Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 59-513 (2026)

Incapacity of person who kills another to take from decedent's estate or property; effect on estates and property of both of suicide by person who kills spouse; order prohibiting disposition of assets until criminal proceedings are completed

✓ current as of May 2026

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59-513. Incapacity of person who kills another to take from decedent's estate or property; effect on estates and property of both of suicide by person who kills spouse; order prohibiting disposition of assets until criminal proceedings are completed. (a) No person convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit or take by will, by intestate succession, as a surviving joint tenant, as the designated beneficiary of real or personal property, as a beneficiary under a trust or otherwise from such other person any portion of the estate or property in which the decedent had an interest.

(b) When any person kills or causes the killing of such person's spouse, and then takes such person's own life, the estates and property of both persons shall be disposed of as if their deaths were simultaneous pursuant to the provisions of K.S.A. 58-708 to 58-718, inclusive, and amendments thereto.

(c) (1) The court may, upon its own motion or upon the written request of any party, prohibit the sale, distribution, spending or use of an asset or interest described in subsection (a), or a portion or proceeds thereof, by a person who has been arrested for or charged with the felonious killing, or procuring the killing of, the decedent.

(2) An order entered pursuant to this subsection may be granted ex parte upon a showing of criminal charges filed against a person interested in the estate.

(3) (A) An order entered pursuant to this subsection shall be in effect until modified or terminated by the court.

(B) Upon the written request of a person subject to an order under this subsection to modify or terminate such order, the court shall fix the time and place for the hearing thereof. Notice of the time and place of the hearing shall be given in such manner and to such persons as the court shall direct.

(C) The court shall terminate such order if the court finds that any of the following events relating to the arrest or charges that were the basis for the order have occurred:

(i) Dismissal of all such charges;

(ii) acquittal as to all such charges;

(iii) conviction or other disposition; or

(iv) expungement of the arrest records by court order pursuant to K.S.A. 22-2410, and amendments thereto.

History: L. 1939, ch. 180, § 35; L. 1970, ch. 225, § 1; L. 1995, ch. 105, § 1; L. 2023, ch. 74, § 1; July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 21 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1959–2024 · leading case: Harper Ex Rel. Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 P.2d 1264 (Kan. 1983).

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Harper Ex Rel. Harper v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 662 P.2d 1264 (Kan. 1983). · cites it 12× “1923, 22-133 only bars the killer when he has been convicted of a crime, if the beneficiary has not been convicted, he is entitled to the proceeds of the policy.”

In Re Est. of Shields, 584 P.2d 139 (Kan. 1978). · cites it 22× “The two children of the couple claim that by reason of K.S.A. 59-513, Victoria has no interest in any property in which Robert had an interest, including the property held in joint tenancy.”

In Re Est. of Shields, 574 P.2d 229 (Kan. Ct. App. 1978). · cites it 10× “The two children of the couple claim that by reason of K.S.A. 59-513 Victoria has no interest in any property in which Robert had an interest.”

Ford v. Ford, 512 A.2d 389 (Md. 1986). · cites it 2× “535 (West 1964); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-513 (1983); Ky.Rev.Stat.”

Rosenberger v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins., 176 F. Supp. 379 (D. Kan. 1959). · cites it 4× “He bases his claim on his interpretation of Section 59-513 of the General Statutes of Kansas, which provides: “No person who shall be convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit or take by will or otherwise from such other person…”

Mitchelson v. Travelers Ins., 629 P.2d 143 (Kan. 1981). · cites it 2× “Sandstrom stood charged with the murder of her husband, and that conviction of that offense would disqualify her from receiving the policy benefits by virtue of K.S.A. 59-513. Also, Mitchelson was appointed special administrator of the estate of Thad Sandstrom, deceased, and…”

In Re Est. of Van Der Veen, 935 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1997). · cites it 3× “Decedents’ son, Kent Van Der Veen, was disqualified under K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 59-513 (slayer statute) from inheriting any portion of their estate.”

California-W. States Life Ins. v. Sanford, 515 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1981). · cites it 2× “2d 22 (1935), the court considered the law currently codified as Kan.Stat.Ann. § 59-513 (1976) which disqualifies as a beneficiary “[a]ny person who shall hereafter be convicted of killing or of conspiring with another to kill or of procuring said killing” of *531 an insured.”

Shrader v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 485 N.E.2d 1031 (Ohio 1985). “K.S.A. 59-513 (1970) provides: “No person who shall be convicted of feloniously killing, or procuring the killing of, another person shall inherit or take by will * * * or otherwise from such other person any portion of the estate in which the decedent had an interest * * In…”

State Mut. Life Assurance Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985). “2d 1264 (1983), the Kansas Supreme Court had consistently held that under its slayer statute (KSA § 59-513 (1976)) a con *1032 viction was required in order to bar a beneficiary from recovering under the insured’s life insurance policy.”

Chute v. Old Am. Ins., 629 P.2d 734 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). “Plaintiff’s reasoning and conclusion would be correct except for the fact she ignores the finding of the trial court that the Carpenters had formed an intent to kill Upshaw at the time the policies were issued.”

State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of Am. v. Hampton, 696 P.2d 1027 (Okla. 1985). · cites it 2× “2d 1264 (1983), the Kansas Supreme Court had consistently held that under its slayer statute (KSA § 59-513 (1976)) a conviction *1032 was required in order to bar a beneficiary from recovering under the insured's life insurance policy.”

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