Notes of Decisions
Cited in
43
cases, 1985–2020 · leading case:
In re Thomas H., 889 A.2d 297 (Me. 2005).
In re Thomas H., 889 A.2d 297 (Me. 2005).
· cites it 4× “The Department contends that the court abused its discretion by not giving sufficient weight to the statutory policy of permanency in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (2004). The mother cross-appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to the court’s finding of her unfitness.”
In Re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159 (Me. 2002).
· cites it 2× “22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4050(1)-(3) (1992). See In re Kayla M.”
In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23 (Me. 2017).
“” 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2) (2016). As the court found in this matter, particularly in light of evidence of significant mental health issues presently affecting one the of the children and the prospect of psychological damage to the second child absent permanence, “[bjoth children…”
Wawenock, LLC v. Dep't of Transp., 2018 ME 83 (Me. 2018).
“§ 1-102(b) (2017) ; 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), or require an entity to promulgate rules and regulations to further effectuate statutory objectives, e.”
In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50 (Me. 2018).
“" 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2), (3) (2017). [¶ 15] Here, the court determined the permanency plan for the child to be adoption.”
In re Child of Ronald W., 2018 ME 107 (Me. 2018).
“The court properly noted the Legislature's policy in favor of permanency and stated that the time within which a parent must take responsibility for the child is measured from the child's perspective.”
In re Tiyonie R., 203 A.3d 824 (Me. 2019).
“See 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2018) ; In re Child of Ronald W.”
In re Child. of Melissa F., 2018 ME 110 (Me. 2018).
“[¶13] As for the best interests of the children, the clear preference of the Legislature, as evinced by 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), is to “[e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return…”
In re Melissa F., 191 A.3d 348 (Me. 2018).
“[¶ 13] As for the best interests of the children, the clear preference of the Legislature, as evinced by 22 M.R.S. § 4050 (2017), is to "[e]liminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return…”
In re Anthony M., 195 A.3d 1229 (Me. 2018).
“[¶ 14] The Legislature has explicitly stated that the purposes of the termination statute include "[e]liminat[ing] the need for the children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family" and…”
In Re Alana S., 2002 ME 126 (Me. 2002).
“[¶ 21] The purpose statement of the termination of parental rights law, 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (1992), includes the Legislature’s statement of intent to “[eliminate the need for children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(1) — 2 cases
In Re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159 (Me. 2002).
“22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4050(1)-(3) (1992). See In re Kayla M.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(2) — 15 cases
In re Logan M., 2017 ME 23 (Me. 2017).
“” 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2) (2016). As the court found in this matter, particularly in light of evidence of significant mental health issues presently affecting one the of the children and the prospect of psychological damage to the second child absent permanence, “[bjoth children…”
In re Child of James R., 2018 ME 50 (Me. 2018).
“" 22 M.R.S. § 4050(2), (3) (2017). [¶ 15] Here, the court determined the permanency plan for the child to be adoption.”
In re Anthony M., 195 A.3d 1229 (Me. 2018).
“[¶ 14] The Legislature has explicitly stated that the purposes of the termination statute include "[e]liminat[ing] the need for the children to wait unreasonable periods of time for their parents to correct the conditions which prevent their return to the family" and…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(3) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(4) — 1 case
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(8) — 1 case
In re Thomas H., 889 A.2d 297 (Me. 2005).
“The Department contends that the court abused its discretion by not giving sufficient weight to the statutory policy of permanency in 22 M.R.S.A. § 4050 (2004). The mother cross-appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to the court’s finding of her unfitness.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 4050(l) — 1 case
In Re Michaela C., 2002 ME 159 (Me. 2002).
“22 M.R.S.A. §§ 4050(1)-(3) (1992). See In re Kayla M.”
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