Me. Rev. Stat. » Title 17-A
Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34 (2026)

Culpable state of mind as an element

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  A person is not guilty of a crime unless that person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4. When the state of mind required to establish an element of a crime is specified as "willfully," "corruptly," "maliciously" or by some other term importing a state of mind, that element is satisfied if, with respect thereto, the person acted intentionally or knowingly.  
[PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).]
2.  When the definition of a crime specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that crime, but without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind applies to all the other elements of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4.  
[PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).]
3.  When the law provides that negligence is sufficient to establish an element of a crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly. When the law provides that recklessness is sufficient to establish an element of a crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally or knowingly. When the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of the crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally.  
[PL 1981, c. 324, §14 (NEW).]
4.  Unless otherwise expressly provided, a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to:  
A. Any fact that is solely a basis for sentencing classification;   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).]
B. Any element of the crime as to which it is expressly stated that it must "in fact" exist;   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).]
C. Any element of the crime as to which the statute expressly provides that a person may be guilty without a culpable state of mind as to that element;   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (NEW).]
D. Any element of the crime as to which a legislative intent to impose liability without a culpable state of mind as to that element otherwise appears;   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (NEW).]
E. Any criminal statute as to which it is expressly stated to be a "strict liability crime" or otherwise expressly reflects a legislative intent to impose criminal liability without proof by the State of a culpable mental state with respect to any of the elements of the crime; or   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (NEW).]
F. Any criminal statute as to which a legislative intent to impose liability without a culpable state of mind as to any of the elements of the crime otherwise appears.   [PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (NEW).]
[PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).]
4-A.  As used in this section, "strict liability crime" means a crime that, as legally defined, does not include a culpable mental state element with respect to any of the elements of the crime and thus proof by the State of a culpable state of mind as to that crime is not required.  
[PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (NEW).]
5. 
[PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (RP).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1981, c. 324, §14 (NEW). PL 1981, c. 470, §B6 (AMD). PL 1999, c. 23, §2 (AMD).
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Notes of Decisions
Cited in 31 cases (4 in the last 5 years), 1984–2025 · leading case: State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112 (Me. 1984).
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State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112 (Me. 1984). · cites it 3× “Also, by virtue of the express terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34, which specifies that a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to any element of any particular crime as to which the statute expressly states that such element must in fact exist, we must conclude that it…”
State of Maine v. Richard Griffin, 2017 ME 79 (Me. 2017). · cites it 2× “” 17-A M.R.S. § 34(4-A) (2016); see Graham, 2015 ME 35, ¶ 21 , 113 A.”
State of Maine v. Michael J. Siracusa Jr., 2017 ME 84 (Me. 2017). · cites it 3× “§ 34(1) (2016) states: A person is not guilty of a crime unless that person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4.”
State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984). · cites it 2× “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34 states “[wjhen the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of the crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally.”
State v. Seamen's Club, 1997 ME 70 (Me. 1997). · cites it 2× “Motion to Dismiss [¶ 10] The defendant argues the crime of possession of short lobsters must include a culpable mental state of at least criminal *1252 negligence as an essential element of the crime pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34 (1983). 3 It argues that because the State…”
State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719 (Me. 1986). · cites it 3× “Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(1) (1983) provides that “[a] person is not guilty of a crime unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 5.”
State of Maine v. Dustin Brown, 2017 ME 59 (Me. 2017). “A defendant acts with criminal negligence with respect to a result of the defendant’s conduct — here, the death of an infant — “when [he] fails to be aware of a risk that [his] conduct will cause such a result.” 17-A M.R.S. § 35(4)(A) (2016). The defendant’s failure to be aware…”
State v. Fowler, 676 A.2d 43 (Me. 1996). · cites it 3× “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34; 12 M.R.S.A. § 7406; see also Goyette, 407 A.”
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). · cites it 2× “1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). Because the gross sexual misconduct statute did not expressly prescribe a culpable state of mind, such an analysis was necessary in order…”
Linda J. Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 60 (Me. 2014). “17-A M.R.S. §§ 34(1), 35 (2013). 8 . Although in a portion not specifically cited by the parties, the summary judgment record indicates that Clifford testified that the worker "had the 24 to 72-hour paper.”
