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Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 6002 (2026)

Tenancy at will; buildings on land of another

Edition and currency
laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). The text is the edition Syfert holds; for a past event, check the version in force on that date.
Other sources
CURRENTlaws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026) cited 1974–2021 19citing cases
At a glance

Courts have cited this section in 19 opinions since 1974, 1 of them in the last five years. The most litigated part is subsection (1) (2 cases).

Tenancies at will must be terminated by either party by a minimum of 30 days' notice, except as provided in subsections 2 and 4, in writing for that purpose given to the other party, but if the landlord or the landlord's agent has made at least 3 good faith efforts to serve the tenant, that service may be accomplished by both mailing the notice by first class mail to the tenant's last known address and by leaving the notice at the tenant's last and usual place of abode. In cases when the tenant has paid rent through the date when a 30-day notice would expire, the notice must expire on or after the date through which the rent has been paid. Either party may waive in writing the 30 days' notice at the time the notice is given, and at no other time prior to the giving of the notice. A termination based on a 30-day notice is not affected by the receipt of money, whether previously owed or for current use and occupation, until the date a writ of possession is issued against the tenant during the period of actual occupancy after receipt of the notice. When the tenancy is terminated, the tenant is liable to the process of forcible entry and detainer without further notice and without proof of any relation of landlord and tenant unless the tenant has paid, after service of the notice, rent that accrued after the termination of the tenancy. These provisions apply to tenancies of buildings erected on land of another party. Termination of the tenancy is deemed to occur at the expiration of the time fixed in the notice. A 30-day notice under this paragraph and a 7-day notice under subsection 2 may be combined in one notice to the tenant.   [PL 2015, c. 293, §6 (AMD).]
A notice to terminate under this section must include language advising the tenant that the tenant has the right to contest the termination in court. Failure to include language regarding the right to contest termination in the notice to terminate is not grounds to dismiss a forcible entry and detainer action. If the landlord fails to include language required by this paragraph in a notice to terminate and the tenant does not appear at the court hearing scheduled in any forcible entry and detainer action arising from the notice to terminate, the landlord's failure to include the required language in the notice to terminate constitutes sufficient grounds to set aside any default judgment entered against the tenant for failure to appear at the court hearing. This paragraph does not limit the right of a tenant to raise as a defense in an action for forcible entry and detainer the landlord's failure to include language in the notice to terminate as required by a lease agreement or any federal or state statutes, regulations or rules affecting the tenancy.   [PL 2009, c. 566, §4 (NEW).]
1.  Causes for 7-day notice of termination of tenancy.  Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, the tenancy may be terminated upon 7 days' written notice in the event that the landlord can show, by affirmative proof, that:  
A. The tenant, the tenant's family or an invitee of the tenant has caused substantial damage to the demised premises that the tenant has not repaired or caused to be repaired before the giving of the notice provided in this subsection;   [PL 2009, c. 171, §2 (NEW).]
B. The tenant, the tenant's family or an invitee of the tenant caused or permitted a nuisance within the premises, has caused or permitted an invitee to cause the dwelling unit to become unfit for human habitation or has violated or permitted a violation of the law regarding the tenancy;   [PL 2015, c. 293, §7 (AMD).]
C. The tenant is 7 days or more in arrears in the payment of rent;   [PL 2017, c. 103, §1 (AMD).]
D. The tenant is a perpetrator of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking and the victim is also a tenant;   [PL 2017, c. 103, §2 (AMD).]
E. The tenant or the tenant's guest or invitee is the perpetrator of violence, a threat of violence or sexual assault against another tenant, a tenant's guest, the landlord or the landlord's employee or agent, except that this paragraph does not apply to a tenant who is a victim as defined in section 6000, subsection 4 and who has taken reasonable action under the circumstances to comply with the landlord's request for protection of the tenant, another tenant, a tenant's guest or invitee, the landlord or the landlord's employee or agent or of the landlord's property; or   [PL 2017, c. 103, §3 (NEW).]
F. The person occupying the premises is not an authorized occupant of the premises.   [PL 2017, c. 103, §3 (NEW).]
If a tenant who is 7 days or more in arrears in the payment of rent pays the full amount of rent due before the expiration of the 7-day notice in writing, that notice is void. Thereafter, in all residential tenancies at will, if the tenant pays all rental arrears, all rent due as of the date of payment and any filing fees and service of process fees actually expended by the landlord before the issuance of the writ of possession as provided by section 6005, then the tenancy must be reinstated and no writ of possession may issue.  
In the event that the landlord or the landlord's agent has made at least 3 good faith efforts to personally serve the tenant in-hand, that service may be accomplished by both mailing the notice by first class mail to the tenant's last known address and by leaving the notice at the tenant's last and usual place of abode.  
Payment or written assurance of payment through the general assistance program, as authorized by the State or a municipality pursuant to Title 22, chapter 1161, has the same effect as payment in cash.  
[PL 2017, c. 103, §§1-3 (AMD).]
