Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (2026)

Immunity of governmental entity or employee

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 3. (a) A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from the following:

(1) The natural condition of unimproved property.

(2) The condition of a reservoir, dam, canal, conduit, drain, or similar structure when used by a person for a purpose that is not foreseeable.

(3) The temporary condition of a public thoroughfare or extreme sport area that results from weather.

(4) The condition of an unpaved road, trail, or footpath, the purpose of which is to provide access to a recreation or scenic area.

(5) The design, construction, control, operation, or normal condition of an extreme sport area, if all entrances to the extreme sport area are marked with:

(A) a set of rules governing the use of the extreme sport area;

(B) a warning concerning the hazards and dangers associated with the use of the extreme sport area; and

(C) a statement that the extreme sport area may be used only by persons operating extreme sport equipment.

This subdivision shall not be construed to relieve a governmental entity from liability for the continuing duty to maintain extreme sports areas in a reasonably safe condition.

(6) The initiation of a judicial or an administrative proceeding.

(7) The performance of a discretionary function; however, the provision of medical or optical care as provided in IC 34-6-2.1-54 shall be considered as a ministerial act.

(8) The adoption and enforcement of or failure to adopt or enforce:

(A) a law (including rules and regulations); or

(B) in the case of a public school or charter school, a policy;

unless the act of enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment.

(9) An act or omission performed in good faith and without malice under the apparent authority of a statute which is invalid if the employee would not have been liable had the statute been valid.

(10) The act or omission of anyone other than the governmental entity or the governmental entity's employee.

(11) The issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization, where the authority is discretionary under the law.

(12) Failure to make an inspection, or making an inadequate or negligent inspection, of any property, other than the property of a governmental entity, to determine whether the property complied with or violates any law or contains a hazard to health or safety.

(13) Entry upon any property where the entry is expressly or impliedly authorized by law.

(14) Misrepresentation if unintentional.

(15) Theft by another person of money in the employee's official custody, unless the loss was sustained because of the employee's own negligent or wrongful act or omission.

(16) Injury to the property of a person under the jurisdiction and control of the department of correction if the person has not exhausted the administrative remedies and procedures provided by section 7 of this chapter.

(17) Injury to the person or property of a person under supervision of a governmental entity and who is:

(A) on probation;

(B) assigned to an alcohol and drug services program under IC 12-23, a minimum security release program under IC 11-10-8, a pretrial conditional release program under IC 35-33-8, or a community corrections program under IC 11-12; or

(C) subject to a court order requiring the person to be escorted by a county police officer while on or in a government building (as defined in IC 36-9-13-3) owned by a county building authority under IC 36-9-13, unless the injury is the result of an act or omission amounting to:

(i) gross negligence;

(ii) willful or wanton misconduct; or

(iii) intentional misconduct.

(18) Design of a highway (as defined in IC 9-13-2-73), toll road project (as defined in IC 8-15-2-4(4)), tollway (as defined in IC 8-15-3-7), or project (as defined in IC 8-15.7-2-14) if the claimed loss occurs at least twenty (20) years after the public highway, toll road project, tollway, or project was designed or substantially redesigned; except that this subdivision shall not be construed to relieve a responsible governmental entity from the continuing duty to provide and maintain public highways in a reasonably safe condition.

(19) Development, adoption, implementation, operation, maintenance, or use of an enhanced emergency communication system.

(20) Injury to a student or a student's property by an employee of a school corporation if the employee is acting reasonably under a:

(A) discipline policy adopted under IC 20-33-8-12; or

(B) restraint and seclusion plan adopted under IC 20-20-40-14.

(21) An act or omission performed in good faith under the apparent authority of a court order described in IC 35-46-1-15.1 or IC 35-46-1-15.3 that is invalid, including an arrest or imprisonment related to the enforcement of the court order, if the governmental entity or employee would not have been liable had the court order been valid.

(22) An act taken to investigate or remediate hazardous substances, petroleum, or other pollutants associated with a brownfield (as defined in IC 13-11-2-19.3) unless:

(A) the loss is a result of reckless conduct; or

(B) the governmental entity was responsible for the initial placement of the hazardous substances, petroleum, or other pollutants on the brownfield.

(23) The operation of an off-road vehicle (as defined in IC 14-8-2-185) by a nongovernmental employee, or by a governmental employee not acting within the scope of the employment of the employee, on a public highway in a county road system outside the corporate limits of a city or town, unless the loss is the result of an act or omission amounting to:

(A) gross negligence;

(B) willful or wanton misconduct; or

(C) intentional misconduct.

