Indiana Code
Ind. Code § 35-38-1-4 (2026)
Presence of defendant when sentence pronounced; pronouncement of sentence against defendant corporation
✓ current as of May 2026
Sec. 4. (a) The defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced. If the defendant is not personally present when sentence is to be pronounced, the court may issue a warrant for his arrest.
(b) Sentence may be pronounced against a defendant corporation in the absence of counsel, if counsel fails to appear on the date of sentencing after reasonable notice.
As added by P.L.311-1983, SEC.3.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 18
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1986–2023 · leading case: Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 1986).
Burr v. State, 492 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. 1986). “While one does have a right to be present at sentencing, Ind.Code § 35-38-1-4 (Burns 1985 Repl.); Joseph v.”
Ronald B. Hawkins v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 997 (Ind. 2013). “A better interpretation — and one that gives force to both provisions — is that “personally present” and “present in person,” as used in Indiana Code § 35-38-1-4(a) and Indiana Administrative Rule 14(A)(2)(c), respectively, refer to the defendant’s actual physical presence.”
Gillespie v. State, 634 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). “Indiana Code § 35-38-1-4(a) provides: "The defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
Cleff v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). “See I.C. § 35-38-1-4(a); Crank, 502 N.E.2d at 1358 ; Disney, 441 N.”
State v. Hart, 669 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). “CODE § 35-38-1-4. While Indiana law allows a citizen to arrest for OWI, we caution that there is risk inherent in every arrest and that a private person makes a citizen's arrest at his own peril.”
Hawkins v. State, 970 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Sentencing Hawkins via Videoconference Hawkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him via videoconference, arguing that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-4(a) requires that he be physically present in the…”
Bates v. State, 650 N.E.2d 754 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). “" Ind.Code 35-38-1-4. Thus, the reasonable inference is that Bates had actual knowledge of the forfeiture for life of his driving privileges, which was one of the provisions of his sentence, as well as of his conviction.”
C.S., Jr. v. State of Indiana, 110 N.E.3d 433 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “2013) (discussing Ind. Code § 35-38-1-4 (a) & Ind. Admin. R.”
Tervarus L. Gary v. State of Indiana, 113 N.E.3d 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Rather, this nonconstitutional right is derived from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-4(a), which provides that criminal defendants "must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
Gary v. State, 116 N.E.3d 455 (Ind. 2019). “Combined with our legislature's mandate that defendants are entitled-and even compelled 2 -to be physically present at sentencing hearings, Ind. Code § 35-38-1-4 (a), I believe there are significant and important reasons for finding a constitutional right for a defendant to be…”
Anthony J. Demarco v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.) (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). “1 DeMarco asserts that this right derives from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-4(a), which provides that “[t]he defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
Christopher Hudson v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “He asserts this was error, and directs our attention to Indiana Code section 35-38-1-4. The statute provides, “[t]he defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
— Ind. Code § 35-38-1-4(a) — 12 cases
Ronald B. Hawkins v. State of Indiana, 982 N.E.2d 997 (Ind. 2013). “A better interpretation — and one that gives force to both provisions — is that “personally present” and “present in person,” as used in Indiana Code § 35-38-1-4(a) and Indiana Administrative Rule 14(A)(2)(c), respectively, refer to the defendant’s actual physical presence.”
Gillespie v. State, 634 N.E.2d 862 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). “Indiana Code § 35-38-1-4(a) provides: "The defendant must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
Cleff v. State, 565 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). “See I.C. § 35-38-1-4(a); Crank, 502 N.E.2d at 1358 ; Disney, 441 N.”
Hawkins v. State, 970 N.E.2d 762 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). “Whether the Trial Court Abused its Discretion in Sentencing Hawkins via Videoconference Hawkins contends that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him via videoconference, arguing that Indiana Code section 35-38-1-4(a) requires that he be physically present in the…”
Tervarus L. Gary v. State of Indiana, 113 N.E.3d 237 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). “Rather, this nonconstitutional right is derived from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-4(a), which provides that criminal defendants "must be personally present at the time sentence is pronounced.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.