Kansas Statutes Annotated

K.S.A. § 60-2203a (2026)

Notice of pendency of certain actions; liens; release; fees; authorized only by legislative enactment

✓ current as of May 2026

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60-2203a. Notice of pendency of certain actions; liens; release; fees; authorized only by legislative enactment. (a) After the commencement of any action in any district court of this state, or the courts of the United States in the state of Kansas or in any action now pending heretofore commenced in such courts, which does not involve title to real estate, any party to such action may give notice in any other county of the state of the pendency of the action by filing for record with the clerk of the district court of such other county a verified statement setting forth the parties to the action, the nature of the action, the court in which it is pending, and the relief sought, which shall impart notice of the pendency of the action and shall result in the same lien rights as if the action were pending in that county. The lien shall be effective from the time the statement is filed, but not to exceed four months prior to the entry of judgment except as provided in subsection (c)*. The party filing such notice shall within 30 days after any satisfaction of the judgment entered in such action, or any other final disposition thereof, cause to be filed with such clerk of the district court a notice that all claims in such action are released. If the party filing fails or neglects to do so after reasonable demand by any party in interest, such party shall be liable in damages in the same amounts and manner as is provided by law for failure of a mortgagee to enter satisfaction of a mortgage. Upon the filing of such a notice of the pendency of an action the clerk shall charge a fee of $14 and shall enter and index the action in the same manner as for the filing of an original action. Upon the filing of a notice of release, the notice shall likewise be entered on the docket. Except as provided further, the fee established in this subsection shall be the only fee collected or moneys in the nature of a fee collected for the court procedure. Such fee shall only be established by an act of the legislature and no other authority is established by law or otherwise to collect a fee. On and after July 1, 2019, through June 30, 2025, the supreme court may impose an additional charge, not to exceed $22 per fee, to fund the costs of non-judicial personnel.

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions of this section, the filing of a notice of the pendency of an action pursuant to subsection (a) shall create no lien rights against the property of an employee of the state or a municipality prior to the date judgment is rendered if the pleadings in the pending action allege a negligent or wrongful act or omission of the employee while acting within the scope of such employee's employment, regardless of whether or not it is alleged in the alternative that the employee was acting outside of such employee's employment. A judgment against an employee shall become a lien upon such employee's property in the county where notice is filed pursuant to subsection (a) when the judgment is rendered only if it is found that: (1) The employee's negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred when the employee was acting outside the scope of such employee's employment; or (2) the employee's conduct which gave rise to the judgment was because of actual fraud or actual malice of the employee. In such cases the lien shall not be effective prior to the date judgment was rendered. As used in this subsection (c)**, "employee" shall have the meaning ascribed to such term in K.S.A. 75-6102, and amendments thereto.

History: L. 1977, ch. 112, § 28; L. 1979, ch. 186, § 25; L. 2006, ch. 215, § 13; L. 2008, ch. 95, § 14; L. 2009, ch. 116, § 24; L. 2010, ch. 62, § 16; L. 2011, ch. 87, § 16; L. 2012, ch. 66, § 17; L. 2013, ch. 125, § 17; L. 2015, ch. 81, § 25; L. 2017, ch. 80, § 20; L. 2019, ch. 58, § 21; July 1.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 4 cases, 1986–2005 · leading case: City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 804 P.2d 1026 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991).

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City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 804 P.2d 1026 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). · cites it 2× “” EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL Kline and Guaranty contend the trial court erred by refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or the “two innocent persons” principle in their favor.”

Fid. Bank v. King, 109 P.3d 180 (Kan. Ct. App. 2005). “Regarding Iuka’s status, the court stated: “Waters owned the real estate at all relevant times and, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-2203a, appellant [Iuka] had a valid judgment lien which attached to the real estate well before it was sold.”

Home State Bank v. P. B. Hoidale Co., 718 P.2d 292 (Kan. 1986). “For reasons not here important, that action was ineffective (see K.S.A. 60-2203a). On May 13,1983, the Bank finally recorded its three mortgages in the office of the Russell County Register of Deeds, and on June 16 it filed this action in Russell County District Court against…”

Kinsley State Bank v. Waters, 854 P.2d 311 (Kan. Ct. App. 1993). · cites it 7× “Appellant first argues that, under K.S.A. 60-2203a, it had a valid judgment lien against Waters’ real estate at the time of the sheriffs sale, and, therefore, had a right to seek satisfaction of its claim from the surplus proceeds remaining after the sale.”

— K.S.A. § 60-2203a(a) — 1 case

City of Arkansas City v. Anderson, 804 P.2d 1026 (Kan. Ct. App. 1991). “” EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL Kline and Guaranty contend the trial court erred by refusing to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel, or the “two innocent persons” principle in their favor.”

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