913 N.E.2d 1077 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In re: Marriage of Samardzija, 850 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
In Re Marriage of Peters, 760 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In Re Marriage of Kerman, 624 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(b) — 38 cases
In Re Marriage of Didier, 742 N.E.2d 808 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “2d 124 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 1998). "There is another presumption that a transfer from a parent to a child is presumed to be a gift, and that presumption may be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”
In Re Marriage of Hegge, 674 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In Re Marriage of Weiler, 629 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 92636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “3d 138, 141 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2008). ¶ 78 A “gift” is defined as a “ ‘voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another,’ ” and it is “ ‘essential to a gift that it should be without consideration.”
In re Marriage of Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(1) — 59 cases
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In re Marriage of James, 2018 IL App (2d) 170627 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018). “" ¶ 18 On March 7, 2017, the trial court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage fully incorporating its memorandum of decision. Respondent sought reconsideration thereof, and the trial court denied it after a hearing on July 20, 2017.”
Marjorie L. Mungo, Debtor-Appellant, Cross-Appellee v. Maureen Sullivan Taylor, 355 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004).
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 92636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “3d 138, 141 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2008). ¶ 78 A “gift” is defined as a “ ‘voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another,’ ” and it is “ ‘essential to a gift that it should be without consideration.”
In re Marriage of Stuhr, 2016 IL App (1st) 152370 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(2) — 39 cases
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 2004).
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
Smithberg v. Illinois Mun. Ret. Fund, 735 N.E.2d 560 (Ill. 2000).
In Re Marriage of Peters, 760 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(3) — 7 cases
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
Hmelyar v. Phoenix Controls, 791 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
In re Marriage of Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
In re Marriage of Micheli, 2014 IL App (2d) 121245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(b)(l) — 10 cases
In Re Marriage of Peters, 760 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In re: Marriage of Samardzija, 850 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
In Re Innis, 331 B.R. 784 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2005).
Partipilo v. Partipilo, 770 N.E.2d 1136 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c) — 27 cases
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In re Marriage of Hluska, 2011 IL App (1st) 92636 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). “3d 138, 141 (1996); 750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2008). ¶ 78 A “gift” is defined as a “ ‘voluntary, gratuitous transfer of property by one to another,’ ” and it is “ ‘essential to a gift that it should be without consideration.”
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1) — 19 cases
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In re Marriage of Foster, 2014 IL App (1st) 123078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
In Re Marriage of Hegge, 674 N.E.2d 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In Re Marriage of Snow, 660 N.E.2d 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In re Marriage of Foster, 2014 IL App (1st) 123078 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1)(A) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Taylor, 2021 IL App (2d) 190315-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1)(A)(i) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Guiher, 2022 IL App (4th) 210322-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1)(A)(ii) — 2 cases
In re Marriage of Guiher, 2022 IL App (4th) 210322-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
In re Marriage of Fisher, 2021 IL App (4th) 200316-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(1)(B) — 6 cases
In re Marriage of Klose, 2023 IL App (1st) 192253 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Mast, 2022 IL App (4th) 210363-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
In re Marriage of Taylor, 2021 IL App (2d) 190315-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
In re Marriage of Calk, 2020 IL App (1st) 182512-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
In re Marriage of Fikejs, 2026 IL App (3d) 240183-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2) — 31 cases
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
In Re Marriage of Nelson, 698 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
In Re Marriage of Blunda, 702 N.E.2d 993 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
In Re Marriage of Crook, 813 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 2004).
In Re Marriage of Snow, 660 N.E.2d 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2)(A) — 9 cases
In re Marriage of Zamudio, 2019 IL 124676 (Ill. 2019).
In re Marriage of Klose, 2023 IL App (1st) 192253 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Zamudio, 2019 IL 124676 (Ill. 2020).
In re Marriage of Mast, 2022 IL App (4th) 210363-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
In re Marriage of Guiher, 2022 IL App (4th) 210322-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(2)(B) — 4 cases
In re Marriage of Burnett, 2021 IL App (5th) 200236-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
In re Mariage of Adduci, 2020 IL App (1st) 192238-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
In re Marriage of Mast, 2022 IL App (4th) 210363-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
In re Marriage of Metz, 2020 IL App (2d) 181029-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(c)(l) — 6 cases
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In re: Marriage of Samardzija, 850 N.E.2d 880 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
In Re Marriage of Demar, 897 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d) — 241 cases
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Donovan, 838 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
In Re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1) — 42 cases
In Re Marriage of Marriott, 636 N.E.2d 1141 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In re Marriage of Larocque, 2018 IL App (2d) 160973 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018).
