Indiana Code

Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2026)

Battery

✓ current as of May 2026
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     Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, "public safety official" means:

(1) a law enforcement officer, including an alcoholic beverage enforcement officer;

(2) an employee of a penal facility or a juvenile detention facility (as defined in IC 31-9-2-71);

(3) an employee of the department of correction;

(4) a probation officer;

(5) a parole officer;

(6) a community corrections worker;

(7) a home detention officer;

(8) a department of child services employee;

(9) a firefighter;

(10) an emergency medical services provider;

(11) a judicial officer;

(12) a bailiff of any court; or

(13) a special deputy (as described in IC 36-8-10-10.6).

     (b) As used in this section, "relative" means an individual related by blood, half-blood, adoption, marriage, or remarriage, including:

(1) a spouse;

(2) a parent or stepparent;

(3) a child or stepchild;

(4) a grandchild or stepgrandchild;

(5) a grandparent or stepgrandparent;

(6) a brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister;

(7) a niece or nephew;

(8) an aunt or uncle;

(9) a daughter-in-law or son-in-law;

(10) a mother-in-law or father-in-law; or

(11) a first cousin.

     (c) Except as provided in subsections (d) through (k), a person who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) touches another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; or

(2) in a rude, insolent, or angry manner places any bodily fluid or waste on another person;

commits battery, a Class B misdemeanor.

     (d) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Class A misdemeanor if it:

(1) results in bodily injury to any other person; or

(2) is committed against a member of a foster family home (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-139.3) by a person who is not a resident of the foster family home if the person who committed the offense is a relative of a person who lived in the foster family home at the time of the offense.

     (e) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Level 6 felony if one (1) or more of the following apply:

(1) The offense results in moderate bodily injury to any other person.

(2) The offense is committed against a public safety official while the official is engaged in the official's official duty, unless the offense is committed by a person detained or committed under IC 12-26.

(3) The offense is committed against a person less than fourteen (14) years of age and is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.

(4) The offense is committed against a person of any age who has a mental or physical disability and is committed by a person having the care of the person with the mental or physical disability, whether the care is assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation.

(5) The offense is committed against an endangered adult (as defined in IC 12-10-3-2).

(6) The offense:

(A) is committed against a member of a foster family home (as defined in IC 35-31.5-2-139.3) by a person who is not a resident of the foster family home if the person who committed the offense is a relative of a person who lived in the foster family home at the time of the offense; and

(B) results in bodily injury to the member of the foster family.

     (f) The offense described in subsection (c)(2) is a Level 6 felony if the person knew or recklessly failed to know that the bodily fluid or waste placed on another person was infected with hepatitis, tuberculosis, or human immunodeficiency virus.

     (g) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Level 5 felony if one (1) or more of the following apply:

(1) The offense results in serious bodily injury to another person.

(2) The offense is committed with a deadly weapon.

(3) The offense results in bodily injury to a pregnant woman if the person knew of the pregnancy.

(4) The person has a previous conviction for a battery or strangulation offense included in this chapter against the same victim.

(5) The offense results in bodily injury to one (1) or more of the following:

(A) A public safety official while the official is engaged in the official's official duties, unless the offense is committed by a person detained or committed under IC 12-26.

(B) A person less than fourteen (14) years of age if the offense is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.

(C) A person who has a mental or physical disability if the offense is committed by an individual having care of the person with the disability, regardless of whether the care is assumed voluntarily or because of a legal obligation.

(D) An endangered adult (as defined in IC 12-10-3-2).

     (h) The offense described in subsection (c)(2) is a Level 5 felony if:

(1) the person knew or recklessly failed to know that the bodily fluid or waste placed on another person was infected with hepatitis, tuberculosis, or human immunodeficiency virus; and

(2) the person placed the bodily fluid or waste on a public safety official, unless the offense is committed by a person detained or committed under IC 12-26.

     (i) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Level 4 felony if it results in serious bodily injury to an endangered adult (as defined in IC 12-10-3-2).

     (j) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Level 3 felony if it results in serious bodily injury to a person less than fourteen (14) years of age if the offense is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.

