regulation of sounding train whistles at night.
(1) Every railroad company shall provide each locomotive engine running over any of
its lines with a bell of ordinary size and a whistle. The bell shall be rung or the
whistle sounded at a distance of at least fifty (50) rods from the place where the
track crosses upon the same level any highway or crossing where a signboard is
required to be maintained. The bell shall be rung or the whistle sounded
continuously or alternately until the engine has reached the highway or crossing
except as provided in subsection (2) of this section.
(2) A city, county, urban-county, or charter county government may regulate the
sounding of train whistles at night if the city, county, urban-county, or charter
county government enacts an ordinance adopting the provisions of Emergency
Order Number 15, Notice Number 4, issued by the Federal Railroad Administration
on August 31, 1993. If the Federal Railroad Administration updates the
requirements of Emergency Order 15, a city, county, urban-county, or charter
county government that has adopted the provisions of Emergency Order 15 shall by
ordinance adopt the most recent federal requirements governing the sounding of
train whistles.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Amended 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 195, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1994. – Amended
1992 Ky. Acts ch. 229, sec. 5, effective July 14, 1992. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts
ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 786.
Notes of Decisions
Calhoun v. CSX Transp., Inc., 331 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2011).
· cites it 2× “KRS 277.190. [6] When exiting the Sanitation Company, the crossbuck sign (prior to the crossing) was to Mary's right; the same direction as the approaching train.”
Wadkins' Adm'x v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 298 S.W.2d 7 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956).
· cites it 3× “The appellants urge that the railroad company was guilty of negligence: (1) In failing to give the required signals for a public crossing as provided by KRS 277.190; (2) in permitting its right-of-way to become foul with shrubbery, vines, and fences which obstructed the view of…”
Hargadon v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 375 S.W.2d 834 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964).
· cites it 3× “There was some equivocal testimony, the probative value of which we need not assess, to the effect that the train whistle may not have been blowing, or its bell ringing, continuously for the full distance of 50 rods as required by KRS 277.190. However, the driver of the car…”
Hunt's Adm'r v. Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co., 254 S.W.2d 705 (Ky. Ct. App. 1952).
· cites it 2× “At this time, from his rear, proceeding also towards the crossing, was a train traveling about forty miles per hour. The decedent drove slowly onto the tracks without stopping and the train struck the body of the truck squarely behind the cab.”
Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v. Burke's Adm'x, 187 S.W.2d 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945).
· cites it 4× “The testimony of plaintiff was directed to the establishment of two facts; the first of which was that the road crossing the track at the point of the collision was a public road, and the second was that the signals required by the statute (section 277.190, KBS) were not given…”
Fryrear v. Kentucky I. Terminal R. Co., Inc., 220 S.W.2d 546 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949).
“* * *” KRS 277.190 provides: “Every railroad company shall provide each locomotive engine running over any of its lines with a bell of ordinary size and a whistle.”
Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Blanton, 200 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. Ct. App. 1947).
“160, and, in addition, maintained a whistling post on its railroad line at a point fifty rods distant from the crossing pursuant to the provisions of KRS 277.190. It is argued next in support of.”
Deitz' Adm'x v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 176 S.W.2d 699 (Ky. Ct. App. 1943).
“But even though the crossing be regarded as a public one, the statutory duty of signaling imposed by KS 786, KRS 277.190, is not applicable since the statute applies only to crossings outside of incorporated cities and towns.”
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Troutman, 351 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. Ct. App. 1961).
“KRS 277.190. If the evidence was sufficient to describe prima facie an extrahazardous crossing, there was the added common law duty of the railroad company to protect the traveling public.”
Louisville & N. R. v. Paul's Adm'r, 235 S.W.2d 787 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950).
“KRS 277.190. If the statement in the appellant’s brief be supported by the stricken bill of evidence, there was no claim by any witness for either party that the bell was rung, hence, the instruction was tantamount to a peremptory for the plaintiffs.”
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Arms, 361 S.W.2d 506 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
“The negative testimony was of such character that the court ruled as a matter of law that these statutory signals (KRS 277.190) had been sounded, and the instruction did not predicate liability on a failure to give them or either of them.”
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Bailey, 211 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. Ct. App. 1948).
“The evidence is in direct conflict as to whether the engineer was complying- with KRS 277.190 by ringing the bell or sounding the whistle continuously or alternately when the train came within 50 rods of this crossing- and until it reached it.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 277.190(1) — 2 cases
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