2.  Ground for termination notice.  A notice of termination issued pursuant to subsection 1 must indicate the specific ground claimed for issuing the notice.  
A. If a ground claimed is rent arrearage of 7 days or more, the notice must also include a statement:  
(1) Indicating the amount of the rent that is 7 days or more in arrears as of the date of the notice; and  
(2) Setting forth the following notice: "If you pay the amount of rent due as of the date of this notice before this notice expires, then this notice as it applies to rent arrearage is void. After this notice expires, if you pay all rental arrears, all rent due as of the date of payment and any filing fees and service of process fees actually paid by the landlord before the writ of possession issues at the completion of the eviction process, then your tenancy will be reinstated."   [PL 2009, c. 171, §3 (NEW).]
B. If the notice states an incorrect rent arrearage or contains any other clerical errors that do not significantly or materially alter the purpose or understanding of the notice, the notice cannot be held invalid if the landlord can show the error was unintentional.   [PL 2009, c. 171, §3 (NEW).]
[PL 2009, c. 171, §3 (RPR).]
3.  Breach of warranty of habitability as an affirmative defense.  In an action brought by a landlord to terminate a rental agreement on the ground that the tenant is in arrears in the payment of rent, the tenant may raise as a defense any alleged violation of the implied warranty and covenant of habitability, provided that the landlord or the landlord's agent has received actual or constructive notice of the alleged violation, and has unreasonably failed under the circumstances to take prompt, effective steps to repair or remedy the condition and the condition was not caused by the tenant or another person acting under the tenant's control. Upon finding that the dwelling unit is not fit for human habitation, the court shall permit the tenant either to terminate the rental agreement without prejudice or to reaffirm the rental agreement, with the court assessing against the tenant an amount equal to the reduced fair rental value of the property for the period during which rent is owed. The reduced amount of rent thus owed must be paid on a pro rata basis, unless the parties agree otherwise, and payments become due at the same intervals as rent for the current rental period. The landlord may not charge the tenant for the full rental value of the property until such time as it is fit for human habitation.  
[PL 1995, c. 208, §1 (AMD).]
4.  Victims of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking.  A victim may terminate the victim's tenancy in a tenancy-at-will or a lease with a term of less than one year with 7 days' written notice and documentation required pursuant to section 6001, subsection 6, paragraph H due to an incident or threat of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking. A victim of domestic violence, sexual assault or stalking may terminate the victim's tenancy in a lease with a term of one year or more with 30 days' written notice and documentation required pursuant to section 6001, subsection 6, paragraph H. When written notice is provided to the landlord, the victim is not liable for any rent due beyond the date the notice expires or the date the victim vacates the unit, whichever is later, unless the victim has prepaid rent for the month, in which case the landlord is not required to refund the rent for that month.  
[PL 2015, c. 293, §9 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1971, c. 322, §§2,3 (AMD). PL 1971, c. 544, §§46-A,47 (AMD). PL 1977, c. 441 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 232 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 298 (AMD). PL 1981, c. 65 (AMD). PL 1981, c. 428, §§2-4 (AMD). PL 1983, c. 398 (AMD). PL 1989, c. 284 (AMD). PL 1993, c. 202, §1 (AMD). PL 1993, c. 211, §2 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 208, §1 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 248, §§1,2 (AMD). PL 2003, c. 296, §1 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 171, §§1-3 (AMD). PL 2009, c. 566, §4 (AMD). PL 2015, c. 293, §§6-9 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 103, §§1-3 (AMD).
The 19 cases that cite Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 6002 most heavily, weighted by court and treatment. RelevanceNewestTreatment
1
GREENRubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665 (Me. 1984).
cites § 6002 3×subsections: (1)cited by 41 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“However, a close examination of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002, in its entirety, leads us to conclude subsection 1 is limited in scope to termination of tenancies at will.”
The case’s holding
A statute is not read to modify the common law absent clear and explicit language showing that modification was intended; forcible entry and detainer is purely statutory and summary.
Later courts cite it for
“will not interpret a statute as modifying the common law in the absence of clear and explicit language showing such modification or abrogation was intended.” · 3 citing courts
2
GREENFrost Vacationland Props., Inc. v. Palmer, 1999 ME 15, 723 A.2d 418.
cites § 6002 3×cited by 16 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“[¶ 6] In February 1997, after serving a notice of termination on Linda Palmer pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1998), Vaca-tionland brought an FED action against the Palmers pursuant to 14 M.”
Later courts cite it for
“access to the summary forcible entry and detainer process” · 1 citing court
3
GREENPerreault v. Parker, 490 A.2d 203 (Me. 1985).
cites § 6002 2×cited by 9 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“The plaintiff had to terminate the defendant's tenancy pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1984), which imposes a notice requirement, before he could maintain a forcible entry and detainer action against her.”
4
GREENIrving Oil Corp. v. Maine Aviation Corp., 1998 ME 16, 704 A.2d 872.
cites § 6002 2×cited by 6 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“The court concluded that Irving had failed to provide the requisite notice of termination to MAC pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (1980 & Supp.1997). Defendants now appeal from the judgment of the Superior Court.”