     (k) The offense described in subsection (c)(1) or (c)(2) is a Level 2 felony if it results in the death of one (1) or more of the following:

(1) A person less than fourteen (14) years of age if the offense is committed by a person at least eighteen (18) years of age.

(2) An endangered adult (as defined in IC 12-10-3-2).

As added by Acts 1976, P.L.148, SEC.2. Amended by Acts 1977, P.L.340, SEC.30; Acts 1979, P.L.298, SEC.1; Acts 1979, P.L.83, SEC.10; Acts 1981, P.L.299, SEC.1; P.L.185-1984, SEC.1; P.L.205-1986, SEC.1; P.L.322-1987, SEC.1; P.L.164-1993, SEC.10; P.L.59-1995, SEC.2; P.L.31-1996, SEC.20; P.L.32-1996, SEC.20; P.L.255-1996, SEC.25; P.L.212-1997, SEC.1; P.L.37-1997, SEC.2; P.L.56-1999, SEC.1; P.L.188-1999, SEC.5; P.L.43-2000, SEC.1; P.L.222-2001, SEC.4; P.L.175-2003, SEC.2; P.L.281-2003, SEC.3; P.L.2-2005, SEC.125; P.L.99-2007, SEC.209; P.L.164-2007, SEC.1; P.L.120-2008, SEC.93; P.L.131-2009, SEC.73; P.L.114-2012, SEC.137; P.L.158-2013, SEC.420; P.L.147-2014, SEC.2; P.L.65-2016, SEC.33; P.L.80-2018, SEC.3; P.L.142-2020, SEC.63; P.L.209-2023, SEC.2; P.L.148-2024, SEC.24.

 

