History:
L. 1969, ch. 180, § 21-3204; L. 1984, ch. 39, § 33; L. 1996, ch. 214, § 25; L. 1999, ch. 164, § 4; Repealed, L. 2010, ch. 136, § 307; July 1, 2011.
CASE ANNOTATIONS
1. Violation of speeding statute absolute liability offense; defective cruise control not defense. State v. Baker, 1 Kan. App. 2d 568, 569, 570, 571, 571 P.2d 65.
2. Offense charged under city ordinance an absolute liability offense in light hereof. City of Overland Park v. Estell, 8 Kan. App. 2d 182, 187, 653 P.2d 819 (1982).
3. Cited; absolute liability of DUI statute (K.S.A. 8-1567), lack of intent, proof by circumstantial evidence followed. City of Wichita v. Hull, 11 Kan. App. 2d 441, 444, 724 P.2d 699 (1986).
5. Compulsion defense determined applicable to absolute liability traffic offenses. State v. Riedl, 15 Kan. App. 2d 326, 329, 807 P.2d 697 (1991).
6. Whether statute clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability examined. State v. JC Sports Bar, Inc., 253 Kan. 815, 822, 823, 861 P.2d 1324 (1993).
7. Whether K.S.A. 65-2803 requires proof of criminal intent to show violation examined on question reserved by prosection. State v. Mountjoy, 257 Kan. 163, 170, 891 P.2d 376 (1995).
8. Statutory requirement that all vehicles be driven on the right half of roadway is an absolute liability offense. State v. Hopper, 260 Kan. 66, 69, 917 P.2d 872 (1996).
10. If law enforcement officer observes person violating K.S.A. 8-1548, officer has probable cause to seize person to investigate violation. State v. Greever, 286 Kan. 124, 138, 142, 183 P.3d 788 (2008).
11. Crime involving intent to expose individuals to a life-threatening communicable disease is a specific intent crime. State v. Richardson, 289 Kan. 118, 209 P.3d 696 (2009).
12. Discussion of crimes designated as strict liability, general intent and specific intent crimes. In re C.P.W., 289 Kan. 448, 213 P.3d 413 (2009).
13. K.S.A. 8-1522 construed; section establishes two rules, one relating to maintaining a single lane and one relating to changing lanes. State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601 (2009).
State v. Lewis, 953 P.2d 1016 (Kan. 1998). · cites it 21ד21-3201 and K.S.A. 21-3204, as well as K.S.A. 21-3102, concerning the application of the Kansas Criminal Code.”
State v. Greever, 183 P.3d 788 (Kan. 2008). · cites it 4דInterestingly, in a more recent case, our Supreme Court noted that “K.S.A. 21-3204 came into being with the adoption of the Kansas Criminal Code” in 1969; that the criminal code was based almost entirely on recommendations of the Kansas Judicial Council; and that those Judicial…”
State v. Mountjoy, 891 P.2d 376 (Kan. 1995). · cites it 4דA person may be held guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.”
State v. Marx, 215 P.3d 601 (Kan. 2009). · cites it 2ד2d 1016 (1998) (K.S.A. 21-3204 limits strict liability crimes to those situations where legislature has clearly indicated an intention to dispense with criminal intent).”
State v. Baker, 571 P.2d 65 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977). · cites it 6ד8-1336) is an absolute liability offense when read in light of the absolute liability statute (K.S.A. 21-3204), which provides: “A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor and the statute defining the offense clearly…”
State v. Dinkel, 495 P.3d 402 (Kan. 2021). · cites it 2ד" K.S.A. 21-3204. In 2011, the Kansas Legislature's recodification of the Kansas Criminal Code took effect.”
State v. Creamer, 996 P.2d 339 (Kan. Ct. App. 2000). · cites it 4ד21-3201 through K.S.A. 1998 Supp. 21-3204. “Interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and our review is unlimited.”
State v. JC Sports Bar, Inc., 861 P.2d 1334 (Kan. 1993). · cites it 2ד) *822 The legislature has codified the foregoing principle as to misdemeanor and traffic offenses in K.S.A. 21-3204, which provides: “A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction and the statute defining…”
State v. Maze, 825 P.2d 1169 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992). · cites it 2דK.S.A. 21-3204 states: “A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.”
State v. Hopper, 917 P.2d 872 (Kan. 1996). · cites it 2דK.S.A. 21-3204 provides: “A person may be guilty of an offense without having criminal intent if the crime is a misdemeanor or traffic infraction and the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for the conduct described.”
State v. Jones, 644 P.2d 464 (Kan. 1982). · cites it 2דHe pled not guilty to driving while his license was suspended, and at the close of a bench trial the judge found him not guilty, finding that “notice or knowledge and an intent to drive in violation of that notice” was essential, and that the State had not met its burden of…”
State v. Richardson, 209 P.3d 696 (Kan. 2009). “Except for limited instances described in K.S.A. 21-3204, “a criminal intent is an essential element of every crime defined by [the criminal] code.”
State v. Greever, 183 P.3d 788 (Kan. 2008). “Interestingly, in a more recent case, our Supreme Court noted that “K.S.A. 21-3204 came into being with the adoption of the Kansas Criminal Code” in 1969; that the criminal code was based almost entirely on recommendations of the Kansas Judicial Council; and that those Judicial…”
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