In Re Marriage of Zweig, 798 N.E.2d 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
In re Marriage of Smith, 2012 IL App (2d) 110522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1)(ii) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Kattner, 2023 IL App (1st) 220803-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Morris-Foland, 2023 IL App (5th) 220222-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Brown, 2021 IL App (5th) 200007-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2021).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(1)(iii) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(10) — 15 cases
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Brackett, 722 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In re: the Marriage of Jensen, 2013 IL App (4th) 120355 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(11) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Schneider (Ill. 2005).
In re Marriage of Polsky (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(12) — 7 cases
In Re Marriage of Alexander, 857 N.E.2d 766 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
In Re Marriage of Toole, 653 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
In re Marriage of Berberet, 2012 IL App (4th) 110749 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Bradley, 2013 IL App (5th) 100217 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2) — 44 cases
In Re Marriage of Romano, 968 N.E.2d 115 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). “" ¶ 68 Cynthia insists that, because the ATF applications referenced Daniel's "personal funds" as the source of his investment in the three Affiliates, Daniel "was the purchaser of his interest in each of these entities and each of the purchases were made from [Daniel's]…”
In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
Kic v. Bianucci, 2011 IL App (1st) 100622 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011).
In Re Marriage of Charles, 672 N.E.2d 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In re Marriage of Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2)(i) — 6 cases
In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019).
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Kelly, 2026 IL App (5th) 230003-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2026).
In re Marriage of Hubble, 2022 IL App (4th) 200657-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2)(ii) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Beltran, 2025 IL App (3d) 240064-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
In re Marriage of May, 2024 IL App (1st) 221485-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(2)(iv) — 2 cases
Lewis v. Kalbhen, 2025 IL App (1st) 242110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
In re Marriage of May, 2024 IL App (1st) 221485-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(3) — 17 cases
In Re Marriage of Mouschovias, 831 N.E.2d 1222 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “Ergo, it is Telemachos’s nonmarital property (see 750 ILCS 5/503(a)(6) (West 2002)), subject to reimbursement of the marital estate (see 750 ILCS 5/503 (c) (West 2002)). Its classification as marital property is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In re Marriage of Johnson, 2016 IL App (5th) 140479 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In re Marriage of Johnson, 2016 IL App (5th) 140479 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016).
In re: the Marriage of Sturm, 2012 IL App (4th) 110559 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(4) — 15 cases
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 798 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
In re Marriage of Brill, 2017 IL App (2d) 160604 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
In Re Marriage of Polsky, 899 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(5) — 19 cases
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In Re Marriage of Minear, 679 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(6) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(7) — 3 cases
In Re Marriage of Barnes, 755 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Barnes (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(8) — 13 cases
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In re Marriage of Sobieski, 2013 IL App (2d) 111146 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
In Re Marriage of Zweig, 798 N.E.2d 1223 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
In Re Marriage of Bonneau, 691 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(9) — 2 cases
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In re Marriage of Kattner, 2023 IL App (1st) 220803-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(ii) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Yazeji, 2022 IL App (3d) 190197-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2022).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(l) — 12 cases
In Re Marriage of Heroy, 895 N.E.2d 1025 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). “750 ILCS 5/503(a)(2) (West 2006). Ultimately, “ ‘[a]ny doubts as to the nature of the property are resolved in favor of finding that the property is marital.”
In Re Marriage of Hubbs, 843 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
In Re Marriage of Wojcik, 838 N.E.2d 282 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2004). One such exception is where the property has been acquired by gift, legacy, or descent.”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Henke, 728 N.E.2d 1137 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The determination of whether property is to be classified as marital or nonmarital is governed by section 503 of the IIlinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)). Section 503(a)(6) of the Act provides that “non-marital property” is…”
— 750 ILCS 5/503(d)(ll) — 3 cases
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 824 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2005). “The circuit court then considered the factors set forth in section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Dissolution Act) (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 2000)), as well as the allocation of marital property and debt, and held that each party should be responsible…”
In Re Marriage of Sawicki, 806 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2000). Those relevant factors include the following: (1) each party’s contribution to the marital estate; (2) the dissipation of martial assets by either party; (3) the value of the property assigned to the spouse; (4) the duration of the marriage; (5)…”
In Re Marriage of Polsky, 899 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(e) — 12 cases
In Re Marriage of Centioli, 781 N.E.2d 611 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
Reinbold ex rel. Est. of Thorpe v. Thorpe (In re Thorpe), 546 B.R. 172 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2016).
