Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 103 (2026)

Traffic infraction

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Traffic infraction.  A traffic infraction is not a crime. The penalty for a traffic infraction may not be deemed for any purpose a penal or criminal punishment.  
[PL 1993, c. 683, Pt. A, §2 (NEW); PL 1993, c. 683, Pt. B, §5 (AFF).]
2.  Jury trial.  There is no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction.  
[PL 1993, c. 683, Pt. A, §2 (NEW); PL 1993, c. 683, Pt. B, §5 (AFF).]
3.  Exclusive penalty.  The exclusive penalty for a traffic infraction is a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, unless specifically authorized, or suspension of a license, or both.  
[PL 1995, c. 584, Pt. B, §2 (AMD).]
4.  Standard of proof.  The burden of proof that a traffic infraction has occurred is on the State and must be established by a standard of a preponderance of the evidence.  
[PL 2011, c. 156, §1 (NEW).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1993, c. 683, §A2 (NEW). PL 1993, c. 683, §B5 (AFF). PL 1995, c. 584, §B2 (AMD). PL 2011, c. 156, §1 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 14 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 2000–2025 · leading case: State v. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85 (Me. 2011).
State v. LaPlante, 2011 ME 85 (Me. 2011). “” 29-A M.R.S. § 103 (2010); but see 29-A M.”
State v. Chase, 157 A.3d 1291 (Me. 2017). · cites it 2× “[¶6] We also discern no error in the court’s handling of Chase’s various requests for accommodation for his claimed disabilities.”
State v. Chittim, 775 A.2d 381 (Me. 2001). “…a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, unless specifically authorized, or suspension of a license, or both.” 29-A M.R.S.A. § 103 (Supp.2000).”
State of Maine v. Christopher Ray, 2025 ME 29 (Me. 2025). “See 29-A M.R.S. § 103(4) (2024); State v. Chase, 2017 ME 43, ¶ 1 , 157 A.”
State of Maine v. Daniel L. Chase, 2017 ME 43 (Me. 2017). · cites it 2× “Indeed, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 103(2) (2016), “There is no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction.”
State of Maine v. Thomas E. Palmer, 2017 ME 183 (Me. 2017). “§ 2118; 29-A M.R.S. § 103 (2016); M.R. Civ. P. 80F(b).”
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
State v. Palmer, 169 A.3d 425 (Me. 2017). “§ 2118; 29-A M.R.S. § 103 (2016); M.R. Civ. P. 80F(b).”
State v. Palmer, 169 A.3d 425 (Me. 2017). “§ 2118; 29-A M.R.S. § 103 (2016); M.R. Civ. P. 80F(b).”
State of Maine v. Chittim (Me. Super. Ct 2000). · cites it 2× “1 29-A M.R.S.A. § 103 states that the exclusive penalty for a traffic infraction is a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $500, unless specifically authorized.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 103(1) — 3 cases
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
State v. Rupert, 169 A.3d 423 (Me. 2017). “VI; 29-A M.R.S § 103(1) (2016). Therefore, contrary to Rupert’s contention, no fundamental right was affected by the court’s denial of his request to be represented by his father, and consequently the application of the statutory provision allowing the law enforcement officer,…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 103(2) — 2 cases
State v. Chase, 157 A.3d 1291 (Me. 2017). “[¶6] We also discern no error in the court’s handling of Chase’s various requests for accommodation for his claimed disabilities.”
State of Maine v. Daniel L. Chase, 2017 ME 43 (Me. 2017). “Indeed, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 103(2) (2016), “There is no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 29-A, § 103(4) — 3 cases
State v. Chase, 157 A.3d 1291 (Me. 2017). “[¶6] We also discern no error in the court’s handling of Chase’s various requests for accommodation for his claimed disabilities.”
State of Maine v. Christopher Ray, 2025 ME 29 (Me. 2025). “See 29-A M.R.S. § 103(4) (2024); State v. Chase, 2017 ME 43, ¶ 1 , 157 A.”
State of Maine v. Daniel L. Chase, 2017 ME 43 (Me. 2017). “Indeed, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S. § 103(2) (2016), “There is no right to trial by jury for a traffic infraction.”
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