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ILCSChapter 820Act 115

820 ILCS 115/2 (2026)

Definitions

Edition and currency
laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026) ACTIVE · 51 IN 5Y cited 1996–2026 124citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 124 opinions since 1996, 51 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (7 cases).

(820 ILCS 115/2) (from Ch. 48, par. 39m-2)
    Sec. 2. Definitions. For all employees, other than separated employees, "wages" shall be defined as any compensation owed an employee by an employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, or any other basis of calculation. Payments to separated employees shall be termed "final compensation" and shall be defined as wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement between the 2 parties. Where an employer is legally committed through a collective bargaining agreement or otherwise to make contributions to an employee benefit, trust or fund on the basis of a certain amount per hour, day, week or other period of time, the amount due from the employer to such employee benefit, trust, or fund shall be defined as "wage supplements", subject to the wage collection provisions of this Act.
    As used in this Act, the term "employer" shall include any individual, partnership, association, corporation, limited liability company, business trust, employment and labor placement agencies where wage payments are made directly or indirectly by the agency or business for work undertaken by employees under hire to a third party pursuant to a contract between the business or agency with the third party, or any person or group of persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee, for which one or more persons is gainfully employed.
    As used in this Act, the term "employee" shall include any individual permitted to work by an employer in an occupation, but shall not include any individual:
        (1) who has been and will continue to be free from
    
control and direction over the performance of his work, both under his contract of service with his employer and in fact; and
        (2) who performs work which is either outside the
    
usual course of business or is performed outside all of the places of business of the employer unless the employer is in the business of contracting with third parties for the placement of employees; and
        (3) who is in an independently established trade,
    
occupation, profession or business.
    "Pay stub" means an itemized statement or statements reflecting an employee's hours worked, rate of pay, overtime pay and overtime hours worked, gross wages earned, deductions made from the employee's wages, and the total of wages and deductions year to date.
    The following terms apply to an employer's use of payroll cards to pay wages to an employee under the requirements of this Act:
    "Payroll card" means a card provided to an employee by an employer or other payroll card issuer as a means of accessing the employee's payroll card account.
    "Payroll card account" means an account that is directly or indirectly established through an employer and to which deposits of a participating employee's wages are made.
    "Payroll card issuer" means a bank, financial institution, or other entity that issues a payroll card to an employee under an employer payroll card program.
(Source: P.A. 103-953, eff. 1-1-25.)