In re West, 507 B.R. 252 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).
Voiland v. Kimmell (In re Kimmell), 480 B.R. 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2012).
Reinbold v. Thorpe (In re Thorpe), 569 B.R. 310 (C.D. Ill. 2017).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(f) — 20 cases
In re Marriage of Mathis, 2012 IL 113496 (Ill. 2013). “Section 503(a) defines nonmarital property (750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2010)), and section 503(d) instructs the trial court to divide marital property in “just proportions” (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2010)).”
Marjorie L. Mungo, Debtor-Appellant, Cross-Appellee v. Maureen Sullivan Taylor, 355 F.3d 969 (7th Cir. 2004).
In re Marriage of Budorick, 2020 IL App (1st) 190994 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “750 ILCS 5/503(a) (West 2018). We will not disturb a trial court’s classification of property unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
In Re Marriage of Donovan, 838 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
In Re Marriage of Asher-Goettler, 883 N.E.2d 564 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(f)(1) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Tarbouche, 2023 IL App (1st) 211145-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(g) — 35 cases
In Re Marriage of Petersen, 744 N.E.2d 877 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In Re Marriage of Walker, 899 N.E.2d 1097 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
In Re Marriage of Wolfe, 699 N.E.2d 190 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
In Re Marriage of Schneider, 798 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
In Re Keon C., 800 N.E.2d 1257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(h) — 2 cases
In re Marriage of Jones, 2019 IL App (5th) 180388 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
In Re Marriage of Hale, 662 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(i) — 7 cases
In Re Marriage of Carter, 740 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
In Re Marriage of Schweihs, 650 N.E.2d 569 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
In Re Marriage of Marx, 667 N.E.2d 734 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
In re Marriage of Carter (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
In re Marriage of Are, 2020 IL App (4th) 190499-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j) — 80 cases
Blum v. Koster, 919 N.E.2d 333 (Ill. 2009).
In Re Marriage of King, 802 N.E.2d 1216 (Ill. 2003).
In Re Marriage of Hasabnis, 749 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In Re Marriage of McGuire, 712 N.E.2d 411 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
In Re Marriage of Berto, 800 N.E.2d 550 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(1) — 10 cases
In re Marriage of Anderson, 2015 IL App (3d) 140257 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015).
Walker v. Tillman, 2025 IL App (1st) 242424-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2025).
Cooney v. Bischoff, 898 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
In re Marriage of Waldschmidt, 2020 IL App (3d) 190143-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
In re Marriage of Kestner-Pennell, 2024 IL App (4th) 230611-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(2) — 56 cases
In Re Marriage of Suriano & LaFeber, 756 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In re Marriage of Lonvick, 2013 IL App (2d) 120865 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).
In Re Marriage of Nesbitt, 879 N.E.2d 445 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
In Re Marriage of Haken, 914 N.E.2d 739 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
In Re Marriage of Brackett, 722 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(3) — 2 cases
Kaufman, Litwin & Feinstein v. Edgar, 704 N.E.2d 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
Kaufman, Litwin, & Feinstein v. Edgar (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(4) — 3 cases
In Re Marriage of Suriano & LaFeber, 756 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In Re Marriage of DeLarco, 728 N.E.2d 1278 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
In re Marriage of Suriano (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(5) — 5 cases
In Re Marriage of Minear, 679 N.E.2d 856 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
In Re Marriage of Suriano & LaFeber, 756 N.E.2d 382 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
In re Parentage of J.W., 2017 IL App (2d) 160554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
In re Parentage of J.W., 2017 IL App (2d) 160554 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017).
In re Marriage of Suriano (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(j)(l) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Blum, 879 N.E.2d 940 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
In Re Marriage of Konchar & Ionta, 727 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
Cooney v. Bischoff, 898 N.E.2d 1122 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(k) — 3 cases
In re Marriage of Bornhofen, 2023 IL App (1st) 221194-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Mansoor, 2023 IL App (3d) 220216-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
In re Marriage of Morrison, 2020 IL App (2d) 200068-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020).
— 750 ILCS 5/503(n) — 1 case
In re Marriage of Phalen, 2023 IL App (3d) 220296-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
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