Sec. 11. (a) As used in this section, "firearm" has the
meaning set forth in IC 35-47-1-5.
(b) As used in this section, "offense" means:
(1) a felony under IC 35-42 that resulted in death or serious bodily
injury;
(2) kidnapping;
(3) criminal confinement as a Level 2 or Level 3 felony; or
(4) attempted murder.
(c) As used in this section, "police officer" means any of the
following:
(1) A state police officer.
(2) A county sheriff.
(3) A county police officer.
(4) A city police officer.
(5) A state educational institution police officer appointed under
IC 21-39-4.
(6) A school corporation police officer appointed under IC 20-26-16.
(7) A police officer of a public or private postsecondary
educational institution whose board of trustees has established a
police department under IC 21-17-5-2 or IC 21-39-4-2.
(8) An enforcement officer of the alcohol and tobacco
commission.
(9) A conservation officer.
(10) A gaming agent employed under IC 4-33-4.5 or a gaming
control officer employed by the gaming control division under IC 4-33-20.
(11) An investigator for the inspector general appointed under IC 4-2-7-2.
(12) A hospital police officer employed by a hospital police
department established under IC 16-18-4.
(d) The state may seek, on a page separate from the rest of a
charging instrument, to have a person who allegedly committed an
offense sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment if the
state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or
intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the offense.
(e) The state may seek, on a page separate from the rest of a
charging instrument, to have a person who allegedly committed a
felony or misdemeanor other than an offense (as defined under
subsection (b)) sentenced to an additional fixed term of imprisonment
if the state can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the person, while
committing the felony or misdemeanor, knowingly or intentionally:
(1) pointed a firearm; or
(2) discharged a firearm;
at an individual whom the person knew, or reasonably should have
known, was a police officer.
(f) If the person was convicted of:
(1) the offense under subsection (d); or
(2) the felony or misdemeanor under subsection (e);
in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene to hear evidence in the
enhancement hearing. If the trial was to the court, or the judgment was
entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall hear evidence in the
enhancement hearing.
(g) If the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing
is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person knowingly or intentionally used a
firearm in the commission of the offense under subsection (d), the court
may sentence the person to an additional fixed term of imprisonment
of between five (5) years and twenty (20) years.
(h) If the jury (if the hearing is by jury) or the court (if the hearing
is to the court alone) finds that the state has proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the person, while committing a felony or
misdemeanor under subsection (e), knowingly or intentionally:
(1) pointed a firearm; or
(2) discharged a firearm;
at an individual whom the person knew, or reasonably should have
known, was a police officer, the court may sentence the person to an
additional fixed term of imprisonment of between five (5) and twenty
(20) years.
(i) A person may not be sentenced under subsections (g) and (h) for
offenses, felonies, and misdemeanors comprising a single episode of
criminal conduct.
As added by P.L.140-1994, SEC.15. Amended by P.L.203-1996,
SEC.9; P.L.71-2005, SEC.13; P.L.158-2013, SEC.665; P.L.152-2014,
SEC.10; P.L.238-2015, SEC.18; P.L.157-2016, SEC.1; P.L.174-2021,
SEC.81; P.L.4-2022, SEC.1; P.L.122-2023, SEC.19.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
101
cases (
12 in the last 5 years), 1999–2026 · leading case:
Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010).
Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010).
· cites it 32× “Nicoson contends he was placed in double jeopardy because "[t]he mere use of the firearm not only subjected him to the higher sentencing range imposed for [c]lass B [f]elonies, but it also subjected him to an additional, multiple sentence imposed under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-11.…”
Wright v. State, 881 N.E.2d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 8× “(citing I.C. § 35-50-2-11.) The statute defines an offense, in part as: "a felony under [I.”
Abney v. State, 822 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 10× “Subsequently, in the first reported case in Indiana to consider application of the Apprendi holding, [1] this court held that the enhancement of a defendant's sentence pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11 did not offend due process under the Apprendi standard.”
Kendall Johnson v. State of Indiana, 986 N.E.2d 852 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).
· cites it 2× “Ind.Code § 35-50-2-11. 7 . "A person who recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide, a Class C felony.”
Darnell Cleveland v. State of Indiana, 129 N.E.3d 227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
· cites it 6× “2010), our Supreme Court analyzed Indiana Code section 35-50-2-11, which defines when a firearm is "used" in the commission of an offense, as a separate charge, or for purposes of an enhanced sentence.”
Sweatt v. State, 887 N.E.2d 81 (Ind. 2008).
· cites it 4× “Further evidence that the legislature intended that separate crimes involving firearms receive independent sentencing significance is found in section 35-50-1-2(e) (2004), which requires the five-year additional term for use of a firearm in felonies defined in section 35-50-2-11…”
Jacob Lumbley v. State of Indiana, 74 N.E.3d 234 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 4× “Lumbley contends that the trial court erred by imposing consecutive sentencing enhancements pursuant to Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11 , and that absent specific statutory authority, the sentencing enhancements for use of a firearm cannot be run consecutively, just as habitual offender…”
Cooper v. State, 940 N.E.2d 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
· cites it 4× “Ind.Code § 35-50-2-11. The record clearly reveals that Nicoson was not only armed with a deadly weapon, but that he used the firearm-firing into the air, ordering the victims from the vehicle with it, and firing at the victims' vehicle as they drove away.”
Lori Barcroft v. State of Indiana, 111 N.E.3d 997 (Ind. 2018).
· cites it 2× “Code § 35-42-1-1 (2012) (murder); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11 (2012) (sentencing enhancement).”
Shawn Wilson v. State of Indiana, 39 N.E.3d 705 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
· cites it 2× “See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-11 (West 2012). Before the jury trial, the trial court addressed the State’s motion in li-mine, which requested that Wilson be instructed not to mention—among other things—“Any questions, testimony, or evidence of prior uncharged or charged criminal…”
Sunday v. State, 720 N.E.2d 716 (Ind. 1999).
· cites it 6× “Because the State did not follow the statutory charging procedure necessary to enhance the rape count under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-11, we remand this case to the trial court with instructions to reduce the sentence for rape to fifty years and the total sentence to 108 years.”
Joseph Ira Burns v. State of Indiana, 91 N.E.3d 635 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018).
· cites it 2× “15 We note that, in closing arguments, defense counsel conceded Burns was guilty of conspiracy to commit burglary, robbery resulting in bodily injury, and theft. ( See Tr. Vol.”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(b) — 4 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(b)(1) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(b)(3) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(c) — 2 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(d) — 14 cases
Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010).
“Nicoson contends he was placed in double jeopardy because "[t]he mere use of the firearm not only subjected him to the higher sentencing range imposed for [c]lass B [f]elonies, but it also subjected him to an additional, multiple sentence imposed under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-11.…”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(e) — 1 case
Nicoson v. State, 938 N.E.2d 660 (Ind. 2010).
“Nicoson contends he was placed in double jeopardy because "[t]he mere use of the firearm not only subjected him to the higher sentencing range imposed for [c]lass B [f]elonies, but it also subjected him to an additional, multiple sentence imposed under Indiana Code § 35-50-2-11.…”
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(e)(h) — 1 case
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(f) — 3 cases
— Ind. Code § 35-50-2-11(g) — 8 cases
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.