Section 9. If after any hearing under sections six or ten the report of the commissioner does not charge a violation of this chapter, then any intervenor in the proceedings may within thirty days after the service of such report, cause a petition to be filed in the supreme judicial court for a review of such report. Upon such review, the court shall have authority to issue appropriate orders and decrees in connection therewith, including, if the court finds that it is to the interest of the public, orders enjoining and restraining the continuance of any method of competition, act or practice which it finds, notwithstanding such report of the commissioner, constitutes a violation of this chapter and containing penalties pursuant to section seven.
Ciardi v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche, Ltd., 436 Mass. 53 (Mass. 2002). “5, we held that claims by plaintiffs complaining of unfair debt collection practices had been properly dismissed for the plaintiffs’ failure to allege that the practices, although extreme and outrageous, had resulted in the “loss of money or property, real or personal.”
Loftis v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 101 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995). “See G.L.c. 176D, §9(b) and (c). 7. Similarly, Liberty seeks to excuse some of the delay in reaching a settlement on the grounds that its adjuster was looking at the wrong set of doors for a considerable period of time.”
Batterymarch, LLC v. Everest Nat'l Ins. Co., 119 N.E.3d 356 (Mass. App. Ct. 2018). “93A, § 9, and G. L. c. 176D, § 9, was added. In that order, the judge noted that any claim by Batterymarch against the trust for breach of fiduciary duty sounded in tort and was time-barred.”
Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 636 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1994). · cites it 2דIt simply concludes that the defendant acted in bad faith and proceeds to summarize some of the requirements of G.L.c. 176D, §9. The plaintiff does not offer a specific description of alleged deceptive acts prior to the required demand letter.”
Brewster v. Arbella Mut. Ins., 24 Mass. L. Rptr. 37 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2008). “93A, §§2 and 9 and G.L.c. 176D, §9, I double the juiy’s damage award of $50,000.”
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 9(3) — 1 case
Simpson v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 636 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1994). “It simply concludes that the defendant acted in bad faith and proceeds to summarize some of the requirements of G.L.c. 176D, §9. The plaintiff does not offer a specific description of alleged deceptive acts prior to the required demand letter.”
— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D, § 9(b) — 1 case
Loftis v. Liberty Mut. Ins., 4 Mass. L. Rptr. 101 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995). “See G.L.c. 176D, §9(b) and (c). 7. Similarly, Liberty seeks to excuse some of the delay in reaching a settlement on the grounds that its adjuster was looking at the wrong set of doors for a considerable period of time.”
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