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Illinois Compiled Statutes

750 ILCS 60/217 (2026)

Emergency order of protection

✓ current as of May 2026
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(750 ILCS 60/217) (from Ch. 40, par. 2312-17)
    Sec. 217. Emergency order of protection.
    (a) Prerequisites. An emergency order of protection shall issue if petitioner satisfies the requirements of this subsection for one or more of the requested remedies. For each remedy requested, the petitioner shall establish that:
        (1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208;
        (2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and
        (3) There is good cause to grant the remedy,
    
regardless of prior service of process or of notice upon the respondent, because:
            (i) For the remedies of "prohibition of abuse"
        
described in Section 214(b)(1), "stay away order and additional prohibitions" described in Section 214(b)(3), "removal or concealment of minor child" described in Section 214(b)(8), "order to appear" described in Section 214(b)(9), "physical care and possession of the minor child" described in Section 214(b)(5), "protection of property" described in Section 214(b)(11), "prohibition of entry" described in Section 214(b)(14), "prohibition of firearm possession" described in Section 214(b)(14.5), "prohibition of access to records" described in Section 214(b)(15), and "injunctive relief" described in Section 214(b)(16), the harm which that remedy is intended to prevent would be likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner's efforts to obtain judicial relief;
            (ii) For the remedy of "grant of exclusive
        
possession of residence" described in Section 214(b)(2), the immediate danger of further abuse of the petitioner by the respondent, if the petitioner chooses or had chosen to remain in the residence or household while the respondent was given any prior notice or greater notice than was actually given of the petitioner's efforts to obtain judicial relief, outweighs the hardships to the respondent of an emergency order granting the petitioner exclusive possession of the residence or household. This remedy shall not be denied because the petitioner has or could obtain temporary shelter elsewhere while prior notice is given to the respondent, unless the hardships to respondent from exclusion from the home substantially outweigh those to the petitioner;
            (iii) For the remedy of "possession of personal
        
property" described in Section 214(b)(10), improper disposition of the personal property would be likely to occur if the respondent were given any prior notice, or greater notice than was actually given, of the petitioner's efforts to obtain judicial relief, or the petitioner has an immediate and pressing need for possession of that property.
    An emergency order may not include the counseling, legal custody, payment of support, or monetary compensation remedies.
    (a-5) When a petition for an emergency order of protection is granted, the order and file shall not be public and shall only be accessible to the court, the petitioner, law enforcement, a domestic violence advocate or counselor, the counsel of record for either party, and the State's Attorney for the county until the order is served on the respondent.
    Accessibility to the order and file under this subsection prior to the order being served on the respondent shall be in accordance with Section 5 of the Court Record and Document Accessibility Act.
    (b) Appearance by respondent. If the respondent appears in court for this hearing for an emergency order, he or she may elect to file a general appearance and testify. Any resulting order may be an emergency order, governed by this Section. Notwithstanding the requirements of this Section, if all requirements of Section 218 have been met, the court may issue a 30-day interim order.
    (c) Emergency orders: court holidays and evenings.
        (1) Prerequisites. When the court is unavailable at
    
the close of business, the petitioner may file a petition for a 21-day emergency order before any available circuit judge or associate judge who may grant relief under this Act. If the judge finds that there is an immediate and present danger of abuse to the petitioner and that the petitioner has satisfied the prerequisites set forth in subsection (a) of Section 217, that judge may issue an emergency order of protection.
        (1.5) Issuance of order. The chief judge of the
    
circuit court may designate for each county in the circuit at least one judge to be reasonably available to issue orally, by telephone, by facsimile, or otherwise, an emergency order of protection at all times, whether or not the court is in session.
        (2) Certification and transfer. The judge who issued
    
