ILCS » Chapter 815 · Act 710
Illinois Compiled Statutes

815 ILCS 710/14 (2026)

Limitations

✓ current as of May 2026
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(815 ILCS 710/14) (from Ch. 121 1/2, par. 764)
    Sec. 14. Limitations. Except as provided in Section 12, actions arising out of any provision of this Act shall be commenced within 4 years next after the cause of action accrues; provided, however, that if a person liable hereunder conceals the cause of action from the knowledge of the person entitled to bring it, the period prior to the discovery of his cause of action by the person entitled shall be excluded in determining the time limited for the commencement of the action. If a cause of action accrues during the pendency of any civil, criminal or administrative proceeding against a person brought by the United States, or any of its agencies under the antitrust laws, the Federal Trade Commission Act, or any other federal act, or the laws or to franchising, such actions may be commenced within one year after the final disposition of such civil, criminal or administrative proceeding.
(Source: P.A. 81-43.)

    
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases, 1996–2010 · leading case: Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2002).
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Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 770 N.E.2d 177 (Ill. 2002). · cites it 16× “The appellate court rejected defendants' numerous claims of error and affirmed the circuit court judgment. We granted defendants' petition for leave to appeal.”
People Ex Rel. Graf v. Vill. of Lake Bluff, 795 N.E.2d 281 (Ill. 2003). · cites it 2× “] Through the legislature's adoption of the Act in 1979, the legislature created a new justiciable matter. The legislature's creation of a new justiciable matter, however, does not mean that the legislature thereby confers jurisdiction on the circuit court.”
Mauer v. Rubin, 926 N.E.2d 947 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “The period of limitations at issue in Belleville was the four-year limit under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (Act) (815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000)). Plaintiff, an automobile dealership, sued defendants for alleged violations of the Act, claiming that defendants had failed to…”
People v. Sharifpour, 930 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010). · cites it 2× “Moreover, as explained by our supreme court in Davis: "Generally, once a court has acquired jurisdiction, no subsequent error or irregularity will oust the jurisdiction thus acquired.”
People v. Keegan, 779 N.E.2d 904 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). “This is apparently a question of first impression; however, our supreme court, considering a four-year limitations period under the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000)), recently provided guidance to resolve the issue.”
Hamilton v. Chrysler Corp., 666 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996). “764 (now 815 ILCS 710/14 (West 1994))). Chrysler’s motion was denied on September 19, 1989.”
Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (Ill. 2002). · cites it 6× “Act’s Limitations Period Defendants first argue that plaintiff’s claim under the Act was barred based on the four-year limitations period contained in the statute.”
People ex rel. Graf v. Vill. of Lake Bluff (Ill. 2003). “However, as we explained in construing the limitations period contained in the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act (815 ILCS 710/14 (West 2000)): “The legislature may create new justiciable matters by enacting legislation that creates rights and duties that have no counterpart at common…”
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