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 1,375 cases (71 in the last 5 years), 1978–2026 · leading case: Joshua Thompson v. State of Indiana, 82 N.E.3d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Joshua Thompson v. State of Indiana, 82 N.E.3d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 23× “” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (b)(1) (2014). If Thompson’s use of the word “victim” is in reference to “another person” who must be touched for battery to have occurred, then Thompson is correct that ’battery requires a defendant “to actually touch his victim.”
Richardson v. State, 717 N.E.2d 32 (Ind. 1999). · cites it 6× “CODE § 35-42-2-1 (1993). The offense becomes a class A misdemeanor if "it results in bodily injury to any other person.”
Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). · cites it 12× “*1283 Can bolstering testimony (especially by a police officer) be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the entire case turns upon the credibility of the two witnesses? I think not, and for such reason, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.”
Jose Ernesto Flores v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the United States, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). · cites it 6× “Although he now contends that he was not given sufficient time before that admission to retain counsel, a removal proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the Constitution does not of its own force create a right to legal assistance at every stage.”
Larry C. Perry, Jr. v. State of Indiana, 78 N.E.3d 1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). · cites it 4× “Battery is the knowing or intentional touching of another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 , Indiana Code'Section 35-31,5-2-292 defines serious bodily injury in pertinent part as bodily injury that causes unconsciousness or extreme pain.”
Adam Horton v. State of Indiana, 51 N.E.3d 1154 (Ind. 2016). · cites it 2× “Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 .3(b)(l)(A) (Supp.2013).”
Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727 (Ind. 1994). · cites it 8× “A jury returned a verdict finding appellant Scott Townsend guilty of battery, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2)(B) (West supp. 1988).”
United States v. Eddy Wilmer Vail-Bailon, 868 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2017). · cites it 3× “3d at 669 (citing Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 ). 12 Case: 15-10351 Date Filed: 08/25/2017 Page: 13 of 67 The question before the Seventh Circuit was whether the statute required the use of physical force and thus qualified as a crime of violence under the elements clause of 18 U.”
United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). “, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 .5 (Supp. 2018) ("substantial risk of death"); Wis.”
Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008). · cites it 6× “” I.C. § 35-42-2-1 (a)(2)(B). . See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) [setting forth the penalty for a Class D felony offense], if a person has committed a Class D felony, the court may enter judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor and sentence…”
Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). · cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1. 3 . We held oral argument in this case at Elk-hart Central High School.”
Wright v. State, 658 N.E.2d 563 (Ind. 1995). · cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1. 571 N.E.2d at 539 (some citations omitted).”
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(1) — 7 cases
Straub v. State, 567 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 1991).
Nieto v. State, 499 N.E.2d 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
Carty v. State, 421 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
Delahanty v. State, 658 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
Isom v. State, 479 N.E.2d 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2) — 1 case
Carty v. State, 421 N.E.2d 1151 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2)(A) — 1 case
State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2)(B) — 1 case
Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727 (Ind. 1994). “A jury returned a verdict finding appellant Scott Townsend guilty of battery, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2)(B) (West supp. 1988).”
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2)(F) — 2 cases
Dodd v. Indiana Dept of Corr. (N.D. Ind. 2022).
Dodd v. Indiana Dep't of Corr. (N.D. Ind. 2023).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(2)(a) — 1 case
Hollen v. State, 761 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. 2002).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(3) — 21 cases
Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996).
Bell v. State, 622 N.E.2d 450 (Ind. 1993).
Bailey v. State, 763 N.E.2d 998 (Ind. 2002).
Isaacs v. State, 673 N.E.2d 757 (Ind. 1996).
Hoskins v. State, 563 N.E.2d 571 (Ind. 1990).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(8) — 4 cases
Litel v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1114 (Ind. 1988).
Straub v. State, 567 N.E.2d 87 (Ind. 1991).
Dausch v. State, 616 N.E.2d 13 (Ind. 1993).
Davis v. State, 481 N.E.2d 387 (Ind. 1985).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(A)(1)(a) — 1 case
Darrell Warren v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(A)(3) — 1 case
Morgan Govan v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(A)(8) — 1 case
Scott v. State, 829 N.E.2d 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(B)(c) — 2 cases
Comm'r, Indiana Dep't of Ins. v. Alvin C. Putman, 98 N.E.3d 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
Comm'r, Indiana Dep't of Ins. v. A.P., 121 N.E.3d 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a) — 40 cases
Elmer J. Bailey v. State of Indiana, 979 N.E.2d 133 (Ind. 2012).
Otte v. State, 967 N.E.2d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012).
Goldsberry v. State, 821 N.E.2d 447 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). “Ind.Code § 35-42-2-1. 3 . We held oral argument in this case at Elk-hart Central High School.”
Tisdial v. Young, 925 N.E.2d 783 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008). “” I.C. § 35-42-2-1 (a)(2)(B). . See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) [setting forth the penalty for a Class D felony offense], if a person has committed a Class D felony, the court may enter judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor and sentence…”
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1) — 15 cases
Fleming v. State, 833 N.E.2d 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
Vandergriff v. State, 812 N.E.2d 1084 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
McCullough v. State, 888 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
Mauricio v. State, 941 N.E.2d 497 (Ind. 2011).
Jester v. State, 746 N.E.2d 437 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(2006) — 1 case
Tillman v. State, 934 So. 2d 1263 (Fla. 2006).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(A) — 30 cases
Hardley v. State, 905 N.E.2d 399 (Ind. 2009).
