Sec. 2. (a) The consent to adoption may be executed
or acknowledged at any time after the birth of the child, either in the
presence of:
(1) the court, in person or by video conferencing;
(2) a notary public or other person authorized to take
acknowledgments; or
(3) an authorized agent of:
(A) the department; or
(B) a licensed child placing agency.
(b) The child's mother may not execute a consent to adoption before
the birth of the child.
(c) The child's father may execute a consent to adoption before the
birth of the child if the consent to adoption:
(1) is in writing;
(2) is signed by the child's father in the presence of a notary
public; and
(3) contains an acknowledgment that:
(A) the consent to adoption is irrevocable; and
(B) the child's father will not receive notice of the adoption
proceedings.
(d) A child's father who consents to the adoption of the child under
subsection (c) may not challenge or contest the child's adoption.
(e) Except as provided in subsection (f) or (g), a person who
executes a written consent to the adoption of a child may not execute
a second or subsequent written consent to have another person adopt
the child unless one (1) or more of the following apply:
(1) Each original petitioner provides a written statement that the
petitioner is not adopting the child.
(2) The person consenting to the adoption has been permitted to
withdraw the first consent to adoption under IC 31-19-10.
(3) The court dismisses the petition for adoption filed by the
original petitioner or petitioners for adoption based upon a
showing, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is not in the
best interests of the child that the petition for adoption be granted.
(4) The court denies the petition to adopt the child filed by the
original petitioner or petitioners for adoption.
(f) The department may execute more than one (1) written consent
to the adoption of a child if the department determines that the
execution of more than one (1) written consent is in the best interests
of the child.
(g) The parents of a child who is a ward of the department may
execute a second or subsequent consent if:
(1) the court with jurisdiction over the child in need of services
determines that adoption by the person to whom consents were
originally signed is not in the child's best interest; or
(2) if the child's placement with the person who has petitioned or
intends to petition to adopt the child is disrupted.
[Pre-1997 Recodification Citation: 31-3-1-6(d).]
As added by P.L.1-1997, SEC.11. Amended by P.L.130-2005,
SEC.4; P.L.145-2006, SEC.251; P.L.21-2010, SEC.5; P.L.162-2011,
SEC.15; P.L.128-2012, SEC.55; P.L.89-2023, SEC.3.
Notes of Decisions
In Re the Adoption of A.S. Ex Rel. M.L.S., 912 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
· cites it 4× “10 Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2. A consent to adoption that does not identify a specific petitioner or petitioners for adoption, also called a "blanket" or general consent, is valid if the consent contains a statement, by the person consenting to adoption, that said person voluntarily…”
In Re Adoption of Infant Child Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. 2003).
· cites it 8× “However, the court also found that the signatures of the biological parents and maternal grandparents had not been executed in the presence of a notary public as required by Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2 and that, under Ind.”
In Re Adoption of MLL, 810 N.E.2d 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 2× “Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-2 provides in relevant part that a consent to adoption "may be executed at any time after the birth of the child either in the presence of: (1) the court; [or] (2) a notary public.”
In Re Adoption of Njg, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 14× “Finding that Erikka's consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
In Re the Adoption of X.J.A., 166 P.3d 396 (Kan. 2007).
· cites it 2× “2d at 1062 (quoting Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2). Considering this language, the court found that "the intent of the statute, which is designed to provide an equitable adoption procedure by protecting the rights of the adoptive parents and the child as well as those of the biological…”
Robbins v. Baxter, 799 N.E.2d 1057 (Ind. 2003).
· cites it 8× “However, the court also found that the signatures of the biological parents and maternal grandparents had not been executed in the presence of a notary public as required by Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2 and that, under Ind.”
Gillis v. Jackson, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 12× “Finding that Erikka’s consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
In Re the Adoption of M.P.S., Jr. A.S. v. M.P.S., Sr., M.S., & An.S., 963 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-2 provides that a consent to adoption may be executed at any time after the birth of the child, in the presence of the court, a notary public, or an authorized agent of the DCS or a licensed child placement agency.”
Robbins v. Baxter, 778 N.E.2d 417 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
· cites it 5× “Code § 31-3-1-6, was later recodified as Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2. . The birth mother in H.”
In Re Adoption of MPS, Jr., 963 N.E.2d 625 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “Indiana Code Section 31-19-9-2 provides that a consent to adoption may be executed at any time after the birth of the child, in the presence of the court, a notary public, or an authorized agent of the DCS or a licensed child placement agency.”
— Ind. Code § 31-19-9-2(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 31-19-9-2(a) — 2 cases
In Re Adoption of Njg, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Finding that Erikka's consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
Gillis v. Jackson, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Finding that Erikka’s consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
— Ind. Code § 31-19-9-2(b) — 3 cases
In Re the Adoption of A.S. Ex Rel. M.L.S., 912 N.E.2d 840 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
“10 Ind.Code § 31-19-9-2. A consent to adoption that does not identify a specific petitioner or petitioners for adoption, also called a "blanket" or general consent, is valid if the consent contains a statement, by the person consenting to adoption, that said person voluntarily…”
In Re Adoption of Njg, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Finding that Erikka's consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
Gillis v. Jackson, 891 N.E.2d 60 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
“Finding that Erikka’s consent was not valid because it was given before the child was born and did not follow the execution requirements of Indiana Code section 31-19-9-2, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.