Massachusetts General Laws
Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 183, § 17 (2026)
''Quitclaim covenants'' or ''limited covenants''
✓ current as of July 2026
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Section 17. In a conveyance of real estate the words ''quitclaim covenants'' or the words ''limited covenants'' shall have the full force, meaning and effect of the following words: ''The grantor, for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and successors, covenants with the grantee, his heirs, successors and assigns, that the granted premises are free from all encumbrances made by the grantor, and that he will, and his heirs, executors, administrators and successors shall, warrant and defend the same to the grantee and his heirs, successors and assigns forever against the lawful claims and demands of all persons claiming by, through or under the grantor, but against none other''.
Notes of Decisions
Cited in 15
cases (3 in the last 5 years), 1928–2025 · leading case: Silverblatt v. Livadas, 164 N.E.2d 875 (Mass. 1960).
Silverblatt v. Livadas, 164 N.E.2d 875 (Mass. 1960). “529, 531-532 , we held that the absence from the statutory quitclaim covenants (G. L. c. 183, § 17, quoted infra) of the words “or suffered” was “without significance” and that the statutory covenant would be construed as if the covenant contained those words.”
Snyder v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 333 N.E.2d 421 (Mass. 1975). “The deed simply stated the quitclaim covenants (G. L. c. 183, § 17) with the qualification that the property was subject to a lease to S & H dated March 16, 1961, “together with Amendments.”
Schulman v. Attorney Gen., 447 Mass. 189 (Mass. 2006). “529 [1957], and holding that omission of words “or suffered” was significant in evaluating quitclaim deed under G. L. c. 183, § 17). See, e.g., Powers v.”
Rand-Whitney Packaging Corp. v. Robertson Grp., Inc., 651 F. Supp. 520 (D. Mass. 1986). “(g) Robertson shall deliver at the closing a quitclaim deed (containing the quitclaim covenants prescribed by Mass. Gen.Laws c. 183, § 17) covering all real estate owned by Robertson Paper Box Co.”
Conte v. Marine Lumber Co., 848 N.E.2d 1246 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). “See G. L. c. 183, § 17.” Ibid. Hence, we held that the title given by the father, although by quitclaim deed, operated to estop his daughter from asserting title by inheritance from him.”
Clark v. Mead Realty Grp., Inc., 854 N.E.2d 972 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006). “183, § 15; G. L. c. 183, § 17; and G. L. c. 184, § 10, and find no argument or authority persuasive as to the applicability of these statutes which, when simply read, do not apply to the claim that Mead Realty was required to fulfil the terms of the agreement.”
Zayka v. Giambro, 594 N.E.2d 894 (Mass. App. Ct. 1992). “Application of estoppel by deed to a quitclaim deed is particularly compelling where, as here, the claim against the title is made by someone who bases her claim on direct descent by blood from the grantor. Quitclaim covenants, after all, do warrant that the grantor shall not…”
Horn v. Crest Hill Homes, Inc., 164 N.E.2d 150 (Mass. 1960). “” G. L. c. 183, § 17. It will be noted that the sole basis for the award of damages against Crest is that the plaintiffs cannot remove the pipe because it has become part of the town’s drainage system.”
Brooks v. Bornstein, 20 Mass. L. Rptr. 646 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2006). “Specifically, the Commission’s Order is not an encumbrance “made by the grantor” within the terms of G.L.c. 183, §17 because the word “made” implies something more than mere inaction by the grantor.”
Fannie Mae v. Branch (Mass. 2024). “See G. L. c. 183, § 17 (listing applicable quitclaim covenants).”
MICHELLE STEWARDSON, Tr. v. EDWARD P. HARRINGTON, Pers. Rep., & Another (& Four Consol. Cases & a Companion Case). (Mass. App. Ct. 2025). “183, § 11, sets forth the covenants and warranties that come with quitclaim deeds; G. L. c. 183, § 17, provides that, in conveyances of real estate, the words "quitclaim covenants" and "limited covenants," have a specific meaning, as set forth in the statute.”
Patricia Postale v. Rose Mitchell. (Mass. App. Ct. 2025). “" Under G. L. c. 183, § 17, that language imposed obligations on Postale as grantor, running to Anthony and his successors as grantees, that Postale could have sought to satisfy by continuing to pursue recovery of whatever interest Mitchell might claim under the October 2020…”
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