Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1022 (2026)

Undue influence

✓ current as of May 2026
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1.  Presumption.  In any transfer of real estate or major transfer of personal property or money for less than full consideration or execution of a guaranty by an elderly person who is dependent on others to a person with whom the elderly dependent person has a confidential or fiduciary relationship, it is presumed that the transfer or execution was the result of undue influence, unless the elderly dependent person was represented in the transfer or execution by independent counsel. When the elderly dependent person successfully raises the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence and when the transferee or person who benefits from the execution of a guaranty fails to rebut the presumption, the elderly dependent person is entitled to avoid the transfer or execution and entitled to the relief set forth in section 1024.  
[PL 2003, c. 236, §1 (AMD).]
2.  Confidential or fiduciary relationship.  For the purpose of this section, the transfer of property or execution of a guaranty is deemed to have been made in the context of a confidential or fiduciary relationship if the transferee or person who benefits from the execution of a guaranty had a close relationship with the elderly dependent person prior to the transfer or execution. Confidential or fiduciary relationships include the following:  
A. A family relationship between the elderly dependent person and the transferee or person who benefits from the execution of a guaranty, including relationships by marriage and adoption;   [PL 2003, c. 236, §1 (AMD).]
B. A fiduciary relationship between the elderly dependent person and the transferee or person who benefits from the execution of a guaranty, such as with a guardian, conservator, trustee, accountant, broker or financial advisor;   [PL 2003, c. 236, §1 (AMD).]
C. A relationship between an elderly dependent person and a physician, nurse or other medical or health care provider;   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
D. A relationship between the elderly dependent person and a psychologist, social worker or counselor;   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
E. A relationship between the elderly dependent person and an attorney;   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
F. A relationship between the elderly dependent person and a priest, minister, rabbi or spiritual advisor;   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
G. A relationship between the elderly dependent person and a person who provides care or services to that person whether or not care or services are paid for by the elderly person;   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
H. A relationship between an elderly dependent person and a friend or neighbor; or   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
I. A relationship between an elderly dependent person and a person sharing the same living quarters.   [PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW).]
When any of these relationships exist and when a transfer or execution is made to a corporation or organization primarily on account of the membership, ownership or employment interest or for the benefit of the fiduciary or confidante, a fiduciary or confidential relationship with the corporation or organization is deemed to exist.  
[PL 2003, c. 236, §1 (AMD).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1987, c. 699, §1 (NEW). PL 2003, c. 236, §1 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 17 cases (2 in the last 5 years), 1994–2023 · leading case: Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153 (Me. 2000).
Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153 (Me. 2000). · cites it 4× “1999) (defining as consumer credit transactions those loans made to “person other than an organization” where debt is “incurred primarily for a personal, family or household purpose”).”
Lois Young v. Joseph Lagasse, 2016 ME 96 (Me. 2016). · cites it 2× “33 M.R.S. § 1022(1). The only element of the presumption that the parties dispute is whether Juskewitch acted as “independent counsel” for Young.”
Est. of Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 48 (Me. 2001). · cites it 2× “See 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022. 1 *301 [¶ 12] The applicability of the Improvident Transfer Act must be examined, because if its statutory presumption should have been available to Groton, it would have shifted the burden of proof on the undue influence claim.”
Plimpton v. Gerrard, 668 A.2d 882 (Me. 1995). “Finally, he asked the Superior Court to enter a declaratory judgment in his favor, setting aside Axel’s Last Will and Testament produced by Gerrard’s undue influence. Thereafter, Bernard moved to amend his complaint to add claims for an accounting of the funds administered under…”
Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “33 M.R.S. § 1022(1). If the transferor successfully establishes the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the person benefiting from the transfer fails to rebut the presumption, the transferor “is entitled to avoid the transfer.”
Est. of Plummer, 666 A.2d 116 (Me. 1995). “The trial court rejected that argument in ruling against the beneficiaries on their undue influence and fraud claim and their claim pursuant to the Improvident Transfers of Title Act, 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022 et seq. 3 . Contrary to the position of the beneficiaries at oral argument,…”
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 882 A.2d 796 (Me. 2005). · cites it 2× “See 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022. .Reilly’s answer and counterclaim included claims against Crossland alleging various torts.”