This subdivision shall not be construed to relieve a governmental entity from liability for the continuing duty to maintain highways in a reasonably safe condition for the operation of motor vehicles licensed by the bureau of motor vehicles for operation on public highways.

(24) Any act or omission rendered in connection with a request, investigation, assessment, or opinion provided under IC 36-9-28.7.

     (b) This subsection applies to a cause of action that accrues during a period of a state disaster emergency declared under IC 10-14-3-12 to respond to COVID-19, if the state of disaster emergency was declared after February 29, 2020, and before April 1, 2022. A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable for an act or omission arising from COVID-19 unless the act or omission constitutes gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or intentional misrepresentation. If a claim described in this subsection is:

(1) a claim for injury or death resulting from medical malpractice; and

(2) not barred by the immunity provided under this subsection;

the claimant is required to comply with all of the provisions of IC 34-18 (medical malpractice act).

[Pre-1998 Recodification Citation: 34-4-16.5-3.]

As added by P.L.1-1998, SEC.8. Amended by P.L.142-1999, SEC.2; P.L.250-2001, SEC.6; P.L.280-2001, SEC.42; P.L.1-2002, SEC.144; P.L.161-2003, SEC.5; P.L.1-2005, SEC.218; P.L.208-2005, SEC.14; P.L.47-2006, SEC.48; P.L.121-2009, SEC.15; P.L.86-2010, SEC.10; P.L.125-2011, SEC.1; P.L.122-2013, SEC.2; P.L.220-2013, SEC.2; P.L.65-2016, SEC.21; P.L.166-2021, SEC.14; P.L.135-2023, SEC.1; P.L.186-2025, SEC.182.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 267 cases (56 in the last 5 years), 1998–2026 · leading case: Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by & through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes & Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., City of Columbus, 75 N.E.3d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by & through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes & Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., City of Columbus, 75 N.E.3d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 54× “Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 03A01-1608-CT-1900 | April 11, 2017 Page 5 of 37 accident per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(18); it was not liable per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(7) (discretionary function immunity) because it was in the planning stages of making…”
East Chicago Police Dep't v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 52× “See Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3. Governmental entities and their employees are subject to liability for torts committed by them unless they can prove that one of the immunity provisions of the ITCA applies.”
Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). · cites it 30× “However, it is now located at I.C. § 34-13-3-3. [4] Because we find this issue dispositive, we need not address whether the Hammond defendants are immune under subsections (6) and (9) of the Act or whether Minks has stated a claim for relief under state law.”
Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2001). · cites it 21× “Noble County argues that two of the specific immunity provisions of Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3 preclude the damages Rogers sought in her counterclaim: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: .”
F.D. v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131 (Ind. 2013). · cites it 21× “enforcee a law," Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (8), and accordingly, EPD is immune under the ITCA.”
Giles v. Brown Cnty. Ex Rel. Bd. of Commissioners, 868 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2007). · cites it 32× “[2] Formerly I.C. § 34-13-3-3(18). [3] At various places, Giles has suggested that she is entitled to recovery as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Brown County and Columbus Regional Hospital.”
City of South Bend v. Dollahan, 918 N.E.2d 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). · cites it 20× “I.C. § 34-13-3-3. For instance, Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3 provides that "[a] governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from the following: .”
Bd. of Com'rs of Cnty. of Harrison v. Lowe, 753 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). · cites it 28× “A panel of this court sought to determine as a matter of first impression whether Tell City was immune from liability under paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 34-13-3-3. The Tell City court noted that local authorities are authorized by statute to regulate traffic on streets and…”
Bartholomew Cnty. v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). · cites it 30× “The County also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was entitled to immunity from liability for the acts or omissions of the designer and builder pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(10), which provides that “[a] governmental entity or an employee acting…”
Putnam Cnty. Sheriff v. Price, 954 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. 2011). · cites it 12× “The ITCA "allows suits against governmental entities for torts committed by their employees but grants immunity under the specific circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3.”
King Ex Rel. King v. Ne. Sec., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. 2003). · cites it 6× “I.C. § 34-13-3-3. Specifically, the District contends that both section 3(9) and 3(7) 2 of the ITCA shield the District from liability for negligence.”
City of Beech Grove v. Cathy J. Beloat, 50 N.E.3d 135 (Ind. 2016). · cites it 6× “The City responded, denying any liability and asserting, among other things, immunity under the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3. On March 19, 2014, the City motioned for summary judgment.”