    
The 20 cases that cite 820 ILCS 115/2 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENAndrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 838 N.E.2d 894 (Ill. 2005).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 10×cited by 88 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“Kowa, and Huston-Patterson Corporation. Plaintiffs alleged that they were owed unpaid vacation time and severance pay and that all three defendants were jointly liable for the amounts owed, as all three fell within the Wage Act's definition of "employer.”
The case’s holding
The plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language serves as the best indication of legislative intent during statutory construction.
Later courts cite it for
“nevertheless, the interpretation of a statute by involved administrative bodies constitutes 'an informed source for guidance when seeking to ascertain the legislature's intention when the statute was enacted.” · 9 citing courts
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 13×subsections: (1) 3× (2) 2×cited by 47 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“The defendants argue in the alternative that, even if the Wage Act were to apply to nonresidents, dismissal would still be appropriate because Adams comes under the exclusion in 820 ILCS 115/2, making him a non-employee.”
The case’s holding
The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act applies to nonresidents who perform work in Illinois for an in-state employer.
Later courts cite it for
“nonresidents of illinois who work in that state for an in-state employer may qualify as employees within the protection of the iwpca.” · 2 citing courts
3
GREENWatts v. ADDO Mgmt., L.L.C., 2018 IL App (1st) 170201, 97 N.E.3d 75.
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 4×cited by 24 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“¶ 4 In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they were residents of Illinois and, at all relevant times, "employees" of the defendants, as that term is defined under section 2 of the Wage Act ( 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2014) ). They further alleged that the…”
4
GREENCatania v. LOCAL 4250/5050, 834 N.E.2d 966 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2005).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 5×cited by 40 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 1998). With respect to who is considered to be an “employer” under the Wage Payment Act, section 2 defines the term as: “any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, employment and labor placement agencies where wage payments are…”
The case’s holding
A plaintiff must demonstrate performance of contract requirements to succeed on a breach of contract claim.
Later courts cite it for
“(1) the defendant was an 'employer' as defined in the wage payment act; (2) the parties entered into an 'employment contract or agreement'; and (3) the plaintiff was due 'final compensation.” · 5 citing courts
5
GREENZabinsky v. Gelber Grp., Inc., 807 N.E.2d 666 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 4×cited by 59 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“) 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 1994). Plaintiff testified at trial that he worked the first quarter of 1990 pursuant to an agreement that defendants would pay him a bonus based upon a mutually agreed-upon formula.”
The case’s holding
The Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act requires only a manifestation of mutual assent to establish an agreement rather than a formal, enforceable contract.
Later courts cite it for
“an 'agreement' is broader than a contract and requires only a manifestation of mutual assent on the part of two or more persons; parties may enter into an 'agreement' without the formalities and accompanying legal protections of a contract.” · 9 citing courts
6
GREENByung Moo Soh v. Target Mktg. Sys., 817 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 4×subsections: (1)cited by 52 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“On appeal, the plaintiff, Byung Moo Soh, argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted an employee exemption found in section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2002)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial…”
The case’s holding
An individual is excluded from the protections of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act only if they satisfy all three conjunctive criteria of the independent contractor exemption.
Later courts cite it for
“to provide employees with a cause of action for the timely and complete payment of earned wages or final compensation, without retaliation from employers.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENO'Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, 198 N.E.3d 323.
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 5×subsections: (2) 2× (1)cited by 12 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“Udo, International Asset Transactions, LLC (IAT), and IATMarkets, LLC (IATM), pursuant to section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2018)). On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff met all…”
Later courts cite it for
“however, it is also well established that plaintiff's status under the act is not controlled by how the parties referred to themselves in their agreement.” · 2 citing courts
8
GREENLanders-Scelfo v. Corp. Off. Sys., 827 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2005).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 3×cited by 91 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“See 820 ILCS 115/2, 3, 5 (West 2002). At issue here is whether plaintiff adequately pleaded (1) that she had an employment agreement with Synergy that required the payment of commissions and (2) that Synergy was her employer under the Wage Collection Act.”
The case’s holding
An employer and an employee manifest assent to the material terms of an employment agreement through conduct alone.
Later courts cite it for
“must plead that wages or final compensation is due to him or her as an employee from an employer under an employment contract or agreement.” · 9 citing courts
9
GREENPeter Enger v. Chicago Carriage Cab Corp., 812 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2016).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 1×cited by 96 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (emphasis added). As such, to state a claim under the IWPCA, the drivers are required to demonstrate that they are owed compensation from defendants pursuant to an employment agreement.”
The case’s holding
To state a claim under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they are owed compensation from the employer pursuant to an employment agreement.
Later courts cite it for
“if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to the relief requested.” · 18 citing courts
10
GREENBrown v. DS Servs. of Am., Inc., 246 F. Supp. 3d 1206 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 2×cited by 18 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“July 16, 2012) (internal citations omitted). Rather, an IWPCA claim will fail unless the plaintiff shows that the defendants owe her compensation pursuant to an employment agreement, which can manifest based on mutual assent and need not involve a written contract.”
Later courts cite it for
“whether a reasonable factfinder could 'conclude that mahran's proscribed factor caused the adverse employment action.” · 3 citing courts
11
GREENAndrews v. Kowa Printing Corp., 814 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2004).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 2×cited by 38 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2000). We agree with plaintiffs and hold that under the specific facts of this case, their claim under the Wage Act was a proper vehicle for their requested relief and federal preemption was not required.”
The case’s holding
Illinois law governs the calculation of post-judgment interest in claims brought under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
Later courts cite it for
“the purpose of the wage act is to provide illinois employees with a cause of action for the timely and complete payment of earned wages or final com pensation.” · 4 citing courts
12
GREENAnderson v. First Am. Grp. of Companies, 818 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 3×cited by 17 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“Defendants argue that plaintiffs position as vice president of operations for First American is not an “employee” within the meaning of section 2 (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2000)). Defendants also contend that plaintiff is not an “employee” under section 1 of the Attorneys Fees in…”
13
GREENTimothy Johnson v. Diakon Logistics, 44 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2022).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 2×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“Under 820 ILCS 115/2, Illinois courts apply a three-part test to determine employee status.”
Later courts cite it for
“courts in illinois routinely disregard contractual language classifying workers as contractors or consultants” · 3 citing courts
14
GREENDoherty v. Kahn, 682 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 2×subsections: (1)cited by 61 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 1992). Claims for wages or final compensation are thus akin to breach of contract actions.”
The case’s holding
Allegations of broken promises regarding corporate office, stock ownership, and salary do not constitute a scheme to defraud (plaintiff did not plead scheme to defraud).
Later courts cite it for
“was 'incompetent,' 'lazy,' 'dishonest,' 'cannot manage a business,' and/or 'lacks the ability to perform landscaping services.” · 5 citing courts
15
GREENWatts v. ADDO Mgmt., L.L.C., 2018 IL App (1st) 170201.
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 4×cited by 13 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“¶4 In their second amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that they were residents of Illinois and, at all relevant times, “employees” of the defendants, as that term is defined under section 2 of the Wage Act (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2014)). They further alleged that the…”
Later courts cite it for
“he had an employment agreement with the employer that required the payment of wages or final compensation.” · 7 citing courts
16
GREENLawrence Hess v. Kanoski & Associat, 668 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2012).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 1×cited by 80 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (2006). The parties do not dispute that Hess had a valid contract with the firm (his “employment agreement,” not to be confused with “agreement” as it is used by the IWPCA) and that, until his termination, he adequately performed as an employee under that…”
The case’s holding
A court must consider extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent when a contract term is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.
Later courts cite it for
“an equitable remedy that lies where a 'defendant has unjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiffs detriment and ... the defendant's retention of the benefit violates the fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience.” · 4 citing courts
17
GREENMajmudar v. House of Spices (India), Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 130292, 1 N.E.3d 1207.
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 3×cited by 7 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“" 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2006). Payments to separated employees are termed "final compensation," which is defined as "wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other compensation owed the…”
18
GREENLiaquat Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 756 N.E.2d 902 (Ill. App. Ct. 2d Dist. 2001).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 1×cited by 51 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 1998). While VRI was a “labor placement agency,” it was not a labor placement agency within this state.”
The case’s holding
The mere execution of a contract in Illinois does not constitute a transaction of business sufficient to trigger the long-arm statute.
Later courts cite it for
“the mere execution of a contract in illinois is not by itself a sufficient transaction of business to trigger the application of the long-arm statute.” · 2 citing courts
19
GREENMolina v. First Line Solutions LLC, 566 F. Supp. 2d 770 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 1×cited by 35 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“See 820 ILCS 115/2 (definition of employer & employee under the IWP-CA).”
The case’s holding
A FLSA collective action may proceed without a unified policy where an identifiable factual or legal nexus binds the plaintiffs together and collective treatment promotes judicial economy.
Later courts cite it for
“a unified policy, plan, or scheme ... is not necessarily required ... especially if a collective action would promote judicial economy because there is otherwise an identifiable factual or legal nexus.” · 2 citing courts
20
GREENGrant v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 668 N.E.2d 1188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1996).
cites § 820 ILCS 115/2 2×cited by 20 cases
Where it cites § 820 ILCS 115/2
“"Final compensation” is defined in that act as: "wages, salaries, earned commissions, earned bonuses, and the monetary equivalent of earned vacation and earned holidays, and any other compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an employment contract or agreement…”
The case’s holding
A right to back pay or restored benefits does not create a right to payment at a specific time; such payment must rest on a collective bargaining agreement or statute.
Later courts cite it for
“include the restoration of sick days that should have accrued during the dismissal period.” · 3 citing courts

