Ky. Rev. Stat. » Chapter 503
Kentucky Revised Statutes

Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070 (2026)

Protection of another

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when: (a) The defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person; and (b) Under the circumstances as the defendant believes them to be, the person whom he seeks to protect would himself have been justified under KRS 503.050 and 503.060 in using such protection. (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when: (a) The defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect a third person against imminent death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat, or other felony involving the use of force, or under those circumstances permitted pursuant to KRS 503.055; and (b) Under the circumstances as they actually exist, the person whom he seeks to protect would himself have been justified under KRS 503.050 and 503.060 in using such protection. (3) A person does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be. Effective: July 12, 2006 History: Amended 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 4, effective July 12, 2006. -- Created 1974 Ky. Acts ch. 406, sec. 32, effective January 1, 1975.

Notes of Decisions
Cited in 24 cases (11 in the last 5 years), 1977–2026 · leading case: Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
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Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009). · cites it 8× “055(3) (emphasis added). KRS 503.050 was also amended to state "[a] person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly physical force.”
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999). · cites it 8× “KRS 503.070. There are pre-penal code cases which support the proposition that "[w]hatever one may lawfully do in his own defense, another may do for him.”
Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2010). · cites it 4× “Likewise, KRS 503.070 was amended to address the justification of protecting another and now recognizes that a person "does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be.”
Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170 (Ky. 2006). · cites it 2× “See KRS 503.070. KRS 527.040, however, seeks to disarm all "convicted felons" by rendering their possession of firearms a further felony crime — as in this case.”
Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803 (Ky. 2014). “While such a person would likely have a defense, such as protection of others, KRS 503.070, choice of evils, KRS 503.030, or prevention of a crime, KRS 503.”
State v. Cook, 515 S.E.2d 127 (W. Va. 1999). · cites it 2× “1995); Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 503.070 (1974) (Michie Repl.”
Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807 (Ky. 1977). “050), protection of others (KRS 503.070), protection o/property (KRS 503.”
State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381 (R.I. 1980). “Being confronted with different schools of thought, we must decide which theory of law we shall follow.”
Randolph v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.3d 576 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018). “Riley was intervening in an unprovoked attack on an inmate and was privileged under KRS 503.070(1) to use physical force in lawful protection of another.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 301 (Ky. 2012). “050(4); KRS 503.070(3); KRS 503.080(3). Where the prosecution’s case, and the Appellant’s liberty, turn on the jury’s determination of which man was the initial aggressor and “who fired first,” creating the erroneous impression, strengthened by *311 implied judicial approval,…”
Irvin Harris v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024). · cites it 8× “As applied to this case, the defendant’s subjective belief is the first prong of KRS 503.070(2). Here, Harris satisfied that prong because he believed Destiny was in imminent danger from an individual who allegedly assaulted Destiny and her father earlier in the day.”
Dazzamon R. Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2025). · cites it 4× “However, a protection-of-another instruction was warranted only if the evidence was also sufficient to satisfy the second element of KRS 503.070(2). That is, the trial court was required to give the instruction only if the evidence also could have allowed a juror to reasonably…”
Show all 24 citing cases →
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(1) — 2 cases
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999). “KRS 503.070. There are pre-penal code cases which support the proposition that "[w]hatever one may lawfully do in his own defense, another may do for him.”
Randolph v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.3d 576 (Ky. Ct. App. 2018). “Riley was intervening in an unprovoked attack on an inmate and was privileged under KRS 503.070(1) to use physical force in lawful protection of another.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(1)(a) — 1 case
Alexander G. Carpenter v. Barry Goodall (Ky. Ct. App. 2024).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(2) — 8 cases
Irvin Harris v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024). “As applied to this case, the defendant’s subjective belief is the first prong of KRS 503.070(2). Here, Harris satisfied that prong because he believed Destiny was in imminent danger from an individual who allegedly assaulted Destiny and her father earlier in the day.”
King v. Taylor, 803 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. Ky. 2011).
Gregory Wahl v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2021).
Scott D. Seaman v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2022).
John Daniel Clark v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2019).
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(2)(a) — 3 cases
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999). “KRS 503.070. There are pre-penal code cases which support the proposition that "[w]hatever one may lawfully do in his own defense, another may do for him.”
Irvin Harris v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024). “As applied to this case, the defendant’s subjective belief is the first prong of KRS 503.070(2). Here, Harris satisfied that prong because he believed Destiny was in imminent danger from an individual who allegedly assaulted Destiny and her father earlier in the day.”
Dazzamon R. Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2025). “However, a protection-of-another instruction was warranted only if the evidence was also sufficient to satisfy the second element of KRS 503.070(2). That is, the trial court was required to give the instruction only if the evidence also could have allowed a juror to reasonably…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(2)(b) — 3 cases
Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439 (Ky. 1999). “KRS 503.070. There are pre-penal code cases which support the proposition that "[w]hatever one may lawfully do in his own defense, another may do for him.”
Irvin Harris v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2024). “As applied to this case, the defendant’s subjective belief is the first prong of KRS 503.070(2). Here, Harris satisfied that prong because he believed Destiny was in imminent danger from an individual who allegedly assaulted Destiny and her father earlier in the day.”
Dazzamon R. Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2025). “However, a protection-of-another instruction was warranted only if the evidence was also sufficient to satisfy the second element of KRS 503.070(2). That is, the trial court was required to give the instruction only if the evidence also could have allowed a juror to reasonably…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(3) — 3 cases
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009). “055(3) (emphasis added). KRS 503.050 was also amended to state "[a] person does not have a duty to retreat prior to the use of deadly physical force.”
Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2010). “Likewise, KRS 503.070 was amended to address the justification of protecting another and now recognizes that a person "does not have a duty to retreat if the person is in a place where he or she has a right to be.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 301 (Ky. 2012). “050(4); KRS 503.070(3); KRS 503.080(3). Where the prosecution’s case, and the Appellant’s liberty, turn on the jury’s determination of which man was the initial aggressor and “who fired first,” creating the erroneous impression, strengthened by *311 implied judicial approval,…”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.070(l)(b) — 1 case
John Daniel Clark v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (Ky. 2019).
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