Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 17-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1203 (2026)

Split sentences

✓ current as of May 2026
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(REPEALED)
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1975, c. 499, §1 (NEW). PL 1977, c. 510, §69 (AMD). PL 1977, c. 671, §27 (RPR). PL 1979, c. 379, §§1,2 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 512, §§38-40 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 663, §122 (AMD). PL 1979, c. 707, §1 (AMD). PL 1983, c. 268, §§1,2 (AMD). PL 1983, c. 673, §§1,2 (AMD). PL 1985, c. 282, §5 (AMD). PL 1985, c. 821, §6 (AMD). PL 1989, c. 693, §1 (AMD). PL 1989, c. 925, §10 (AMD). PL 1995, c. 425, §1 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 24, §3 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 788, §§3-5 (AMD). PL 2003, c. 711, §B17 (AMD). PL 2007, c. 344, §2 (AMD). PL 2017, c. 128, §4 (AMD). PL 2019, c. 113, Pt. A, §1 (RP).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 8 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1983–2023 · leading case: State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164 (Me. 1986).
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State v. Dumont, 507 A.2d 164 (Me. 1986). · cites it 2× “NOTES [1] For a crime committed prior to September 23, 1983, the statute authorizing split sentences, in sentencing proceedings subsequent to that date, required that the defendant consent to any unsupended term of imprisonment in excess of 120 days.”
State v. Keefe, 573 A.2d 20 (Me. 1990). · cites it 2× “[3] Defendant correctly points out that decisions of this Court hold that 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) does not authorize a sentencing court to delay the commencement of a period of probation past the completion of the unsuspended period of incarceration.”
State of Maine v. Ronald T. Cummings, 2023 ME 35 (Me. 2023). · cites it 2× “4 See 17-A M.R.S. §§ 1203(1-A), 1231(1), 1252-C(3) (2013).”
State v. Palmer, 468 A.2d 985 (Me. 1983). “At the time of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(2) provided that when a court imposes a split sentence, the initial unsuspended portion shall not exceed 120 days.”
State v. Parks, 544 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1988). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) (Supp.1987) authorizes probation only where a court “sentence[s] a person to a term of imprisonment, not to exceed the maximum term authorized for the crime, an initial portion of which shall be served and the remainder of which shall be suspended.”
State v. Whitmore, 540 A.2d 465 (Me. 1988). “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) (Supp.1987). In other words, the probationary period of a split sentence must commence either: (1) during the period of incarceration, or (2) on the date of completion of the unsuspended period of imprisonment.”
State v. Dadiego, 617 A.2d 552 (Me. 1992). · cites it 2× “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2)(D) (1992 Supp.) (authorizing such sentences).”
State v. Edwards, 493 A.2d 1051 (Me. 1985). · cites it 6× “17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203 (Supp.1984). 3 Subject to the limitations imposed by subsection 2-A, the present statute authorizes a revocation proceeding against an inmate for criminal conduct committed during the initial period of his imprisonment.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1203(1) — 5 cases
State v. Keefe, 573 A.2d 20 (Me. 1990). “[3] Defendant correctly points out that decisions of this Court hold that 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) does not authorize a sentencing court to delay the commencement of a period of probation past the completion of the unsuspended period of incarceration.”
State v. Parks, 544 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1988). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) (Supp.1987) authorizes probation only where a court “sentence[s] a person to a term of imprisonment, not to exceed the maximum term authorized for the crime, an initial portion of which shall be served and the remainder of which shall be suspended.”
State v. Whitmore, 540 A.2d 465 (Me. 1988). “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(1) (Supp.1987). In other words, the probationary period of a split sentence must commence either: (1) during the period of incarceration, or (2) on the date of completion of the unsuspended period of imprisonment.”
State v. Dadiego, 617 A.2d 552 (Me. 1992). “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1152(2)(D) (1992 Supp.) (authorizing such sentences).”
State v. Edwards, 493 A.2d 1051 (Me. 1985). “17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203 (Supp.1984). 3 Subject to the limitations imposed by subsection 2-A, the present statute authorizes a revocation proceeding against an inmate for criminal conduct committed during the initial period of his imprisonment.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 1203(2) — 1 case
State v. Palmer, 468 A.2d 985 (Me. 1983). “At the time of sentencing, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1203(2) provided that when a court imposes a split sentence, the initial unsuspended portion shall not exceed 120 days.”
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