Later courts cite it for
“because the defendants failed to preserve the issue in the superior court, we will not review it on appeal even though it is one of constitutional dimension.” · 1 citing court
5
GREENMulholland v. Poole, 2005 ME 18, 866 A.2d 122.
cites § 6002 2×cited by 3 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“See 14 M.R.S.A. § 6001(3). If a landlord successfully rebuts this presumption, a writ of possession of the premises may issue.”
6
GREENMacKerron v. MacKerron, 571 A.2d 810 (Me. 1990).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 14 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“Neil argues first that the forcible entry must fail because the notice to quit was invalid for failure to comply with 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1988). We agree.”
Later courts cite it for
“a defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is the equivalent of a defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” · 3 citing courts
7
GREENKane v. Inhabitants of Harpswell (In re Kane), 248 B.R. 216 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 11 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“” On April 5, 1999, the Town, representing itself as the owner of the Property, served the Kanes with a notice to quit pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 et seq. On May 17, 1999, the Town brought a complaint for forcible entry and detainer (the “FED action”) in state court.”
8
GREENState v. Fin & Feather Club, 316 A.2d 351 (Me. 1974).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 21 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“See now 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (30 days notice for tenancies at will).”
Later courts cite it for
“if the acts of the parties taken all together, are such as to rebut the idea of surrender, then none ought to be presumed.” · 1 citing court
9
GREENHomstead Enter. v. Johnson Prods., Inc., 540 A.2d 471 (Me. 1988).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 5 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“See 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1987) (“Tenancies at will must be terminated by either party by 30 days’ notice_”) When Johnson remained on the premises beyond that period, Homstead properly sought a writ of possession by means of a forcible entry and detainer complaint.”
Later courts cite it for
“when, as here, the superior court acts as an intermediate appellate tribunal, we directly review the judgment of the district court to determine whether that decision contains any error of law that affects the validity of the judgment.” · 2 citing courts
10
GREENFraser v. Fraser, 598 A.2d 751 (Me. 1991).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 2 cases
Where it cites § 6002
“In August 1989, after serving notices of eviction, see 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1990), Barry and Phoebe brought separate forcible entry and detainer actions against Estelle and Duane in the District Court.”
11
GREENDiMillo v. Longfellow Cruise Line, 481 A.2d 1313 (Me. 1984).
cites § 6002 1×subsections: (1)cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 6002
“1984) in which we held that 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002(1) is limited in scope to termination of tenancies at will.”
12
GREENCarney v. Bergeron, 518 A.2d 717 (Me. 1986).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 1 case
Where it cites § 6002
“See 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002 (Supp.1986). . The court’s ruling was made in response to an allegation by Carney that the Bergerons’ claim of title was frivolous and intended for delay.”
13
NO FLAGGrimmel's Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Cleaves, No. ANDap-19-10 (Me. Super. Ct Mar. 25, 2020).
cites § 6002 2×subsections: (2) (2)(A)(2)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“14 M.R.S. § 6002(2) (emphasis added). GMHP argues that to the extent the notice stated an incorrect amount ofrent due, the notice was not invalid because such an error was unintentional.”
14
NO FLAGMurphy v. Hains, No. CUMap-00-098 (Me. Super. Ct Apr. 10, 2001).
cites § 6002 2×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“2000); Transcript at 9, 11-13, 17, 28-29; 14. The District Court was incorrect in determining that the notice to quit with regard to apartment #3 was sufficient to .”
15
NO FLAGDussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, No. CUMcv-10-347 (Me. Super. Ct Nov. 9, 2011).
cites § 6002 2×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“Compare Addendum with 14 M.R.S. § 6002 (2) (landlord may bring a forcible entry and detainer action if the rent is as little as seven days overdue, as long as it gives the tenant an opportunity to cure).”
16
NO FLAGS. Maine Landlord Ass. v. City of Portland, No. CUMcv-21-40 (Me. Super. Ct July 2, 2021).
cites § 6002 1×subsections: (1)(A)cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“In particular, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance: violates due process; is preempted by state and federal law; is an unlawful exercise of the municipal citizen referendum; and has unlawful retroactive effect.”
17
NO FLAGDavis v. Grover, No. PENcv-01-34 (Me. Super. Ct Apr. 3, 2002).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“After Grover received title to the house, she served a Notice of Termination of Tenancy on Davis which stated: You are hereby notified, pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002, that your tenancy-at- will in the premises you occupy at 1113 Chase Road, Veazie, Maine owned by .”
18
NO FLAGRainbow Prods., Inc. v. Greg Powers Ent., Inc., No. SAGcv-08-15 (Me. Super. Ct Dec. 7, 2010).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“See 14 M.R.S. § 6002. 1 For similar reasons, GPE is also entitled to damages of $500 for one month's rent for the sIgn.”
19
NO FLAGRobishaw v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. CUMcv-09-263 (Me. Super. Ct May 26, 2010).
cites § 6002 1×cited by 0 casesunpublished
Where it cites § 6002
“6 factual dispute for trial as to the existence of an implied agreement to allow Robishaw to remain in possession. On this record, therefore, the undisputed facts establish that Robishaw was not a tenant at will but a tenant at sufferance.”

