Kentucky Revised Statutes
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.540 (2026)
Period after which adoption not subject to attack
✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases:
SyfertCases citing this section
KY-LRCapps.legislature.ky.gov
JustiaChapter on Justia
CornellLII Search
CasesGoogle Scholar
After the expiration of one (1) year from the date of the entry of judgment of adoption, the validity thereof shall not be subject to attack in any action, collateral or direct, by reason of any irregularity or failure to comply with KRS 199.470 to 199.520, either procedurally or substantively. Effective:April 1, 2022 History: Amended 2022 Ky. Acts ch. 75, sec. 13, effective April 1, 2022. -- Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 242, sec. 9, effective July 15, 1994. -- Amended 1970 Ky. Acts ch. 92, sec. 66. -- Created 1950 Ky. Acts ch. 125, sec. 17.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 7
cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1953–2026 · leading case: Storm v. Mullins, 199 S.W.3d 156 (Ky. 2006).
Storm v. Mullins, 199 S.W.3d 156 (Ky. 2006). “1958) (“Appellees contend that appellants are estopped to contest the validity of the adoption judgment, and rely in part upon KRS 199.540 which fixes a limitation period of two years within which to attack a judgment of adoption for ‘irregularity in procedures’.”
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T’s counsel’s argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or sub *815 stantive, because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Sjls v. Tls, 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T's counsel's argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or substantive, *815 because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Pierce v. Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). “520(2) states: "From and after the date of the judgment the child shall be deemed the child of petitioners and shall be considered for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations the natural, legitimate child of the parents adopting it the same…”
Allen v. Martin, 735 S.W.2d 332 (Ky. Ct. App. 1987). “Since at least 1950, KRS 199.540 has fixed a limitation period of two years within which to attack a judgment of adoption for “irregularity in procedure.”
Jones v. Sutton, 255 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). “) Appellees contend that appellants are es-topped to contest the validity of the adoption judgment, and rely in part upon KRS 199.540 which fixes a limitation period of two years within which to attack a judgment of adoption for “irregularity in procedures”.”
Sierra Nicole Thomas v. Meredith L.B. Podmajersky (Ky. Ct. App. 2026). “KRS 199.540 is “as absolute as statutory language will allow, leaving the possibility of attack after one year available only in the most extraordinary cases.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.540(2) — 4 cases
Storm v. Mullins, 199 S.W.3d 156 (Ky. 2006). “1958) (“Appellees contend that appellants are estopped to contest the validity of the adoption judgment, and rely in part upon KRS 199.540 which fixes a limitation period of two years within which to attack a judgment of adoption for ‘irregularity in procedures’.”
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T’s counsel’s argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or sub *815 stantive, because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Pierce v. Pierce, 522 S.W.2d 435 (Ky. Ct. App. 1975). “520(2) states: "From and after the date of the judgment the child shall be deemed the child of petitioners and shall be considered for purposes of inheritance and succession and for all other legal considerations the natural, legitimate child of the parents adopting it the same…”
Sjls v. Tls, 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T's counsel's argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or substantive, *815 because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.540(2)(1993) — 2 cases
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T’s counsel’s argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or sub *815 stantive, because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Sjls v. Tls, 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T's counsel's argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or substantive, *815 because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 199.540(2)(2008) — 2 cases
S.J.L.S. v. T.L.S., 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T’s counsel’s argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or sub *815 stantive, because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Sjls v. Tls, 265 S.W.3d 804 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). “However, the family court was convinced by T's counsel's argument that KRS 199.540(2) was an absolute bar to any attack on the judgment of adoption whether collateral or direct, procedural or substantive, *815 because more than a year had passed since its entry.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and
treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.