(1) This chapter shall be interpreted to:
(a) Allow victims to obtain effective, short-term protection against further
wrongful conduct in order that their lives may be as secure and as
uninterrupted as possible;
(b) Expand the ability of law enforcement officers to effectively respond to
further wrongful conduct so as to prevent future incidents and to provide
assistance to the victims;
(c) Provide peace officers with the authority to immediately apprehend and
charge for violation of an order of protection any person whom the officer has
probable cause to believe has violated an order of protection and to provide
courts with the authority to conduct contempt of court proceedings for these
violations;
(d) Provide for the collection of data concerning incidents of dating violence and
abuse, sexual assault, strangulation, and stalking in order to develop a
comprehensive analysis of the numbers and causes of such incidents; and
(e) Supplement and not repeal or supplant any duties, responsibilities, services, or
penalties under KRS Chapters 209, 209A, and 620.
(2) Nothing in this chapter is intended to trigger the application of the provisions of 18
U.S.C sec. 922(g) as to an interpersonal protective order issued on the basis of the
existence of a current or previous dating relationship.
Effective: June 27, 2019
History: Amended 2019 Ky. Acts ch. 183, sec. 5, effective June 27, 2019. -- Created
2015 Ky. Acts ch. 102, sec. 20, effective January 1, 2016.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
8
cases (
7 in the last 5 years), 2017–2026 · leading case:
Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
“715 with KRS 456.020. Therefore, the reasoning' in Caudill is applicable to the ease at hand, and we hold that Calhoun’s appeal meets the “collateral consequences” exception to mootness.”
Jane Smith v. John Doe, a Minor (Ky. 2021).
· cites it 6× “20 The IPO was only effective for six months, and it expired before the Court of Appeals could address the respondent’s appeal.”
Guy Joseph Turcotte v. Brittany Elyzabeth Demars (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 3× “The Respondent himself testified that he had people ask him not to touch them and has nonetheless continued to touch people without permission or even implied consent, even coming out of the COVID-19 era of physical distance.”
Johnathan Jones v. Glynis Maria Jones (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).
“]” KRS 456.020(1)(a). Furthermore, these statutes “should be construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from domestic violence and preventing future acts of domestic violence.”
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 456.020(1)(a). Under the notice pleading standard, a party need not state a claim with technical precision, but merely provide fair notice and identify their claim.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.020(1)(a) — 4 cases
Johnathan Jones v. Glynis Maria Jones (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).
“]” KRS 456.020(1)(a). Furthermore, these statutes “should be construed liberally in favor of protecting victims from domestic violence and preventing future acts of domestic violence.”
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 456.020(1)(a). Under the notice pleading standard, a party need not state a claim with technical precision, but merely provide fair notice and identify their claim.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.020(2) — 1 case
Jane Smith v. John Doe, a Minor (Ky. 2021).
“20 The IPO was only effective for six months, and it expired before the Court of Appeals could address the respondent’s appeal.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.020(d) — 1 case
Jane Smith v. John Doe, a Minor (Ky. 2021).
“20 The IPO was only effective for six months, and it expired before the Court of Appeals could address the respondent’s appeal.”
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