the order under this Section shall promptly communicate or convey the order to the sheriff to facilitate the entry of the order into the Law Enforcement Agencies Data System by the Illinois State Police pursuant to Section 302. Any order issued under this Section and any documentation in support thereof shall be certified on the next court day to the appropriate court. The clerk of that court shall immediately assign a case number, file the petition, order and other documents with the court, and enter the order of record and file it with the sheriff for service, in accordance with Section 222. Filing the petition shall commence proceedings for further relief under Section 202. Failure to comply with the requirements of this subsection shall not affect the validity of the order.
(Source: P.A. 102-538, eff. 8-20-21; 102-831, eff. 5-13-22; 103-154, eff. 6-30-23; 103-166, eff. 1-1-24.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 21 cases (6 in the last 5 years), 1997–2025 · leading case: People v. Reid, 688 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill. 1997).
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People v. Reid, 688 N.E.2d 1156 (Ill. 1997). · cites it 2× “750 ILCS 60/217, 220 (West 1994). A plenary order of protection may not issue until respondent has answered or is in default, but may be effective for up to two years.”
Whitten v. Whitten, 686 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). · cites it 3× “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) (West 1996). This can only be accomplished if courts properly apply the requirements of the Act.”
McClellan v. Hull, 2023 IL App (1st) 220465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). · cites it 2× “750 ILCS 60/217(a) (West 2020). Moreover, “[f]or each remedy requested, the petitioner shall establish that: (1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208; (2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and (3) There is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior…”
Mowen v. Holland, 783 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(2) (West 2000). When the trial court issued its “Order Following Issuance of Emergency Order of Protection” continuing the emergency order in full force and effect as a plenary order of protection, the relevant findings of the emergency order were effectively…”
Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). · cites it 2× “For the emergency grant of an order for possession of personal property, this would be critical; such an order is authorized when the “petitioner has an immediate and pressing need for possession of that property” (750 ILCS 60/ 217(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002)), but this is not the…”
Wilson v. Jackson, 728 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “750 ILCS 60/ 217(a)(3)(iii) (West 1998). Therefore, while the court could order a home study to be used in ruling on an interim or plenary order, it should not have continued the March 8 hearing to await the report.”
Lutz v. Lutz, 728 N.E.2d 1234 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “The Act (750 ILCS 60/101 through 401 (West 1998)) provides for entry of (1) an emergency order of protection (750 ILCS 60/217 (West 1998)), (2) a 30-day interim order of protection (750 ILCS 60/ 218 (West 1998)), and (3) a plenary order of protection (750 ILCS 60/ 219 (West…”
Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “” 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3)(i) (West 2014). Emergency orders (unless reopened or extended) are “effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days.”
In Re Th, 820 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) (West 2002). The provision's purposes can only be carried out if courts properly apply its requirements.”
In re Marriage of Goodman, 2020 IL App (2d) 200289-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). “Section 219 of the Domestic Violence Act provides that a plenary order of protection, the type involved here, “shall issue” if the petitioner has, among other things, satisfied the requirements of section 214 of the Domestic Violence Act.”
Martinez v. Leon, 2024 IL App (1st) 231058 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). “See 750 ILCS 60/217(a) (West 2022); id. § 218(a).”
In re Marriage of Botero, 2023 IL App (1st) 221576-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “The Act provides for three types of orders of protection: emergency (750 ILCS 60/217), interim (750 ILCS 60/218), and plenary (750 ILCS 60/219).”
Show all 21 citing cases →
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a) — 2 cases
McClellan v. Hull, 2023 IL App (1st) 220465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “750 ILCS 60/217(a) (West 2020). Moreover, “[f]or each remedy requested, the petitioner shall establish that: (1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208; (2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and (3) There is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior…”
Martinez v. Leon, 2024 IL App (1st) 231058 (Ill. App. Ct. 2024). “See 750 ILCS 60/217(a) (West 2022); id. § 218(a).”
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(1) — 1 case
McClellan v. Hull, 2023 IL App (1st) 220465 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023). “750 ILCS 60/217(a) (West 2020). Moreover, “[f]or each remedy requested, the petitioner shall establish that: (1) The court has jurisdiction under Section 208; (2) The requirements of Section 214 are satisfied; and (3) There is good cause to grant the remedy, regardless of prior…”
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(1)(ii) — 1 case
Creaser v. Creaser (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(2) — 2 cases
Mowen v. Holland, 783 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(2) (West 2000). When the trial court issued its “Order Following Issuance of Emergency Order of Protection” continuing the emergency order in full force and effect as a plenary order of protection, the relevant findings of the emergency order were effectively…”
Mowen v. Holland (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) — 4 cases
Whitten v. Whitten, 686 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) (West 1996). This can only be accomplished if courts properly apply the requirements of the Act.”
In Re Th, 820 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) (West 2002). The provision's purposes can only be carried out if courts properly apply its requirements.”
People v. L.S., 820 N.E.2d 977 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
Whitten v. Whitten (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3)(i) — 3 cases
Whitten v. Whitten, 686 N.E.2d 19 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). “750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3) (West 1996). This can only be accomplished if courts properly apply the requirements of the Act.”
Koshinski v. Trame, 2017 IL App (5th) 150398 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017). “” 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3)(i) (West 2014). Emergency orders (unless reopened or extended) are “effective for not less than 14 nor more than 21 days.”
People v. Hill, 2024 IL App (4th) 240449-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2024).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3)(ii) — 1 case
In re Parentage of N.N., 2023 IL App (1st) 221544-U (Ill. App. Ct. 2023).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(3)(iii) — 4 cases
Wilson v. Jackson, 728 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). “750 ILCS 60/ 217(a)(3)(iii) (West 1998). Therefore, while the court could order a home study to be used in ruling on an interim or plenary order, it should not have continued the March 8 hearing to await the report.”
Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “For the emergency grant of an order for possession of personal property, this would be critical; such an order is authorized when the “petitioner has an immediate and pressing need for possession of that property” (750 ILCS 60/ 217(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002)), but this is not the…”
Creaser v. Creaser (Ill. App. Ct. 2003).
Wilson v. Jackson (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
— 750 ILCS 60/217(a)(l)(ii) — 1 case
Creaser v. Creaser, 794 N.E.2d 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). “For the emergency grant of an order for possession of personal property, this would be critical; such an order is authorized when the “petitioner has an immediate and pressing need for possession of that property” (750 ILCS 60/ 217(a)(3)(iii) (West 2002)), but this is not the…”
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