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Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 866 (2026)

Defendant out of State when action commenced; insolvency

✓ current as of May 2026

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If a person is out of the State when a cause of action accrues against him, the action may be commenced within the time limited therefor after he comes into the State. If a person is absent from and resides out of the State, after a cause of action has accrued against him, the time of his absence from the State shall not be taken as a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. If a person is adjudged an insolvent debtor after a cause of action has accrued against him, and such cause of action is one provable in insolvency, the time of the pendency of his insolvency proceedings shall not be taken as a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. No action shall be brought by any person whose cause of action has been barred by the laws of any state, territory or country while all the parties have resided therein.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 25 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1978–2021 · leading case: Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014).

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Christine S. Angell v. Renald C. Hallee, 2014 ME 72 (Me. 2014). · cites it 3× “3d 922 ; see also 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2013). 1 Specifically, Christine S.”

Angell v. HALLEE, 2012 ME 10 (Me. 2012). · cites it 3× “DISCUSSION [¶ 5] There are two issues raised by this appeal: (1) whether a limitations period is tolled pursuant to 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2011) while a defendant is absent from and resides out of state but is nevertheless amenable to service of process by means other than…”

Ouellette v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 466 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983). · cites it 4× “It argued that Maine’s “borrowing statute,” 14 M.R.S.A. § 866 (1980), required the court to apply Massachusetts’ three and four year limitation periods in bar of plaintiff’s claim.”

Hossler Ex Rel. Dows v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762 (Me. 1979). · cites it 2× “Our borrowing statute, 14 M.R.S.A. § 866, reads in pertinent part: No action shall be brought by any person whose cause of action has been barred by the laws of any state, territory or country while all the parties have resided therein.”

Levasseur v. Aaron, 503 A.2d 1291 (Me. 1986). · cites it 4× “14 M.R.S.A. § 866 (1980). She argues that dismissal is not warranted under the circumstances of this case.”

Patten v. Milam, 468 A.2d 620 (Me. 1983). · cites it 2× “Defense counsel attempted to persuade the trial justice that the earlier ruling on the motion involved an erroneous application of the tolling provision of 14 M.R.S.A. § 866 (1980) and that it was within the power of the trial justice to correct that ruling.”

City of Saco v. Pulsifer, 2000 ME 74 (Me. 2000). · cites it 3× “§ 752 (1980), unless another statutory mechanism operated to toll the running of that time. 2 The City presented only one mechanism for the tolling of the statute of limitations.”

Henderson v. Laser Spine Inst. LLC, 815 F. Supp. 2d 353 (D. Me. 2011). “14 M.R.S. § 866. It allows Maine "to borrow and use the statute of limitations of another state in determining the timeliness of an action,” but only applies where "the parties [] reside in the same state at the same time.”

Tornesello v. Tisdale, 948 A.2d 1244 (Me. 2008). “[¶ 15] Examining the two exceptions set out in Johanson , Maine’s borrowing statute, 14 M.R.S. § 866 (2007), 4 which is designed to prevent forum shopping, does not apply here because the parties did not reside in the same state at the same time.”

Patten v. Milam, 480 A.2d 774 (Me. 1984). “The Superior Court justice concluded on remand that the statute of limitations was tolled pursuant to 14 M.R.S.A. § 866 (1980). Given the meager record before the Superior Court, it is apparent that the allocation of the burden of proof on the issue of tolling assumes…”

Willey v. Brown, 390 A.2d 1039 (Me. 1978). · cites it 2× “Plaintiff’s second point on appeal raises the question whether the involuntary dissolution of a corporate defendant causes it to be “absent from the State of Maine” for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations, as provided in 14 M.R.S.A. § 866 (1964). 5 Defendant Worcester…”

Wallingford's Fruit House v. Inhabitants of Auburn (In Re Wallingford's Fruit House), 30 B.R. 654 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983). “See Me. Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 14, § 866. As noted in text, the notice and filing requirements of Me.”

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