Sec. 2. (a) As used in this chapter, "victim
representative" means a person designated by a sentencing court who
is:
(1) a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or other relative of; or
(2) a person who has had a close personal relationship with;
the victim of a felony who is deceased, incapacitated, or less than
eighteen (18) years of age.
(b) Upon entering a conviction, the court shall set a date for
sentencing within thirty (30) days, unless for good cause shown an
extension is granted. If a presentence report is not required, the court
may sentence the defendant at the time the judgment of conviction is
entered. However, the court may not pronounce sentence at that time
without:
(1) inquiring as to whether an adjournment is desired by the
defendant; and
(2) informing the victim, if present, of a victim's right to make a
statement concerning the crime and the sentence.
When an adjournment is requested, the defendant shall state its purpose
and the court may allow a reasonable time for adjournment.
(c) If:
(1) the state in the manner prescribed by IC 35-34-1-2.5 sought an
increased penalty by alleging that the person was previously
convicted of the offense; and
(2) the person was convicted of the subsequent offense in a jury
trial;
the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing. The person shall be
sentenced to receive the increased penalty if the jury (or the court, if
the trial is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person had a previous conviction for the
offense.
(d) If the felony is nonsuspendible under IC 35-50-2-2 (before its
repeal) or IC 35-50-2-2.2, the judge shall order the defendant, if the
defendant has previously been released on bail or recognizance, to be
imprisoned in the county or local penal facility pending sentencing.
(e) Upon entering a conviction for a felony, the court shall designate
a victim representative if the victim is deceased, incapacitated, or less
than eighteen (18) years of age.
As added by P.L.311-1983, SEC.3. Amended by P.L.50-1984,
SEC.8; P.L.131-1985, SEC.14; P.L.36-1990, SEC.11; P.L.168-2014,
SEC.56.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
14
cases (
2 in the last 5 years), 1988–2024 · leading case:
Jones v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. 1996).
Jones v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. 1996).
· cites it 2× “The trial court having determined that the victim was deceased, designated her mother, Janet Reese, as the victim representative for purposes of the sentencing hearing, under Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2 (1993). At the sentencing hearing the trial court allowed victim statements from…”
Kindred v. State, 524 N.E.2d 279 (Ind. 1988).
· cites it 2× “At the sentencing hearing, defendant filed a motion for discharge because the sentencing hearing was set beyond the statutory thirty-day limit provided in Ind.Code § 35-38-1-2: (a) Upon entering a conviction, the court shall set a date for sentencing within thirty [30] days,…”
Crawley v. State, 677 N.E.2d 520 (Ind. 1997).
· cites it 2× “See Ind.Code § 35-38-1-2 (1993). At the time of the guilty plea, the defendant waived his right to be sentenced within thirty days.”
Cuyler v. State, 798 N.E.2d 243 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 35-38-1-2 requires trial courts to articulate aggravating and mitigating cireumstances only in felonies.”
State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
· cites it 2× “Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-2(5) allows the State to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution.”
Minnick v. State, 965 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
· cites it 2× “1-4-2 (and now its successor statute, section 35-38-1-2) required that a trial court sentence within thirty days of the entry of conviction.”
Nasser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“CODE § 35-38-1-2(c). The first statute reads as follows: If the penalty for an offense is, by the terms of the statute, increased because the person was.”
Jeffrey A. Bowles v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “[15] In addition to this seeming acquiescence in the procedure used by the trial court, we also observe that I.C. § 35-38-1-2(b)(1) provides trial courts with authority to amend the terms of supervised probation at any time.”
Corey Allen Greenlee v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
· cites it 2× “” See also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2 (b). When a defendant fails to object to the scheduling of a sentencing hearing for a day beyond the thirty-day deadline, he cannot later claim error on appeal.”
Reginald D. Akins, Jr. v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
· cites it 2× “”4 See also I.C. § 35-38-1-2(b). [18] Specifically, Akins argues that the trial court “deliberately postpone[d] indefinitely the pronouncement of judgment and sentence” and thus, Akins’ “conviction and sentence in this case should be discharged.”
Kevin J. Mamon v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
· cites it 2× “In resolving this issue, we note that both Indiana Code section 35-38-1-2(b) and Indiana Criminal Rule 11 provide that after a conviction is entered, the trial court shall sentence the defendant within thirty days, unless an extension is supported by good cause.”
— Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(5) — 1 case
State v. Aynes, 715 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
“Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-2(5) allows the State to appeal from an order granting a motion to suppress evidence, if the ultimate effect of the order is to preclude further prosecution.”
— Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(b) — 3 cases
Reginald D. Akins, Jr. v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
“”4 See also I.C. § 35-38-1-2(b). [18] Specifically, Akins argues that the trial court “deliberately postpone[d] indefinitely the pronouncement of judgment and sentence” and thus, Akins’ “conviction and sentence in this case should be discharged.”
Kevin J. Mamon v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
“In resolving this issue, we note that both Indiana Code section 35-38-1-2(b) and Indiana Criminal Rule 11 provide that after a conviction is entered, the trial court shall sentence the defendant within thirty days, unless an extension is supported by good cause.”
— Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(b)(1) — 1 case
Jeffrey A. Bowles v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
“[15] In addition to this seeming acquiescence in the procedure used by the trial court, we also observe that I.C. § 35-38-1-2(b)(1) provides trial courts with authority to amend the terms of supervised probation at any time.”
— Ind. Code § 35-38-1-2(c) — 2 cases
Nasser v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1105 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).
“CODE § 35-38-1-2(c). The first statute reads as follows: If the penalty for an offense is, by the terms of the statute, increased because the person was.”
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