Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 15
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 201 (2026)

Definitions

✓ current as of May 2026
Find cases: SyfertCases citing this section ME-LEGlegislature.maine.gov JustiaTitle on Justia CornellLII Search CasesGoogle Scholar
As used in this chapter, unless the context indicates otherwise, the following words shall have the following meanings.   [PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (RPR).]
1.  Application.  "Application" means a request, by any person specified in section 223, to the Governor of this State to make a requisition to the executive authority of another state for the extradition of a fugitive from justice.  
[PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (RPR).]
2.  Demand.  "Demand" means the demand, as provided in section 203, by the executive authority of another state upon the Governor of this State for the extradition of a fugitive from justice.  
[PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (RPR).]
3.  Executive authority.  "Executive authority" includes the Governor and any person performing the functions of governor in a state other than this State.  
[PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (RPR).]
4.  Fugitive from justice.  "Fugitive from justice" means:  
A. A person accused of a crime in the demanding state who is not in that state, unless the person is lawfully absent pursuant to the terms of the person's bail or other release. "Fugitive from justice" includes both a person who was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and thereafter left the demanding state and a person who committed an act in this State or in a 3rd state or elsewhere resulting in or constituting a crime in the demanding state; or   [RR 2023, c. 2, Pt. D, §9 (COR).]
B. A person convicted of a crime in the demanding state who is not in that state, unless the person is lawfully absent pursuant to the terms of the person's bail or other release, who has not served or completed a sentence imposed pursuant to the conviction. "Fugitive from justice" includes, but is not limited to, a person who has been released pending appeal or other review of the conviction, the review having been completed; a person who has been serving a sentence in this State; a person who has escaped from confinement in the demanding state; and a person who has broken the terms of the person's bail, probation or parole.   [RR 2023, c. 2, Pt. D, §9 (COR).]
[RR 2023, c. 2, Pt. D, §9 (COR).]
5.  Governor.  "Governor" includes any person performing the functions of Governor by authority of the law of this State.  
[PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (NEW).]
5-A.  Judicial officer.  "Judicial officer" shall mean a justice, judge, justice of the peace, clerk of courts or other neutral person empowered by the laws of the demanding state to issue criminal process.  
[PL 1979, c. 274, §1 (NEW).]
6.  State.  "State," referring to a state other than this State, refers to any other state or territory, organized or unorganized, of the United States of America.  
[PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1977, c. 671, §3 (RPR). PL 1979, c. 274, §1 (AMD). PL 1981, c. 317, §1 (AMD). RR 2023, c. 2, Pt. D, §9 (COR).
The Revisor's Office cannot provide legal advice or interpretation of Maine law to the public.
If you need legal advice, please consult a qualified attorney.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 5 cases, 1981–2017 · leading case: Lee v. Massie, 447 A.2d 65 (Me. 1982).
Sort: Relevance Newest Treatment
Lee v. Massie, 447 A.2d 65 (Me. 1982). · cites it 6× “7 Title 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4) (1980), sets forth an explicit definition of such a person, distinct from the other provisions of the extradition statute.”
James D. Perron v. Lisa Menard, Comm'r, 171 A.3d 399 (Vt. 2017). “at 67 (quoting 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4)(B) (1980) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added)).”
Bouchard v. Richardson, 427 A.2d 490 (Me. 1981). “In July, 1980, petitioner Bouchard was arrested as a fugitive from Tennessee under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 201 et seq. He petitioned the Superior Court for a writ of habeas corpus to test the legality of his arrest.”
Robinson v. Warden, N. NH Corr. Facility, 634 F. Supp. 2d 116 (D. Me. 2009). “His theory is that these rules preempt Maine’s “Uniform Criminal Extradition Act,” see 15 M.R.S. § 201 et seq., which guided the Superior Court in his case.”
Barnard v. State, 525 A.2d 1038 (Me. 1987). “We similarly find no merit in Barnard’s second contention, that a statement allegedly made to him by a California police officer that Barnard was free to leave California constituted a “release” under 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4)(A) (1980), because Barnard was neither in custody in…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 201(4) — 1 case
Lee v. Massie, 447 A.2d 65 (Me. 1982). “7 Title 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4) (1980), sets forth an explicit definition of such a person, distinct from the other provisions of the extradition statute.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 201(4)(A) — 1 case
Barnard v. State, 525 A.2d 1038 (Me. 1987). “We similarly find no merit in Barnard’s second contention, that a statement allegedly made to him by a California police officer that Barnard was free to leave California constituted a “release” under 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4)(A) (1980), because Barnard was neither in custody in…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 15, § 201(4)(B) — 2 cases
Lee v. Massie, 447 A.2d 65 (Me. 1982). “7 Title 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4) (1980), sets forth an explicit definition of such a person, distinct from the other provisions of the extradition statute.”
James D. Perron v. Lisa Menard, Comm'r, 171 A.3d 399 (Vt. 2017). “at 67 (quoting 15 M.R.S.A. § 201(4)(B) (1980) (alteration omitted) (emphasis added)).”
Annotations are extracted automatically from the opinions in the Syfert caselaw corpus and ranked by authority, recency, and treatment. Dots show Syfertize treatment of the citing case itself.