Section 29. No compensation pursuant to section thirty-four or thirty-five shall be paid for any injury which does not incapacitate the employee from earning full wages for a period of five or more calendar days. If incapacity extends for a period of twenty-one days or more, compensation shall be paid from the date of onset of incapacity. If incapacity extends for a period of at least five but less than twenty-one days, compensation shall be paid from the sixth day of incapacity. Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, no compensation shall be paid for any period for which any wages were earned. No mental or emotional disability arising principally out of a bona fide, personnel action including a transfer, promotion, demotion, or termination except such action which is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury within the meaning of this chapter.
Notes of Decisions
Crews v. Memorex Corp., 588 F. Supp. 27 (D. Mass. 1984).
“Defendant argues that this claim is barred by the exclusivity provision of the Massachusetts Workmen’s Compensation Act, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 152 § 24 (1958). In response, plaintiff argues that the exclusivity provision applies only to injuries compensable under the act…”
Casey's Case, 374 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978).
· cites it 2× “The insurer’s contention that the employee’s claim is barred by the first sentence of G. L. c. 152, § 29 (which, as in effect prior to its amendment by St.”
Percoco's Case, 634 N.E.2d 1385 (Mass. 1994).
“796, 803 (1994) (cost of living adjustment not “compensation” under G. L. c. 152, § 29). Section 34B 4 provides in part: “Any person receiving or entitled to receive benefits *142 under the provisions of .”
St. Arnaud v. Chapdelaine Truck Ctr., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1993).
“Pursuant to M.G.L. c. 152, § 29, “... action which is the intentional infliction of emotional harm shall be deemed to be a personal injury within the meaning of this chapter.”
Korobchuk's Case, 183 N.E. 67 (Mass. 1932).
“workmen’s compensation act provides that when payment of compensation has begun it shall not be discontinued except with the written consent of the employee or the approval of the department of industrial accidents, “provided, that such compensation shall be paid in accordance…”
Look's Case, 185 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1962).
“On September 29,1958, Look signed an assent to discontinuance of compensation (G. L. c. 152, § 29) and on October 1, 1958, commenced work as the driver of an oil truck.”
Georgilas's Case, 408 N.E.2d 892 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
“earned” within the meaning of G. L. c. 152, § 29, as amended through St.”
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