Massachusetts General Laws

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 26 (2026)

Land use or construction restrictions subject to this section and Secs. 27 to 30; definitions; sufficiency of description; presumptions

✓ current as of July 2026

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Section 26. All restrictions on the use of land or construction thereon which run with the land subject thereto and are imposed by covenant, agreement, or otherwise, whether or not stated in the form of a condition, in any deed, will or other instrument executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land or in any order of taking shall be subject to this section and sections twenty-seven to thirty, inclusive, except (a) restrictions in leases, mortgages and other security instruments, (b) restrictions in orders of taking by the commonwealth or a political subdivision or public instrumentality thereof made before January first, nineteen hundred and seventy and (c) conservation, preservation, agricultural preservation, and affordable housing restrictions, as defined in section thirty-one which have the benefit of section thirty-two, and other restrictions held by any governmental body, if the instrument imposing such conservation, preservation, agricultural preservation, affordable housing or other restriction is duly recorded and indexed in the grantor index in the registry of deeds or registered in the registry district of the land court for the county or district wherein the land lies so as to affect its title, and describes the land by metes and bounds or by reference to a recorded or registered plan showing its boundaries. ''Governmental body'', as referred to in this section and sections thirty-two and thirty-three, means the United States or the commonwealth, acting through any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards or agencies, or any political subdivision or public instrumentality thereof or any public authority or any quasi-public entity or any instrumentality created pursuant to chapter forty F, whether acting for its own account, or as agent or designee for or assignees of any private individual or private entity which has been required to place such restriction in its chain of title as a condition to receiving financial or other assistance from the United States or the commonwealth, acting through any of its departments, divisions, commissions, boards or agencies, or any political subdivision or public instrumentality thereof or any public authority or any quasi-public entity or any instrumentality created pursuant to said chapter forty F.

For the purposes of this section and sections twenty-seven to thirty, inclusive:—

1. ''Subject parcel'' or ''subject land'' means land upon which such a restriction is imposed.

2. ''Benefited land'' means land for the benefit of which such a restriction is imposed.

3. ''Public records'' shall be limited to records filed in the registries of deeds, probate courts and the land court and its registry districts.

4. A description of land shall be sufficient if it specifies the city or town in which the land lies and the place of record in the public records where there is a recorded or registered plan or instrument giving the boundaries of the land and identifies the land with reference to said plan or instrument and, if the land is registered, specifies the certificate or certificates of title thereof.

5. Restrictions may be deemed imposed as part of a common scheme if imposed of record on various parcels in such manner that each owner is entitled to enforce the restrictions against the other parcels, although there may be variations in the restrictions among the various parcels.

Unless the instrument imposing the restriction provides otherwise, it is to be presumed that a restriction imposed as part of a common scheme is enforceable for the benefit of any land only when such land either (a) is bounded by a street by which the subject parcel is bounded or (b) lies in a block surrounded by the same streets as the subject parcel, or (c) is contiguous to said block except for streets or ways.

Notes of Decisions

Cited in 11 cases, 1972–2017 · leading case: Murphy v. Plan. Bd., 874 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007).

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Murphy v. Plan. Bd., 874 N.E.2d 455 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007). · cites it 3× “As in effect at all relevant times, G. L. c. 184, § 26, exempts from the coverage of G.”

Reagan v. Brissey, 446 Mass. 452 (Mass. 2006). “(b) We reject the individual defendants’ characterization of the plaintiffs’ claimed interest in the parks as a restrictive *462 covenant that lapsed in 1964 because the plaintiffs and their predecessors failed to file a notice of restriction pursuant to G. L. c. 184, §§ 26 10…”

Myers v. Salin, 431 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982). “’ We are not inclined to construe this statutory phrase [in G. L. c. 184, § 26, prior to its amendment by St.”

Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 338 N.E.2d 806 (Mass. 1975). · cites it 2× “Pursuant to these statutes, all restrictions on the use of land or construction thereon which run with the land and which were imposed before January 1, 1962, are unenforceable fifty years after imposition unless certain steps to record the restriction were taken before the…”

Dunphy v. Commonwealth, 331 N.E.2d 883 (Mass. 1975). · cites it 2× “The judge apears to have based his decision on the assumption that the language in the grantor’s deed to the town to the effect that the land conveyed was “to be kept and used as a Public Park in perpetuity for the public good” constituted a restriction on the use of land within…”

Kelley v. Cambridge Historical Comm'n, 993 N.E.2d 1228 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013). “See G. L. c. 184, § 26 (stating that preservation restrictions are not subject to § 27).”

Harrod v. Rigelhaupt, 298 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973). “15 The judge of the Land Court, following the remand from this court, took a view of the premises of the parties in the *385 company of their counsel.”

Canty v. Donovan, 281 N.E.2d 611 (Mass. 1972). · cites it 2× “See G. L. c. 184, § 26, subsec. 5. The evidence supports the judge’s findings that the restrictions were pursuant to a common scheme for the tract, that the restrictions were of actual and substantial benefit to the plaintiffs as required by G.”

Johnson v. Cohan, 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 421 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000). · cites it 2× “Although the right of first refusal provision does not fall within the description of G.L.c. 184, §26, it appears that the use restriction contained in the first part of paragraph 5 of the agreement may.”

Vaillancourt v. Gray Wolf Realty, LLC, 29 Mass. L. Rptr. 496 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2012). · cites it 5× “With respect to the first argument, Vaillancourt relies upon G.L.c. 184, §26. That section, he argues, provides for a town to hold a public restriction for conservation land (among other uses) that is not subject to the requirements of G.”

Perry v. Aiello (Mass. App. Ct. 2017). · cites it 2× “, and by establishing a procedure through G. L. c. 184, §§ 26- 30,[7] by which a landowner may 'remove or prevent the enforcement of obsolete, uncertain or unenforceable restrictions.”

— Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 184, § 26(5) — 1 case

Johnson v. Cohan, 11 Mass. L. Rptr. 421 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000). “Although the right of first refusal provision does not fall within the description of G.L.c. 184, §26, it appears that the use restriction contained in the first part of paragraph 5 of the agreement may.”

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