The flag is Syfertize’s treatment of the citing case itself, not of the statute. “Where it cites” is the passage in the opinion; the holding is a summary of the whole case and may concern another point. Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus.

Citing cases by year
197419972021

One bar per year. Tallest: 2 cases in 1984. These are opinions in the Syfert collection, which holds more of some courts’ recent opinions than their older ones, so a rise can reflect what the collection holds and not more litigation.

By court
Me.11Me. Super. Ct71st Cir. BAP1
By subsection
(1)2 cases
Rubin v. Josephson, 478 A.2d 665 (Me. 1984).“However, a close examination of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002, in its entirety, leads us to conclude subsection 1 is limited in scope to termination of tenancies at will.”
DiMillo v. Longfellow Cruise Line, 481 A.2d 1313 (Me. 1984).“1984) in which we held that 14 M.R.S.A. § 6002(1) is limited in scope to termination of tenancies at will.”
(1)(A)1 case
S. Maine Landlord Ass. v. City of Portland, No. CUMcv-21-40 (Me. Super. Ct July 2, 2021).“In particular, Plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance: violates due process; is preempted by state and federal law; is an unlawful exercise of the municipal citizen referendum; and has unlawful retroactive effect.”
(2)1 case
Grimmel's Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Cleaves, No. ANDap-19-10 (Me. Super. Ct Mar. 25, 2020).“14 M.R.S. § 6002(2) (emphasis added). GMHP argues that to the extent the notice stated an incorrect amount ofrent due, the notice was not invalid because such an error was unintentional.”
(2)(A)(2)1 case
Grimmel's Mobile Home Park, LLC v. Cleaves, No. ANDap-19-10 (Me. Super. Ct Mar. 25, 2020).
Enactment and amendments

Syfert holds no separate history line for this section. Where this code prints a source or history note, it appears with the text, usually at the end.

Versions

Edition shown: laws through the 2025 session (checked Sept. 2026). Syfert holds no earlier or later version of this section.