Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316 (2026)

Exclusion or modification of warranties

✓ current as of May 2026
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(1).  Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (section 2‑202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.  
(2).  Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that "There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."  
(3).  Notwithstanding subsection (2)  
(a). Unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no implied warranty; and  
(b). When the buyer before entering into the contract has examined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have revealed to him; and  
(c). An implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.  
(4).  Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages and on contractual modification of remedy (sections 2‑718 and 2‑719).  
(5).  The provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4) do not apply to sales of consumer goods or services. Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services that attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties is unenforceable. A seller or manufacturer of a motor vehicle may indicate that, to the extent permitted by law, the seller or manufacturer is excluding or modifying implied warranties. Any language, oral or written, used by a prior seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services that attempts to exclude or modify the warranty or reimbursement remedy of a retail seller of consumer goods and services who provides reimbursement or return to a consumer as required to honor an implied warranty of merchantability due to a defect for which that prior seller or manufacturer is liable under section 2‑314 or 2‑315 is unenforceable. Consumer goods and services are those new or used goods and services, including mobile homes, that are used or bought primarily for personal, family or household purposes.  
(a). A violation of section 2‑314, 2‑315 or 2‑316 arising from the retail sale of consumer goods and services constitutes a violation of Title 5, chapter 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act.   [PL 1997, c. 497, §1 (AMD).]
(b). A violation of section 2‑316 arising from an attempt by a prior seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services to exclude or modify the warranty or reimbursement remedy of a retail seller of consumer goods and services who provides reimbursement or return to a consumer as required to honor an implied warranty of merchantability due to a defect for which that prior seller or manufacturer is liable under section 2‑314 or 2‑315 does not constitute a violation of Title 5, chapter 10, Unfair Trade Practices Act.   [PL 1997, c. 497, §1 (NEW).]
[PL 2011, c. 523, §1 (AMD).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1973, c. 444 (AMD). PL 1975, c. 320 (AMD). PL 1997, c. 497, §1 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 523, §1 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 16 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1978–2025 · leading case: State Ex Rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981).
State Ex Rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981). · cites it 22× “” 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(5). Our interpretation of paragraph (a) is limited by the parameters of subsection (5) as just defined.”
J.S. McCarthy, Co. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting Equip., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Me. 2004). · cites it 5× “Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.”
In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “Code § 26-1-2-316 (2); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(2); Md. Code, Com.”
Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982). · cites it 2× “979) states that "[t]he purpose of this section is to provide that meritorious actions for personal injury shall not be defeated by the failure to give notice.”
Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982). · cites it 2× “11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(1) (1964). An express warranty is created when “any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods .”
Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818 (Me. 1978). · cites it 3× “S.A. § 2-316(2). It is also clear that the only remaining issue as to the effectiveness of the disclaimer under Section 2-316(2) is the conspicuousness of the language within the contract.”
S. H. Nevers Corp. v. Husky Hydraulics, Inc., 408 A.2d 676 (Me. 1979). “Husky argues that the only express warranty it made was a standard form warranty allegedly accompanying the sale which expressly warranted to repair or replace defective parts which were returned to Husky within six months of the date of purchase, limited its liability for…”
Am. Aerial Servs., Inc. v. Terex USA, LLC, 39 F. Supp. 3d 95 (D. Me. 2014). “11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316. Conspicuousness, as used in § 2-316, is defined by 11 M.”
Maine Farmers Exch. v. McGillicuddy, 1997 ME 153 (Me. 1997). “They argue, pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(3)(b), that MFX’s inspection of the potatoes at the time of shipment obviated all warranties.”
Arundel Valley, LLC v. Branch River Plastics, Inc. (Me. Super. Ct 2017). · cites it 2× “11 M.R.S. § 2-316. Maine's enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code imposes certain requirements for a valid disclaimer of implied warranties.”
Miller v. Camping World Camper Sales (Me. Super. Ct 2023). · cites it 2× “Defendant argues that the contract the parties entered specifies a one-year statute of limitations for claims brought thereunder.”
XL Sports World LLC v. Dynamic Sports Constr. Inc (D. Me. 2025). · cites it 2× “315 ; 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-315. “[T]o exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(1) — 2 cases
Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982). “11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(1) (1964). An express warranty is created when “any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods .”
J.S. McCarthy, Co. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting Equip., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Me. 2004). “Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(2) — 4 cases
In re Rust-Oleum Restore Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 155 F. Supp. 3d 772 (N.D. Ill. 2016). “Code § 26-1-2-316 (2); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(2); Md. Code, Com.”
J.S. McCarthy, Co. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting Equip., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Me. 2004). “Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.”
Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818 (Me. 1978). “S.A. § 2-316(2). It is also clear that the only remaining issue as to the effectiveness of the disclaimer under Section 2-316(2) is the conspicuousness of the language within the contract.”
XL Sports World LLC v. Dynamic Sports Constr. Inc (D. Me. 2025). “315 ; 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-315. “[T]o exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(3)(b) — 1 case
Maine Farmers Exch. v. McGillicuddy, 1997 ME 153 (Me. 1997). “They argue, pursuant to 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(3)(b), that MFX’s inspection of the potatoes at the time of shipment obviated all warranties.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(5) — 6 cases
State Ex Rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981). “” 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(5). Our interpretation of paragraph (a) is limited by the parameters of subsection (5) as just defined.”
Cuthbertson v. Clark Equip. Co., 448 A.2d 315 (Me. 1982). “11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(1) (1964). An express warranty is created when “any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods .”
J.S. McCarthy, Co. v. Brausse Diecutting & Converting Equip., Inc., 340 F. Supp. 2d 54 (D. Me. 2004). “Language to exclude all implied warranties of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that ‘There are no warranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof.”
Todd Equip. Leasing Co. v. Milligan, 395 A.2d 818 (Me. 1978). “S.A. § 2-316(2). It is also clear that the only remaining issue as to the effectiveness of the disclaimer under Section 2-316(2) is the conspicuousness of the language within the contract.”
Miller v. Camping World Camper Sales (Me. Super. Ct 2023). “Defendant argues that the contract the parties entered specifies a one-year statute of limitations for claims brought thereunder.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 11, § 2-316(5)(a) — 2 cases
State Ex Rel. Tierney v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866 (Me. 1981). “” 11 M.R.S.A. § 2-316(5). Our interpretation of paragraph (a) is limited by the parameters of subsection (5) as just defined.”
Porter v. Sangillo, 437 A.2d 855 (Me. 1981).
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.