§14. Possession of property; removal of facilities; objection; waiver
A. In any case where the state or its political corporation or subdivision has actually, in good faith believing it had authority to do so, taken possession of privately owned immovable property of another, and constructed facilities upon, under, or over such property with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property, such owner shall be deemed to have waived his right to contest the necessity for the taking and to receive just compensation prior to the taking, but he shall be entitled to bring an action for such compensation, to be determined in accordance with the provisions of R.S. 19:9, for the taking of his property or interest therein, the just compensation to be determined as of the time of the taking of the property, or right or interest therein, and such action shall proceed as if the state, its political corporation, or subdivision had filed a petition for expropriation as provided for in R.S. 19:2.1.
B. In the case where any expropriating authority referred to in R.S. 19:2, other than the state or its political corporations or subdivisions, has actually, in good faith believing it had the authority to do so, taken possession of privately owned immovable property of another and constructed facilities upon, under, or over such property with the consent or acquiescence of the owner of the property, it shall be presumed that the owner of the property has waived his right to receive just compensation prior to the taking, and he shall be entitled only to bring an action for judicial determination of whether the taking was for a public and necessary purpose and for just compensation to be determined in accordance with R.S. 19:9, as of the time of the taking of the property, or right or interest therein, and such action shall proceed as nearly as may be as if the expropriating authority had filed a petition for expropriation as provided for in R.S. 19:2.1.
C. The provisions of Subsection A of this Section shall apply only to privately owned immovable property over which the state or its political corporation or subdivision has exercised actual possession in good faith for ten years and has completed construction of facilities upon, under, or over such property. The provisions of this Section shall not be deemed to authorize the acquisition of any interest in privately owned immovable property adjoining such facilities, including but not limited to a servitude, right of use, or any right of passage across or access to the private immovable property adjoining such facilities.
Added by Acts 1976, No. 504, §1; Acts 2007, No. 362, §, eff. August 15, 2007; Acts 2012, No. 702, §1, eff. August 1, 2012.
Notes of Decisions
Brooks v. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 370 So. 2d 686 (La. Ct. App. 1979).
· cites it 11× “19:14 (Act 504 of 1976), which provides in pertinent part as follows: "In the case where any corporation referred to in Section 2 of this Title has actually, in good faith believing it had the authority to do so, taken possession of privately owned immovable property of another…”
Crooks v. Placid Refining Co., 903 So. 2d 1154 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
· cites it 10× “R.S. 19:14, and held plaintiffs were limited to an action for compensation based upon the value of the right of way taken as of the date of taking.”
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Eisman, 430 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
· cites it 4× “Eisman's actions constituted ratification of the servitude agreement executed by her husband; (2) In not finding that South Central Bell had a valid servitude; (3) In refusing to apply LSA-R.S. 19:14; (4) In deciding that South Central Bell had trespassed and that it was liable…”
Jungeblut v. Par. of Jefferson, City of Kenner, 485 So. 2d 974 (La. Ct. App. 1986).
· cites it 4× “The defendant, Parish of Jefferson, contends the following: (1) The district court erred in denying plaintiffs' exception of prescription based on LSA-R.S. 19:14 and LSA-R.S. 19:2.1(B). (2) The trial court committed error in denying plaintiffs' exception of prescription based on…”
Howard v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 583 So. 2d 503 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
· cites it 4× “The Louisiana Supreme Court in Lake, supra, overruled the doctrine prospectively as it related to acquisition of discontinuous apparent servitudes; however, in October of the same year, the legislature enacted the Doctrine in LSA-R.S. 19:14. Appellant urges and we agree that…”
Lieber v. State, Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 682 So. 2d 1257 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
· cites it 4× “R.S. 19:14, 19:2.1 and 13:5111. These statutes respectively recognize that the state may acquire private property for a public purpose without formal expropriation proceedings, and without prior payment of constitutional compensation, by constructing public facilities on the…”
Acadian Gas Pipeline Sys. v. Bourgeois, 890 So. 2d 634 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
· cites it 3× “the owner of the property has waived his right to receive just compensation prior to the taking, and he shall be entitled only to bring an action for judicial determination of whether the taking was for a public and necessary purpose and for just compensation to be determined in…”
Adams v. Par., 978 So. 2d 1202 (La. Ct. App. 2008).
· cites it 4× “After a trial, the court issued a written opinion finding that the District had not acted in good faith in negligently building the fire station across the property line and that LSA-R.S. 19:14 was not applicable under the circumstances.”
Tr. Corp. v. Allen, 359 So. 2d 715 (La. Ct. App. 1978).
· cites it 4× “Conventional acquisition of the right-of-way of which defendant Allen was allegedly put on notice by reference in the deed by which he acquired to the 1972 plot plan, recorded in the public records, which depicts a spur track, so labeled, crossing the subject property. 2.…”
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