Sec. 9. (a) Any decision of the liability administrative
law judge shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact. An
interested party to the dispute may, within thirty (30) days after notice
of intention to appeal as provided in section 8 of this chapter, appeal
the decision to the supreme court or the court of appeals solely for
errors of law under the same terms and conditions as govern appeals in
ordinary civil actions.
(b) Any finding of fact, judgment, conclusion, or final order made
by a person with the authority to make findings of fact or law in an
action or proceeding under this article is not conclusive or binding and
shall not be used as evidence in a separate or subsequent action or
proceeding between an individual and the individual's present or prior
employer in an action or proceeding brought before an arbitrator, a
court, or a judge of this state or the United States regardless of whether
the prior action was between the same or related parties or involved the
same facts.
Formerly: Acts 1947, c.208, s.3309; Acts 1951, c.295, s.20. As
amended by P.L.3-1989, SEC.135; P.L.135-1990, SEC.30;
P.L.21-1995, SEC.123; P.L.136-2018, SEC.118.
Notes of Decisions
Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 114 N.E.3d 840 (Ind. 2019).
· cites it 2× “" I.C. § 22-4-32-9(a) (2018). But when challenged as contrary to law, we review the LALJ's decision for the "sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision" and the "sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of facts.”
Tony v. Elkhart Cnty., 918 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“§ 22-4-32-9(b). These statutes clearly preclude the use of opinions by DWD ALJs for collateral es-toppel purposes in a subsequent civil suit.”
Jug's Catering, Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., Unemployment Ins. Bd., 714 N.E.2d 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “” I.C. § 22-4-32-9. Although Jug’s does not challenge the facts that formed the basis of the ALJ’s conclusions of law, Jug’s challenges the ALJ’s determination that the chefs and servers employed by Jug’s are not independent contractors on the basis that the United States…”
Franklin Elec. Co. v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals of the Dep't of Workforce Dev., 928 N.E.2d 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
· cites it 2× “DISCUSSION AND DECISION Standard of Review Indiana Code Section 22-4-32-9(a) (2009) provides that "[alny decision of the liability administrative law judge shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact" When the LALJ's decision is challenged as contrary to law, we…”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-32-9(a) — 10 cases
Q.D.-A., Inc. v. Indiana Dep't of Workforce Dev., 114 N.E.3d 840 (Ind. 2019).
“" I.C. § 22-4-32-9(a) (2018). But when challenged as contrary to law, we review the LALJ's decision for the "sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the decision" and the "sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the finding of facts.”
— Ind. Code § 22-4-32-9(b) — 1 case
Tony v. Elkhart Cnty., 918 N.E.2d 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“§ 22-4-32-9(b). These statutes clearly preclude the use of opinions by DWD ALJs for collateral es-toppel purposes in a subsequent civil suit.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.