Est. of Campbell, 651 A.2d 382 (Me. 1994). · cites it 3× “Finding that the transfer of these properties was for less than full consideration and that Mary was not represented in the transfer by independent counsel, the court applied the presumption of undue influence generated by 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1), and accordingly imposed a…”
Bragdon v. Drew, 658 A.2d 666 (Me. 1995). “Although not referred to by the parties, we note that 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022 (Supp.1994) provides: 1.”
Gorham Sav. Bank v. MacDonald, 710 A.2d 916 (Me. 1998). “…transferee fails to rebut the presumption, the elderly dependent person shall be entitled to avoid the transfer.... 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1) (Pamph.1997).”
Douglass v. Graffam (Me. Super. Ct 2017). · cites it 2× “1 Improvident Transfer of Title - Count I of Amended Complaint Eleanor's primary claim is based on the statute applicable to claims for improvident transfers of title, 33 M.R.S. § 1022(1), which provides in relevant part as follows: In any transfer of real estate .”
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis (Me. Super. Ct 2004). · cites it 2× “Discussion (1) Improvident Transfers of Title Act Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1) creates a presumption that an elderly person was the object of undue influence in a transfer of real estate if (a) the elderly person/transferor receives less than full consideration for the interest…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1022(1) — 11 cases
Lois Young v. Joseph Lagasse, 2016 ME 96 (Me. 2016). “33 M.R.S. § 1022(1). The only element of the presumption that the parties dispute is whether Juskewitch acted as “independent counsel” for Young.”
Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Sargent, 2000 ME 153 (Me. 2000). “1999) (defining as consumer credit transactions those loans made to “person other than an organization” where debt is “incurred primarily for a personal, family or household purpose”).”
Patricia A. McCollor v. Frederick J. McCollor Jr., 2014 ME 39 (Me. 2014). “33 M.R.S. § 1022(1). If the transferor successfully establishes the presumption of undue influence by a preponderance of the evidence, and the person benefiting from the transfer fails to rebut the presumption, the transferor “is entitled to avoid the transfer.”
Est. of Campbell, 651 A.2d 382 (Me. 1994). “Finding that the transfer of these properties was for less than full consideration and that Mary was not represented in the transfer by independent counsel, the court applied the presumption of undue influence generated by 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1), and accordingly imposed a…”
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis, 882 A.2d 796 (Me. 2005). “See 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022. .Reilly’s answer and counterclaim included claims against Crossland alleging various torts.”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1022(2) — 3 cases
Est. of Sylvester v. Benjamin, 2001 ME 48 (Me. 2001). “See 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022. 1 *301 [¶ 12] The applicability of the Improvident Transfer Act must be examined, because if its statutory presumption should have been available to Groton, it would have shifted the burden of proof on the undue influence claim.”
Est. of Campbell, 651 A.2d 382 (Me. 1994). “Finding that the transfer of these properties was for less than full consideration and that Mary was not represented in the transfer by independent counsel, the court applied the presumption of undue influence generated by 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1), and accordingly imposed a…”
First Union Nat'l Bank v. Curtis (Me. Super. Ct 2004). “Discussion (1) Improvident Transfers of Title Act Title 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022(1) creates a presumption that an elderly person was the object of undue influence in a transfer of real estate if (a) the elderly person/transferor receives less than full consideration for the interest…”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1022(2)(8) — 1 case
Douglass v. Graffam (Me. Super. Ct 2017). “1 Improvident Transfer of Title - Count I of Amended Complaint Eleanor's primary claim is based on the statute applicable to claims for improvident transfers of title, 33 M.R.S. § 1022(1), which provides in relevant part as follows: In any transfer of real estate .”
— Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 33, § 1022(l) — 1 case
Vukasovich v. Vukasovich (Me. Super. Ct 2023).
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