In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.010 and 502.020, it is no defense that:
(1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based on the conduct in question, or has previously been acquitted thereof, or has been convicted of a different offense, or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction for such conduct; or
(2) The offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the accused, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity. Effective: January 1, 1975 History: Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 22, effective January 1, 1975.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
6
cases (
1 in the last 5 years), 1997–2024 · leading case:
Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000).
Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000).
· cites it 4× “That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1): In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999).
· cites it 2× “That proposition is specifically rejected in KRS 502.030(1). However, even in the pre-penal code era, it was accepted that the liability of an accomplice is determined by his or her own mens rea and not that of the principal.”
Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1997).
· cites it 2× “KRS 502.030(1) now makes the disposition of the charge against the principal immaterial to the liability of the accomplice.”
Commonwealth v. McKenzie, 214 S.W.3d 306 (Ky. 2007).
“020 (a person is guilty of an offense committed by another if he intentionally promotes or facilitates the offense) and KRS 502.030 (disposition of a charge against the principal offender is immaterial to the liability of an “accomplice”).”
Fields v. Commonwealth, 219 S.W.3d 742 (Ky. 2007).
“020 and KRS 502.030, and subsequent rulings. See Johnson v.”
Antonio Marsonel Wilson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024).
“That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1) [which provides that in] any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 502.030(1) — 4 cases
Tharp v. Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 356 (Ky. 2000).
“That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1): In any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999).
“That proposition is specifically rejected in KRS 502.030(1). However, even in the pre-penal code era, it was accepted that the liability of an accomplice is determined by his or her own mens rea and not that of the principal.”
Wolbrecht v. Commonwealth, 955 S.W.2d 533 (Ky. 1997).
“KRS 502.030(1) now makes the disposition of the charge against the principal immaterial to the liability of the accomplice.”
Antonio Marsonel Wilson v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024).
“That proposition was codified in KRS 502.030(1) [which provides that in] any prosecution for an offense in which the criminal liability of the accused is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to KRS 502.”
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