Sec. 3. (a) Subject to subsection (b), with respect to
determinations as to whether any issues or evidence may be heard in an
original tax appeal that was not heard in the administrative hearing or
proceeding, the tax court is governed by the law that applied before the
creation of the tax court to appeals to trial courts of final
determinations made by the department of state revenue and the state
board of tax commissioners.
(b) Judicial review of disputed issues of fact must be confined to:
(1) the record of the proceeding before the Indiana board of tax
review; and
(2) any additional evidence taken under section 5 of this chapter.
The tax court may not try the case de novo or substitute its judgment
for that of the Indiana board of tax review. Judicial review is limited to
only those issues raised before the Indiana board of tax review, or
otherwise described by the Indiana board of tax review, in its final
determination.
(c) A person may obtain judicial review of an issue that was not
raised before the Indiana board of tax review only to the extent that the:
(1) issue concerns whether a person who was required to be
notified of the commencement of a proceeding under this chapter
was notified in substantial compliance with the applicable law; or
(2) interests of justice would be served by judicial resolution of an
issue arising from a change in controlling law occurring after the
Indiana board of tax review's action.
[Pre-2004 Recodification Citation: 33-3-5-14.]
As added by P.L.98-2004, SEC.5.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
18
cases (
8 in the last 5 years), 2007–2024 · leading case:
Hutcherson v. Ward, 2 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. T.C. 2013).
Hutcherson v. Ward, 2 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. T.C. 2013).
“Code § 33-26-6-3(b)(1) (2013). Moreover, the Tax Court's review is generally limited to the issues raised before the Indiana Board or otherwise described in its final determination.”
Idris v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 12 N.E.3d 331 (Ind. T.C. 2014).
· cites it 4× “1990); Ind. Code § 33-26-6-3 (b) (2014). Consequently, the Court finds that Idris has waived this argument because Kamenova could have, but failed to, present it to the Indiana Board.”
Grant Cnty. Assessor v. Randy & Sara Ballinger (Ind. T.C. 2020).
· cites it 3× “, I.C. § 33-26-6-3. 13 evidence). Accordingly, in the absence of market-based evidence, the Court cannot conclude that the Ballingers’ use of the DLGF’s 2018 statewide capitalization rate weakens the probative value of their income approach simply because the memorandum did not…”
Chris Bougie v. Kosciusko Cnty. Assessor (Ind. T.C. 2024).
· cites it 3× “I.C. § 33-26-6-3. If the Court were to consider this belatedly raised issue, the outcome wouldn’t be different because the Board analyzed the conflicting evidence and determined that Bougie’s upstairs was substantially finished living space, meaning that the exception would have…”
Shoot v. Anderson Twp. Assessor, 868 N.E.2d 79 (Ind. T.C. 2007).
· cites it 4× “I.C § 33-26-6-3. Consequently, the Shoots could have moved to supplement the administrative record with a sworn affidavit from the Madison County Assessor stating that May 3 was indeed the date the Shoots filed their appeals.”
Kathryn Gillette v. Brown Cnty. Assessor (Ind. T.C. 2016).
“CODE § 33-26-6-3(b) (2016) (limiting the Court’s review to the issues raised by litigants during the Indiana Board proceedings or the issues considered in the Indiana Board’s final determination).”
Starke Cnty. Assessor v. Porter-Starke Servs., Inc. (Ind. T.C. 2017).
“) The Indiana Board did not grant the exemption based on whether or not it was a public agency, but granted the exemption because it concluded the property was used for a charitable purpose.”
Square 74 Assocs. LLC v. Marion Cnty. Assessor (Ind. T.C. 2019).
“CODE § 33-26-6-3(b) (2019) (limiting the Court’s review to the issues raised by litigants during the Indiana Board proceedings or the issues discussed by the Indiana Board in its final determination).”
— Ind. Code § 33-26-6-3(b) — 13 cases
Idris v. Marion Cnty. Assessor, 12 N.E.3d 331 (Ind. T.C. 2014).
“1990); Ind. Code § 33-26-6-3 (b) (2014). Consequently, the Court finds that Idris has waived this argument because Kamenova could have, but failed to, present it to the Indiana Board.”
Shoot v. Anderson Twp. Assessor, 868 N.E.2d 79 (Ind. T.C. 2007).
“I.C § 33-26-6-3. Consequently, the Shoots could have moved to supplement the administrative record with a sworn affidavit from the Madison County Assessor stating that May 3 was indeed the date the Shoots filed their appeals.”
Kathryn Gillette v. Brown Cnty. Assessor (Ind. T.C. 2016).
“CODE § 33-26-6-3(b) (2016) (limiting the Court’s review to the issues raised by litigants during the Indiana Board proceedings or the issues considered in the Indiana Board’s final determination).”
Starke Cnty. Assessor v. Porter-Starke Servs., Inc. (Ind. T.C. 2017).
“) The Indiana Board did not grant the exemption based on whether or not it was a public agency, but granted the exemption because it concluded the property was used for a charitable purpose.”
— Ind. Code § 33-26-6-3(b)(1) — 1 case
Hutcherson v. Ward, 2 N.E.3d 138 (Ind. T.C. 2013).
“Code § 33-26-6-3(b)(1) (2013). Moreover, the Tax Court's review is generally limited to the issues raised before the Indiana Board or otherwise described in its final determination.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.