Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39, § 64 (2026)

Sufficiency of notice; knowledge of employer; extension of time for notice

✓ current as of May 2026

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(REPEALED)

SECTION HISTORY

PL 1973, c. 788, §228 (AMD). PL 1991, c. 885, §A7 (RP). PL 1991, c. 885, §§A9-11 (AFF).

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 13 cases, 1972–1990 · leading case: Gallant v. Boise Cascade Paper Grp., 427 A.2d 976 (Me. 1981).

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Gallant v. Boise Cascade Paper Grp., 427 A.2d 976 (Me. 1981). “See 39 M.R.S.A. § 64. For all of these reasons, we conclude that this matter must be remanded to the Commission for further proceedings.”

Metcalf v. Marine Colloids, Inc., 285 A.2d 367 (Me. 1972). · cites it 2× “Metcalf to have been on top of the bales, the negative evidence which exists in this case would have been insufficient to meet the requisites of such ultimate burden of proof.”

Murray v. TW Dick Co., Inc., 398 A.2d 390 (Me. 1979). “Under these provisions, it is clear that no action can be maintained unless an employer receives notice of the injury “within 30 days after the date thereof.”

Farrow v. Carr Bros. Co., Inc., 393 A.2d 1341 (Me. 1978). “We do not find persuasive the appellant’s argument that under 39 M.R.S.A. § 64 the employer, through Gilman the supervisor, had actual knowledge of the work relatedness of the injury so as to excuse the Section 63 notice requirement.”

Mortimer v. Harry C. Crooker & Sons, Inc., 404 A.2d 228 (Me. 1979). “39 M.R.S.A. § 64. 2 . The issue presented in Dufault was whether in a Petition for Review of Incapacity the em *231 ployer, using facts that became known before the WCC’s approval of the agreement but after the parties’ execution of the agreement, could contest the employee’s…”

Ronco v. Diamond Mach. Co., Inc., 424 A.2d 1093 (Me. 1981). “39 M.R.S.A. § 64 (1978). We do not accept the employee’s contention.”

St. Pierre v. Morin Brick Co., 427 A.2d 492 (Me. 1981). “§ 63, 1 and that his default was not excused by independent knowledge of the employer to satisfy 39 M.R.S.A. § 64. We deny the employee’s appeal.”

Malcolm v. Bath Iron Works Corp., 413 A.2d 1314 (Me. 1980). “His decree contains no finding or conclusion bearing directly on Malcolm’s principal contention on this appeal; namely, that Malcolm’s delay in giving notice was excused because it was caused by “mistake of fact” within the meaning of 39 M.R.S.A. § 64, in that he believed…”

Costa v. Foodliner, 431 A.2d 1292 (Me. 1981). “First, the appellant argues that a finding of eligibility for compensation should follow from application of 39 M.R.S.A. § 64 — A, which provides: In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally unable to testify, there shall be a…”

Yuknawicz v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 421 A.2d 1355 (Me. 1980). · cites it 2× “We affirm the judgment, finding there was sufficient basis in the record before it for the tribunal below to conclude that the testimony adduced at hearing was too inconsistent to establish that the employee sustained a work-related injury 'as alleged or that notice was in…”

Hayward v. State Dep't of Audit, 430 A.2d 1111 (Me. 1981). “39 M.R.S.A. § 64. The Commissioner was warranted in finding that, although the employer was aware that Hayward wore a Thomas collar, it “was aware of neither the cause nor the extent of the alleged injury.”

Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 448 A.2d 329 (Me. 1982). “39 M.R.S.A. § 64 (1978). . Section 112 provides as follows: No statement, except made in proceedings before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, to any investigator or employer’s representative, of any kind, oral or written, recorded or unrecorded, made by the injured employee…”

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