(1) Following a hearing ordered under KRS 456.040, if a court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or
stalking has occurred and may again occur, the court may issue an interpersonal
protective order:
(a) Restraining the adverse party from:
1. Committing further acts of dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual
assault;
2. Any unauthorized contact or communication with the petitioner or other
person specified by the court;
3. Approaching the petitioner or other person specified by the court within
a distance specified in the order, not to exceed five hundred (500) feet;
4. Going to or within a specified distance of a specifically described
residence, school, or place of employment or area where such a place is
located; and
5. Disposing of or damaging any of the property of the parties;
(b) Authorizing, at the request of the petitioner:
1. Limited contact or communication between the parties that the court
finds necessary; or
2. The parties to remain in a common area, which may necessitate them
being closer than five hundred (500) feet under limited circumstances
with specific parameters set forth by the court.
Nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to place any restriction or
restraint on the petitioner;
(c) Directing or prohibiting any other actions that the court believes will be of
assistance in eliminating future acts of dating violence and abuse, stalking, or
sexual assault, except that the court shall not order the petitioner to take any
affirmative action;
(d) Directing that either or both of the parties receive counseling services
available in the community in dating violence and abuse cases; and
(e) Awarding possession of any shared domestic animal to the petitioner.
(2) In imposing a location restriction described in subsection (1)(a)4. of this section, the
court shall:
(a) Afford the petitioner and respondent, if present, an opportunity to testify on
the issue of the locations and areas from which the respondent should or
should not be excluded;
(b) Only impose a location restriction where there is a specific, demonstrable
danger to the petitioner or other person protected by the order;
(c) Specifically describe in the order the locations or areas prohibited to the
respondent; and
(d) Consider structuring a restriction so as to allow the respondent transit through
an area if the respondent does not interrupt his or her travel to harass, harm, or
attempt to harass or harm the petitioner.
(3) An interpersonal protective order shall be effective for a period of time fixed by the
court, not to exceed three (3) years, and may be reissued upon expiration for
subsequent periods of up to three (3) years each. The fact that an order has not been
violated since its issuance may be considered by a court in hearing a request for a
reissuance of the order.
Effective: July 14, 2022
History: Amended 2022 Ky. Acts ch. 143, sec. 3, effective July 14, 2022; and ch. 158,
sec. 4, effective July 14, 2022. -- Created 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 102, sec. 24, effective
January 1, 2016.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/14/2022). This statute was amended by 2022
Ky. Acts chs. 143 and 158, which do not appear to be in conflict and have been
codified together.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
24
cases (
20 in the last 5 years), 2017–2026 · leading case:
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
· cites it 2× “130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
“See KRS 456.060(1). Based on our analysis of the proceedings in the circuit court, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to find that Calhoun stalked Wood.”
Benson v. Lively, 544 S.W.3d 159 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018).
“However, similar to the DVO statute, the IPO statute, KRS 456.060, does allow a trial court to direct or prohibit other actions that the court believes would "be of assistance in eliminating future acts of dating violence and abuse, stalking, or sexual assault.”
Bryan Scott Allen v. Valerie Sue Eder (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 4× “130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Danette Kim Divine v. Cami Gibson (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 3× “Divine argues that the family court incorrectly applied the law as found in KRS 456.060. In particular, Divine asserts that the family court failed to find that she intentionally committed 1 Due to COVID-19 precautions, the hearing was held remotely and Danette Kim Divine…”
Tia R. Hill v. Jennifer L. Carnagio (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 3× “But an IPO issued pursuant to KRS 456.060 may be effective for up to three years and may be reissued for additional three-year periods upon its expiration.”
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
· cites it 3× “]” KRS 456.060(1)(a)4. The court shall “[o]nly impose a location restriction where there is a specific, demonstrable danger to the petitioner or other person protected by the order[.”
Kenneth Scott Higgins v. Ellie Scorsone-Stovall (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 3× “130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or -16- explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Daniel Woodie v. Madison Renee Hull (Ky. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 3× “130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Sherdena Rocky Ali v. Carlos Efre Idiokitas (Ky. Ct. App. 2026).
· cites it 3× “130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Johnathan Jones v. Glynis Maria Jones (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).
· cites it 2× “]” KRS 456.060(1). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when “sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim” of dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or stalking.”
Christina Holt Taylor v. Leigh-Ann Fitzpatrick (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).
· cites it 2× “130 and KRS 456.060). -6- Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.060(1) — 18 cases
Halloway v. Simmons, 532 S.W.3d 158 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
“130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Calhoun v. Wood, 516 S.W.3d 357 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
“See KRS 456.060(1). Based on our analysis of the proceedings in the circuit court, we conclude there was sufficient evidence for the circuit court to find that Calhoun stalked Wood.”
Bryan Scott Allen v. Valerie Sue Eder (Ky. Ct. App. 2023).
“130 and KRS 456.060. Additionally, the individual must prove that there was an implicit or explicit threat by the perpetrator that put the victim in reasonable fear of sexual contact, physical injury, or death.”
Johnathan Jones v. Glynis Maria Jones (Ky. Ct. App. 2021).
“]” KRS 456.060(1). The preponderance of the evidence standard is met when “sufficient evidence establishes the alleged victim was more likely than not to have been a victim” of dating violence and abuse, sexual assault, or stalking.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.060(1)(a) — 1 case
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 456.060(1)(a)4. The court shall “[o]nly impose a location restriction where there is a specific, demonstrable danger to the petitioner or other person protected by the order[.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.060(2)(b) — 1 case
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 456.060(1)(a)4. The court shall “[o]nly impose a location restriction where there is a specific, demonstrable danger to the petitioner or other person protected by the order[.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.060(2)(d) — 1 case
Michael Rupard v. Emily Wheeler (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“]” KRS 456.060(1)(a)4. The court shall “[o]nly impose a location restriction where there is a specific, demonstrable danger to the petitioner or other person protected by the order[.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 456.060(3) — 1 case
Tia R. Hill v. Jennifer L. Carnagio (Ky. Ct. App. 2022).
“But an IPO issued pursuant to KRS 456.060 may be effective for up to three years and may be reissued for additional three-year periods upon its expiration.”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the
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