Maine Revised Statutes

Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 39-A, § 301 (2026)

Notice of injury within 90 days

✓ current as of May 2026
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For claims for which the date of injury is prior to January 1, 2013, proceedings for compensation under this Act, except as provided, may not be maintained unless a notice of the injury is given within 90 days after the date of injury. For claims for which the date of injury is on or after January 1, 2013 and prior to January 1, 2020, proceedings for compensation under this Act, except as provided, may not be maintained unless a notice of the injury is given within 30 days after the date of injury. For claims for which the date of injury is on or after January 1, 2020, proceedings for compensation under this Act, except as provided, may not be maintained unless a notice of the injury is given within 60 days after the date of injury. The notice must include the time, place, cause and nature of the injury, together with the name and address of the injured employee. The notice must be given by the injured employee or by a person in the employee's behalf, or, in the event of the employee's death, by the employee's legal representatives, or by a dependent or by a person in behalf of either.   [PL 2019, c. 344, §13 (AMD).]
The notice must be given to the employer, or to one employer if there are more employers than one; or, if the employer is a corporation, to any official of the corporation; or to any employee designated by the employer as one to whom reports of accidents to employees should be made. It may be given to the general superintendent or to the supervisor in charge of the particular work being done by the employee at the time of the injury. Notice may be given to any doctor, nurse or other emergency medical personnel employed by the employer for the treatment of employee injuries and on duty at the work site. If the employee is self-employed, notice must be given to the insurance carrier or to the insurance carrier's agent or agency with which the employer normally does business.   [PL 1991, c. 885, Pt. A, §8 (NEW); PL 1991, c. 885, Pt. A, §§9-11 (AFF).]
SECTION HISTORY
PL 1991, c. 885, §A8 (NEW). PL 1991, c. 885, §§A9-11 (AFF). PL 2011, c. 647, §16 (AMD). PL 2019, c. 344, §13 (AMD).
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 9 cases (1 in the last 5 years), 1997–2021 · leading case: Jensen v. S.D. Warren Co., 2009 ME 35 (Me. 2009).
Jensen v. S.D. Warren Co., 2009 ME 35 (Me. 2009). · cites it 4× “Warren contends the hearing officer erred in (1) determining that Jensen gave adequate notice of the gradual injury pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. § 301 (2008) and timely filed his petition pursuant to 39-A M.”
Roger Desgrosseilliers v. Auburn Sheet Metal at al., 2021 ME 63 (Me. 2021). · cites it 3× “Because neither 39-A M.R.S. § 301 (2021) nor the Occupational Disease Law, 39-A M.”
Lamonica v. Holmes, 718 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998). · cites it 5× “Although the employee suffered a subsequent injury in 1995 while employed by a second employer, the Board concluded that the subsequent injury was nonwork-related because the employee failed to give timely notice of that injury to preserve his workers’ compensation claim against…”
Bridgeman v. S.D. Warren Co., 2005 ME 38 (Me. 2005). · cites it 2× “See 39-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (2001). Bridgeman contends that his failure to provide timely notice was excused by a "mistake of fact" as to the nature or the work-relatedness of the injury.”
Cust v. Univ. of Maine, 2001 ME 29 (Me. 2001). · cites it 2× “885, §§ A-7, A-8 (codified at 39-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (Pamph.2000)), and compensation paid, see 39 M.”
Est. of Joyce v. Com. Welding Co., 55 A.3d 411 (Me. 2012). “[¶ 4] The proceedings were bifurcated so that the hearing officer could first decide two threshold issues: (1) whether Michael had provided sufficient notice of the occupational disease claim pursuant to 39-A M.R.S. §§ 301, 607 (2011), and (2) whether the fourteen-day rule, Me.”
Weeks v. Allen & Coles Moving Sys., 1997 ME 205 (Me. 1997). “*321 39-A M.R.S.A. § 301 (Supp.1996). The employee has not appealed from that decision.”
Pearson v. Freeport Sch. Dep't, 900 A.2d 728 (Me. 2006). · cites it 2× “[¶ 6] Before the hearing officer, the School Department took the position that Pearson’s notice of her injury was untimely, see 39-A M.R.S. § 301 (2005), 1 while Pearson asserted a fourteen-day rule violation based on Me.”
Wilson v. Bath Iron Works, 942 A.2d 1237 (Me. 2008). “Accordingly, the hearing officer correctly determined that the limitations period in this case began to run on the date that BIW filed the first report of injury, and that Wilson’s claim is not time-barred.”
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