Exceptions.
(1) A person is presumed to have held a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or
great bodily harm to himself or herself or another when using defensive force that is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm to another if:
(a) The person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of
unlawfully and forcibly entering or had unlawfully and forcibly entered a
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was
attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling,
residence, or occupied vehicle; and
(b) The person who uses defensive force knew or had reason to believe that an
unlawful and forcible entry or unlawful and forcible act was occurring or had
occurred.
(2) The presumption set forth in subsection (1) of this section does not apply if:
(a) The person against whom the defensive force is used has the right to be in or
is a lawful resident of the dwelling, residence, or vehicle, such as an owner,
lessee, or titleholder, and there is not an injunction for protection from
domestic violence or a written pretrial supervision order of no contact against
that person;
(b) The person sought to be removed is a child or grandchild, or is otherwise in
the lawful custody or under the lawful guardianship of the person against
whom the defensive force is used;
(c) The person who uses defensive force is engaged in an unlawful activity or is
using the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle to further an unlawful
activity; or
(d) The person against whom the defensive force is used is a peace officer, as
defined in KRS 446.010, who enters or attempts to enter a dwelling,
residence, or vehicle in the performance of his or her official duties, and the
officer identified himself or herself in accordance with any applicable law or
the person using force knew or reasonably should have known that the person
entering or attempting to enter was a peace officer.
(3) A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any
other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right
to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or
she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm
to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a felony involving
the use of force.
(4) A person who unlawfully and by force enters or attempts to enter a person's
dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle is presumed to be doing so with the intent
to commit an unlawful act involving force or violence.
Effective: July 12, 2006
History: Created 2006 Ky. Acts ch. 192, sec. 2, effective July 12, 2006.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in
53
cases (
28 in the last 5 years), 2009–2026 · leading case:
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
· cites it 12× “But KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute pertaining to "Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicleExceptions.”
Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349 (Ky. 2013).
· cites it 15× “Among those changes is the amendment of KRS 503.055 to codify the pre-existing “no duty to retreat” rule.”
Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 6× “[2] KRS 503.055(1), as amended, established a presumption, with some exceptions, that a person has "a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm" to himself or others when using defensive force against someone under certain circumstances.”
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 794 (Ky. 2016).
· cites it 4× “Hasch holds that a trial court is bound to provide “no duty to retreat” instruction only “when presented with circumstances in which the provisions of [KRS 503.055] are applicable, and upon the request of one -of the parties[.”
Patrick Deon Ragland v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 476 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2015).
· cites it 4× “2 *244 The problem with both the trial court’s and the Commonwealth’s mechanical approach to giving the no-duty-to-retreat instruction here is that it ignores that, as Ragland ■ correctly points out, KRS 503.055(3) and its various qualifications were not implicated by the…”
Jones v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2011).
· cites it 9× “055(3) INSTRUCTION ON BEHALF OF THE VICTIM At the beginning of trial, the Commonwealth made a motion in limine to preclude the defense from obtaining a self-defense instruction because of KRS 503.055, the “castle doctrine.” KRS 503.”
Foley v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 28 (Ky. 2010).
· cites it 3× “In his petition Foley sought to have Kentucky’s self-defense statutes as they existed at the time of his 1991 trial (and to the extent they now remain inconsistent with KRS 503.055— the castle doctrine statute) declared unconstitutional.”
Murphy v. Commonwealth, 509 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2017).
“1994), superseded by statute KRS 503.055 and 503.050). As to the first factor, Murphy was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s remark that misstated the evidence of Murphy’s threat, ie.”
Commonwealth v. Ousley, 393 S.W.3d 15 (Ky. 2013).
“Kentucky recognizes a strong “castle doctrine” that not only allows a person to use self-defense to repel an invasion of his home, see KRS 503.055, but also to protect property, see KRS 503.”
Caudill v. Commonwealth, 374 S.W.3d 301 (Ky. 2012).
“KRS 503.055(3) provides: A person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in any other place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force, if he or…”
United States v. Tony Petrey, 661 F. App'x 369 (6th Cir. 2016).
“” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(l)(a). Of course, even Sheppard’s account of the December 2012 shooting does not place Hill within or attempting to enter Sheppard’s home or vehicle.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(1) — 4 cases
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
“But KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute pertaining to "Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicleExceptions.”
Hannah v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 509 (Ky. 2010).
“[2] KRS 503.055(1), as amended, established a presumption, with some exceptions, that a person has "a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or great bodily harm" to himself or others when using defensive force against someone under certain circumstances.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(1)(a) — 2 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(1)(b) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(2) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(2)(d) — 2 cases
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(3) — 22 cases
Commonwealth v. Hasch, 421 S.W.3d 349 (Ky. 2013).
“Among those changes is the amendment of KRS 503.055 to codify the pre-existing “no duty to retreat” rule.”
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
“But KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute pertaining to "Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicleExceptions.”
Patrick Deon Ragland v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 476 S.W.3d 236 (Ky. 2015).
“2 *244 The problem with both the trial court’s and the Commonwealth’s mechanical approach to giving the no-duty-to-retreat instruction here is that it ignores that, as Ragland ■ correctly points out, KRS 503.055(3) and its various qualifications were not implicated by the…”
Jackson v. Commonwealth, 481 S.W.3d 794 (Ky. 2016).
“Hasch holds that a trial court is bound to provide “no duty to retreat” instruction only “when presented with circumstances in which the provisions of [KRS 503.055] are applicable, and upon the request of one -of the parties[.”
Jones v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 376 (Ky. 2011).
“055(3) INSTRUCTION ON BEHALF OF THE VICTIM At the beginning of trial, the Commonwealth made a motion in limine to preclude the defense from obtaining a self-defense instruction because of KRS 503.055, the “castle doctrine.” KRS 503.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(4) — 2 cases
Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009).
“But KRS 503.055 is a wholly new substantive statute pertaining to "Use of defensive force regarding dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicleExceptions.”
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(5) — 1 case
— Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(l)(a) — 1 case
United States v. Tony Petrey, 661 F. App'x 369 (6th Cir. 2016).
“” Ky. Rev. Stat. § 503.055(l)(a). Of course, even Sheppard’s account of the December 2012 shooting does not place Hill within or attempting to enter Sheppard’s home or vehicle.”
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