Mathis v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “*1283 Can bolstering testimony (especially by a police officer) be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where the entire case turns upon the credibility of the two witnesses? I think not, and for such reason, I would reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial.”
Jose Ernesto Flores v. John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen. of the United States, 350 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2003). “Although he now contends that he was not given sufficient time before that admission to retain counsel, a removal proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the Constitution does not of its own force create a right to legal assistance at every stage.”
Pritchard v. State, 810 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Jarrett v. State, 804 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(B) — 11 cases
Barnes v. State, 946 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. 2011).
Barnes v. State, 953 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. 2011).
State v. Richardson, 927 N.E.2d 379 (Ind. 2010).
Robinson v. State, 814 N.E.2d 704 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
David Cupello v. State of Indiana, 27 N.E.3d 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(D) — 1 case
Darrail Mix v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(b) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(1)(b)(2013) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2) — 4 cases
Mitchell v. State, 813 N.E.2d 422 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Owens v. State, 742 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Haggard v. State, 771 N.E.2d 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002).
Babes Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308 (Ind. 2009).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(A) — 7 cases
Ricardo Deleon Colon v. United States, 899 F.3d 1236 (11th Cir. 2018).
United States v. Ricardo Deleon Colon, 458 F. App'x 825 (11th Cir. 2012).
United States v. Bryant Love (7th Cir. 2021).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(B) — 14 cases
Townsend v. State, 632 N.E.2d 727 (Ind. 1994). “A jury returned a verdict finding appellant Scott Townsend guilty of battery, a class D felony, Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2)(B) (West supp. 1988).”
Willis v. State, 888 N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 2008). “” I.C. § 35-42-2-1 (a)(2)(B). . See I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b) ("Notwithstanding subsection (a) [setting forth the penalty for a Class D felony offense], if a person has committed a Class D felony, the court may enter judgment of conviction of a Class A misdemeanor and sentence…”
McReynolds v. State, 901 N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Johnson v. State, 804 N.E.2d 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Davis v. State, 796 N.E.2d 798 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(D) — 3 cases
Jarrett v. State, 804 N.E.2d 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Brown v. State, 683 N.E.2d 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
Delahanty v. State, 658 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(G) — 1 case
DH v. State, 932 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(J) — 1 case
Cornelius Hines v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(2)(M) — 2 cases
Williams v. State, 924 N.E.2d 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Darrail Mix v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(3) — 61 cases
Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
Martin v. State, 784 N.E.2d 997 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Winn v. State, 748 N.E.2d 352 (Ind. 2001).
Rodriguez v. State, 714 N.E.2d 667 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(4) — 7 cases
Beauchamp v. State, 788 N.E.2d 881 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
Joseph Curnutt v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(5) — 2 cases
Gibson v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 899 N.E.2d 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(a)(8) — 10 cases
Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
Jackson v. State, 925 N.E.2d 369 (Ind. 2010).
Stellwag v. State, 854 N.E.2d 64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).
Dorsey v. State, 802 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Simmons v. State, 814 N.E.2d 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b) — 14 cases
Chris D. Hawkins v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 100 N.E.3d 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(1) — 17 cases
Christapher Batchelor v. State of Indiana, 119 N.E.3d 550 (Ind. 2019).
Sauntio Carter v. State of Indiana, 67 N.E.3d 1041 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Joseph C. Hudson v. State of Indiana, 129 N.E.3d 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
Carlos Villaruel v. State of Indiana, 52 N.E.3d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(b)(2) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c) — 12 cases
Christopher Milo v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1) — 33 cases
Miller v. Perry (S.D. Ind. 2021).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(2) — 1 case
Donald Anderson, Jr. v. State of Indiana, 74 N.E.3d 1212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d)(1) — 5 cases
Robert Wilder v. State of Indiana, 91 N.E.3d 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
Joshua Thompson v. State of Indiana, 82 N.E.3d 376 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “” Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (b)(1) (2014). If Thompson’s use of the word “victim” is in reference to “another person” who must be touched for battery to have occurred, then Thompson is correct that ’battery requires a defendant “to actually touch his victim.”
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d)(2) — 2 cases
Charles Smith v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d)(6) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(d)(6)(2015) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(1) — 2 cases
Dustin Todd Garner v. State of Indiana, 59 N.E.3d 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).
Christopher Milo v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(2) — 1 case
A V v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2024).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(e)(3) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f) — 2 cases
Robert Coleman v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(4) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(f)(5)(A) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g) — 2 cases
Darryl Calvin v. State of Indiana, 87 N.E.3d 474 (Ind. 2017).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(1) — 2 cases
Troy Burgh v. State of Indiana, 79 N.E.3d 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(2) — 4 cases
Troy Burgh v. State of Indiana, 79 N.E.3d 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Autumn B Stahl v. State of Indiana (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(3) — 4 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(4) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(g)(5)(A) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(h) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(j) — 1 case
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.