Kentucky Revised Statutes
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.060 (2026)
Repealed, effective January 1, 1973
✓ current as of May 2026
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Catchline at repeal: Liability of contractor and subcontractor. History: Repealed 1972 Ky. Acts ch. 78, sec. 36, effective January 1, 1973. -- Recodified 1942 Ky. Acts ch. 208, sec. 1, effective October 1, 1942, from Ky. Stat. sec. 4891.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16
cases, 1945–2004 · leading case: Gateway Constr. Co. v. Wallbaum, 356 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962).
Gateway Constr. Co. v. Wallbaum, 356 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962). “Wallbaum, therefore, insists that he is a so-called "statutory employee" of Gateway, the principal contractor, under KRS 342.060, referred to as a "contractor-under" statute.”
United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Technical Minerals, Inc., 934 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. 1996). “015(1) and the contractor’s liability provision was found in KRS 342.060. The latter provision made a “principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor” liable for payment of compensation benefits to the same extent as the immediate employer; and that provision had been…”
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 635 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1982). “Hence subrogation was of no avail to the employer, and although KRS 342.060 4 did provide a right of indemnification to a contractor against a subordinate contractor, it was silent with respect to any equivalent right on the part of a subordinate against a superior contractor.”
United Engineers & Constructors, Inc. v. Branham, 550 S.W.2d 540 (Ky. 1977). “700 (formerly KRS 342.060), precludes a common-law right of action by Branham against United.”
Ruby Lumber Co. v. K. v. Johnson Co., 187 S.W.2d 449 (Ky. Ct. App. 1945). “055, because he is not a third party, is based on the provisions of section 342.060, which, as has been held, gives a remedy in the way of compensation to the employee as against both the principal and the subcontractor in every case of injury to the employee.”
Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 490 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). “He brought a suit at common law against Reynolds, alleging that his injuries were caused by the negligence of Reynolds’ employes in the way they had stacked some rolls of aluminum foil near the area where Bright was working (the rolls of foil had no connection with the…”
Whittenberg Eng'g & Constr. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 390 S.W.2d 877 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965). “We have also concluded that this cause of action was independent of contract or statute. In the prior action one of the injured employees asserted the right to damages by way of an action for negligence at common law against Whittenberg.”
Wright v. Dolgencorp, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 341 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004). “Reynolds contracted with a business for the excavation work, and one of the business’s employees was *344 injured on the job: The employee brought a negligence action against Reynolds, and Reynolds responded by alleging that it was a “principal contractor” within the meaning of…”
Simmons v. Clark Constr. Co., 426 S.W.2d 930 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968). “KRS 342.060 which is a part of that Act provides in part that: “A principal contractor, intermediate or subcontractor shall be liable for compensation to any employe injured while in the employ of any one of his intermediate or subcontractors and engaged upon the subject matter…”
Peters v. Radcliff Ready Mix Concrete Inc., 412 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967). “In subcontractor situations it may be reasonable to treat the superior contractor as being the equivalent of an immune “employer” of the subcontractor’s employes by reason of his liability to them under KRS 342.060 for workmen’s compensation. The opinion in Jennings v.”
Cottengim's Adm'r v. Adams' Adm'x, 255 S.W.2d 637 (Ky. Ct. App. 1953). “§ 4891 (now KRS 342.060) we held it was applicable where death resulted from injuries, although the statute limited liability for compensation “to any employe injured”.”
Reynolds Metals Co. v. J. U. Schickli & Bros., Inc., 548 S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1977). “The trial court granted Reynolds’ motion for summary judgment on Bright’s claim for injuries on the ground that Reynolds was a “principal contractor” within the meaning of KRS 342.060 and accordingly *842 was immune from common law liability to Bright.”
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