Landry v. Leonard, 1998 ME 241 (Me. 1998). “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(3) (1983). While in the criminal law there are substantial policy reasons for finding an intentional actor guilty of a crime in which acting negligently would suffice, there are equally substantial policy reasons for continuing to distinguish, in civil law,…”
State v. Black, 2000 ME 211 (Me. 2000). “§ 1031(1)(A), as it existed in 1997, did not expressly provide for the requisite state of mind, a "culpable” state of mind was nevertheless required pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1997). See 17-A M.”
Show all 31 citing cases →
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(1) — 7 cases
Linda J. Clifford v. MaineGeneral Med. Ctr., 2014 ME 60 (Me. 2014). “17-A M.R.S. §§ 34(1), 35 (2013). 8 . Although in a portion not specifically cited by the parties, the summary judgment record indicates that Clifford testified that the worker "had the 24 to 72-hour paper.”
State v. Fowler, 676 A.2d 43 (Me. 1996). “See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34; 12 M.R.S.A. § 7406; see also Goyette, 407 A.”
State of Maine v. Michael J. Siracusa Jr., 2017 ME 84 (Me. 2017). “§ 34(1) (2016) states: A person is not guilty of a crime unless that person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4.”
State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719 (Me. 1986). “Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(1) (1983) provides that “[a] person is not guilty of a crime unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 5.”
State v. Lane, 495 A.2d 773 (Me. 1985).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(3) — 8 cases
Landry v. Leonard, 1998 ME 241 (Me. 1998). “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(3) (1983). While in the criminal law there are substantial policy reasons for finding an intentional actor guilty of a crime in which acting negligently would suffice, there are equally substantial policy reasons for continuing to distinguish, in civil law,…”
State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251 (Me. 1984). “” 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34 states “[wjhen the law provides that acting knowingly is sufficient to establish an element of the crime, that element is also established if, with respect thereto, a person acted intentionally.”
State v. Michaud, 513 A.2d 842 (Me. 1986).
State v. Brown, 479 A.2d 1317 (Me. 1984).
State v. Heffron, 190 A.3d 232 (Me. 2018).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(4) — 2 cases
State of Maine v. Michael J. Siracusa Jr., 2017 ME 84 (Me. 2017). “§ 34(1) (2016) states: A person is not guilty of a crime unless that person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 4.”
State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112 (Me. 1984). “Also, by virtue of the express terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34, which specifies that a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to any element of any particular crime as to which the statute expressly states that such element must in fact exist, we must conclude that it…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(4)(B) — 1 case
State v. Reardon, 486 A.2d 112 (Me. 1984). “Also, by virtue of the express terms of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34, which specifies that a culpable mental state need not be proved with respect to any element of any particular crime as to which the statute expressly states that such element must in fact exist, we must conclude that it…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(4)(E) — 2 cases
Shemon Devonte Clayton, a/k/a Shemon Devante Clayton (Va. Ct. App. 2022).
Shemon Devonte Clayton v. Commonwealth of Virginia (Va. Ct. App. 2022).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(5) — 5 cases
State v. Day, 538 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1988). “1981), the focus of the discussion was an analysis of section 11(5) of the Maine Criminal Code, now codified as 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1983). Because the gross sexual misconduct statute did not expressly prescribe a culpable state of mind, such an analysis was necessary in order…”
State v. Dana, 517 A.2d 719 (Me. 1986). “Title 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(1) (1983) provides that “[a] person is not guilty of a crime unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law defining the crime specifies, with respect to each other element of the crime, except as provided in subsection 5.”
State v. Black, 2000 ME 211 (Me. 2000). “§ 1031(1)(A), as it existed in 1997, did not expressly provide for the requisite state of mind, a "culpable” state of mind was nevertheless required pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 34(5) (1997). See 17-A M.”
Dep't of Env't Prot. v. Emerson, 616 A.2d 1268 (Me. 1992).
Olson v. Sec'y of State, 1997 ME 30 (Me. 1997).
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 17-A, § 34(5)(B) — 1 case
State v. Antonsen, 525 A.2d 1048 (Me. 1987).
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