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Citing cases by year
199620112026

One bar per year. Tallest: 15 cases in 2024. 2026 is a partial year. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Ill. App. Ct.61N.D. Ill.427th Cir.8S.D. Ill.4C.D. Ill.3Ill.2E.D. Ill.1Bankr. N.D. Ill.1

The 8 courts with the most citing cases, of 10 courts in all.

By subsection
(1)7 cases
Thomas Adams v. Richard Catrambone & Great Lakes Bldg. Materials, Inc., 359 F.3d 858 (7th Cir. 2004).“The defendants argue in the alternative that, even if the Wage Act were to apply to nonresidents, dismissal would still be appropriate because Adams comes under the exclusion in 820 ILCS 115/2, making him a non-employee.”
Byung Moo Soh v. Target Mktg. Sys., 817 N.E.2d 1105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2004).“On appeal, the plaintiff, Byung Moo Soh, argues that the trial court erroneously interpreted an employee exemption found in section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2002)). For the reasons that follow, we reverse the decision of the trial…”
O'Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, 198 N.E.3d 323.“Udo, International Asset Transactions, LLC (IAT), and IATMarkets, LLC (IATM), pursuant to section 2 of the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (Wage Act) (820 ILCS 115/2 (West 2018)). On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff met all…”
Doherty v. Kahn, 682 N.E.2d 163 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1997).“” 820 ILCS 115/2 (West 1992). Claims for wages or final compensation are thus akin to breach of contract actions.”
Adams, Thomas v. Catrambone, Richard, No. 03-2408 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2004).
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(2)3 cases
O'Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, 198 N.E.3d 323.
Adams, Thomas v. Catrambone, Richard, No. 03-2408 (7th Cir. Feb. 19, 2004).

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Enactment and amendments

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Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2026 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.