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(1) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(10) — 7 cases
Bartholomew Cnty. v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The County also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was entitled to immunity from liability for the acts or omissions of the designer and builder pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(10), which provides that “[a] governmental entity or an employee acting…”
Crossno v. State, 726 N.E.2d 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Reed v. City of Evansville, 956 N.E.2d 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
In re: Indiana State Fair Litig.: Polet v. Mid-Am. Sound, 28 N.E.3d 333 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(11) — 7 cases
City of South Bend v. Dollahan, 918 N.E.2d 343 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). “I.C. § 34-13-3-3. For instance, Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3 provides that "[a] governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from the following: .”
Fifth Third Bank Ex Rel. Bozik v. CSX Corp., 306 F. Supp. 2d 841 (N.D. Ind. 2004).
Lamb v. City of Bloomington, 741 N.E.2d 436 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
City of Carmel v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 849 N.E.2d 1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(12) — 7 cases
Bartholomew Cnty. v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The County also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was entitled to immunity from liability for the acts or omissions of the designer and builder pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(10), which provides that “[a] governmental entity or an employee acting…”
Turner v. Sheriff of Marion Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 2d 966 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
Raymond Kerr v. City of South Bend, 48 N.E.3d 348 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
KA v. City of Indianapolis, 954 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Schmitt v. City of Evansville, 868 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(13) — 1 case
Gibson v. Evansville Vanderburgh Bldg. Comm'n, 725 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(14) — 2 cases
Linden v. Health Care 2000, Inc., 809 N.E.2d 929 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(16) — 2 cases
Bradley K. Buchanan v. State of Indiana, 122 N.E.3d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(17) — 3 cases
Est. OF CROUCH v. Madison Cnty., 682 F. Supp. 2d 862 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
Kantz v. Elkhart Cnty. High. Dep't, 701 N.E.2d 608 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
Bradley K. Buchanan v. State of Indiana, 122 N.E.3d 969 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(18) — 7 cases
Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by & through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes & Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., City of Columbus, 75 N.E.3d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 03A01-1608-CT-1900 | April 11, 2017 Page 5 of 37 accident per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(18); it was not liable per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(7) (discretionary function immunity) because it was in the planning stages of making…”
Giles v. Brown Cnty. Ex Rel. Bd. of Commissioners, 868 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2007). “[2] Formerly I.C. § 34-13-3-3(18). [3] At various places, Giles has suggested that she is entitled to recovery as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Brown County and Columbus Regional Hospital.”
Barnes v. Antich, 700 N.E.2d 262 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
Giles v. Brown Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Commissioners, 839 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Hiland v. State, 879 N.E.2d 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(19) — 4 cases
Giles v. Brown Cnty. Ex Rel. Bd. of Commissioners, 868 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. 2007). “[2] Formerly I.C. § 34-13-3-3(18). [3] At various places, Giles has suggested that she is entitled to recovery as a third-party beneficiary of the contract between Brown County and Columbus Regional Hospital.”
City of Peru v. Lewis, 950 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
Giles v. Brown Cnty. ex rel. Bd. of Commissioners, 839 N.E.2d 1258 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Veolia Water Indianapolis LLC v. Nat'l Trust Ins. Co., 973 N.E.2d 3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(20) — 1 case
Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2001). “Noble County argues that two of the specific immunity provisions of Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3 preclude the damages Rogers sought in her counterclaim: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: .”
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(3) — 12 cases
Putnam Cnty. Sheriff v. Price, 954 N.E.2d 451 (Ind. 2011). “The ITCA "allows suits against governmental entities for torts committed by their employees but grants immunity under the specific circumstances enumerated in Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3.”
Catt v. Bd. of Com'rs of Knox Cnty., 779 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. 2002).
Hochstetler v. Elkhart Cnty. High. Dep't, 868 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 2007).
Dzierba v. City of Michigan City, 798 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Hochstetler v. Elkhart Cnty. High. Dep't, 855 N.E.2d 731 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(5) — 4 cases
Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2001). “Noble County argues that two of the specific immunity provisions of Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3 preclude the damages Rogers sought in her counterclaim: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: .”
Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp. v. Roach-Walker, 917 N.E.2d 1224 (Ind. 2009).
City of New Haven v. Reichhart, 729 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(6) — 30 cases
F.D. v. Indiana Dep't of Child Servs., 1 N.E.3d 131 (Ind. 2013). “enforcee a law," Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3 (8), and accordingly, EPD is immune under the ITCA.”
Bd. of Com'rs of Cnty. of Harrison v. Lowe, 753 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “A panel of this court sought to determine as a matter of first impression whether Tell City was immune from liability under paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 34-13-3-3. The Tell City court noted that local authorities are authorized by statute to regulate traffic on streets and…”
Serino v. Hensley, 735 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2013).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(7) — 45 cases
Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by & through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes & Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., City of Columbus, 75 N.E.3d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 03A01-1608-CT-1900 | April 11, 2017 Page 5 of 37 accident per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(18); it was not liable per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(7) (discretionary function immunity) because it was in the planning stages of making…”
Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “However, it is now located at I.C. § 34-13-3-3. [4] Because we find this issue dispositive, we need not address whether the Hammond defendants are immune under subsections (6) and (9) of the Act or whether Minks has stated a claim for relief under state law.”
Bd. of Com'rs of Cnty. of Harrison v. Lowe, 753 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). “A panel of this court sought to determine as a matter of first impression whether Tell City was immune from liability under paragraphs (6) and (7) of section 34-13-3-3. The Tell City court noted that local authorities are authorized by statute to regulate traffic on streets and…”
O'BANNON v. City of Anderson, 733 N.E.2d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
Turner v. Sheriff of Marion Cnty., 94 F. Supp. 2d 966 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8) — 63 cases
East Chicago Police Dep't v. Bynum, 826 N.E.2d 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “See Ind.Code § 34-13-3-3. Governmental entities and their employees are subject to liability for torts committed by them unless they can prove that one of the immunity provisions of the ITCA applies.”
Jalen Lee, A Minor Child, by & through his Next Friend, Crystal Estes & Crystal Estes, Individually v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., City of Columbus, 75 N.E.3d 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 03A01-1608-CT-1900 | April 11, 2017 Page 5 of 37 accident per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(18); it was not liable per Indiana Code section 34-13-3-3(7) (discretionary function immunity) because it was in the planning stages of making…”
Todero v. Blackwell, 383 F. Supp. 3d 826 (S.D. Ind. 2019).
Noble Cnty. v. Rogers, 745 N.E.2d 194 (Ind. 2001). “Noble County argues that two of the specific immunity provisions of Indiana Code § 34-13-3-3 preclude the damages Rogers sought in her counterclaim: A governmental entity or an employee acting within the scope of the employee's employment is not liable if a loss results from: .”
Patrick v. Miresso, 821 N.E.2d 856 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)(A) — 5 cases
John Doe v. Adam Gray, 75 F.4th 710 (7th Cir. 2023).
Morris v. Myers (S.D. Ind. 2025).
John Doe v. Adam Gray (7th Cir. 2023).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)(B) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(8)(b) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(9) — 6 cases
Minks v. Pina, 709 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). “However, it is now located at I.C. § 34-13-3-3. [4] Because we find this issue dispositive, we need not address whether the Hammond defendants are immune under subsections (6) and (9) of the Act or whether Minks has stated a claim for relief under state law.”
Mangold Ex Rel. Mangold v. Indiana Dep't of Nat. Resources, 720 N.E.2d 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
Bartholomew Cnty. v. Johnson, 995 N.E.2d 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The County also filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that it was entitled to immunity from liability for the acts or omissions of the designer and builder pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34-13-3-3(10), which provides that “[a] governmental entity or an employee acting…”
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(10) — 1 case
Craig (S.D. Ind. 2026).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(11) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(12) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(13) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(17) — 1 case
Ambers v. Tippecanoe Cnty. (N.D. Ind. 2024).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(17)(B) — 1 case
Ambers v. Tippecanoe Cnty. (N.D. Ind. 2024).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(18) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(19) — 1 case
Kleven v. St. Joseph Cnty. (N.D. Ind. 2022).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(6) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(7) — 3 cases
Doe v. Barber (N.D. Ind. 2025).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(8) — 10 cases
Alexander v. City of South Bend, 256 F. Supp. 2d 865 (N.D. Ind. 2003).
Jerry Bewley v. Town Of Speedway (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
Craig (S.D. Ind. 2026).
— Ind. Code § 34-13-3-3(a)(8)(A) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.