(1) A financing statement substantially satisfying the requirements of this part of this article is effective, even if it has minor errors or omissions, unless the errors or omissions make the financing statement seriously misleading.
(2) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with KRS 355.9-503(1) is seriously misleading.
(3) If a search of the records of the filing office under the debtor's correct name, using the filing office's standard search logic, if any, would disclose a financing statement that fails sufficiently to provide the name of the debtor in accordance with KRS 355.9-503(1), the name provided does not make the financing statement seriously misleading.
(4) For purposes of KRS 355.9-508(2), the "debtor's correct name" in subsection (3) of this section means the correct name of the new debtor. Effective: July 1, 2001 History: Repealed and reenacted 2000 Ky. Acts ch. 408, sec. 97, effective July 1, 2001. -- Created 1958 Ky. Acts ch. 77, sec. 9-506, effective July 1, 1960.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1978–2021 · leading case:
Bank Josephine v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
Bank Josephine v. Conn, 599 S.W.2d 773 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980).
“Had the appellees filed an action against the appellant under KRS 355.9-506, it is arguable that the burden of proving commercial reasonableness — or in actuality, commercial unreasonableness — should be borne by the appellees.”
Credit All. Corp. v. Adams Constr. Corp., 570 S.W.2d 283 (Ky. 1978).
· cites it 2× “KRS 355.9-506 and 355.9-501(1), (5). In this case the creditor has not disposed of the collateral, nor entered into a contract for its disposition, nor effectively accepted the collateral in discharge of the obligation.”
First Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 2d 802 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
“§ 355.9-506(1). Having found that the Cooper Payments are properly categorized as “accounts,” that the 2007 Security Agreement specifically identifies the collateral as “Accounts and Other Rights to Payment,” and that the 2007 Security Agreement sufficiently indicates that it…”
Leonard Pivnick v. White Getgey & Meyer Co. LPA (6th Cir. 2009).
“The court observed that “[h]ad the [debtor] filed an action against the [creditor] under KRS 355.9-506, it is arguable that the burden of proving commercial reasonableness—or in actuality, commercial unreasonableness—should be borne by the [debtor].”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.9-506(1) — 1 case
First Bancorp, Inc. v. United States, 945 F. Supp. 2d 802 (W.D. Ky. 2013).
“§ 355.9-506(1). Having found that the Cooper Payments are properly categorized as “accounts,” that the 2007 Security Agreement specifically identifies the collateral as “Accounts and Other Rights to Payment,” and that the 2007 Security Agreement sufficiently indicates that it…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.9-506(1)(3) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 355.9-506(3) — 1 case
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